Implications of IFRS 8 adoption on UK listed companies' disclosure practices and earnings' predictive ability by Al-Aamri, Ibrahim Ali Saleh
i 
 
 
 
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF IFRS 8 ADOPTION ON UK LISTED 
COMPANIES’ DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AND 
EARNINGS’ PREDICTIVE ABILITY 
 
Ibrahim Ali Saleh Al-Aamri 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the University of Newcastle in 
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
August 2016  
ii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. v 
Acknowledgment ..................................................................................................................... vii 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ix 
Chapter 1- Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1: Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 2 
1.2: Study Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 5 
1.3: Justification of the Study, Research Questions and Research Contribution ................................. 6 
Chapter 2- Segment Reporting Background .............................................................................. 8 
2.1- Segment Reporting Under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) ................ 9 
2.2- Segment Reporting Under International Accounting Standards ................................................ 10 
2.3- Comparing IFRS 8 with IAS 14R .............................................................................................. 13 
2.4- Comparing IFRS 8 with SFAS-131 ........................................................................................... 15 
2.5- Segment Reporting Under UK Reporting Regulations .............................................................. 15 
2.6- Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 19 
Chapter 3- The Rationale for Segment Reporting ................................................................... 21 
3.1- Introduction (Importance of Accounting Disclosure) ................................................................ 22 
3.2-The Proposition of Fineness Theorem ........................................................................................ 23 
3.3-The Issue of Segment Identification ............................................................................................ 24 
3.4- Importance of Segment Information to the Users of Financial Reports ..................................... 29 
3.5-Conclusion................................................................................................................................... 34 
Chapter 4- Literature Review ................................................................................................... 35 
4.1- Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 36 
4.2- Factors Influencing Accounting Disclosure ............................................................................... 37 
4.2.1- Firm External-Environment Factors .................................................................................... 37 
4.2.2- Firm-Specific Factors .......................................................................................................... 38 
4.3- Factors Influencing Segmental Disclosure ................................................................................. 42 
4.4- Possible Costs Associated with extensive Segmental Disclosure .............................................. 46 
4.5- Implications of the Management Approach on Segment Reporting .......................................... 50 
4.6- Advantages of Segmental Disclosure ......................................................................................... 56 
4.6.1- Predictive gains to segment information ............................................................................. 57 
4.6.2- Market reaction to segment information ............................................................................. 63 
4.7- The Application of FERC in Financial Disclosure Studies ........................................................ 68 
4.8- Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 73 
Chapter 5- Data and Research Methodology ........................................................................... 74 
5.1- Sample selection ......................................................................................................................... 75 
iii 
 
5.2- Study Hypotheses and Models ................................................................................................... 78 
5.2.1- Comparability and Consistency .......................................................................................... 79 
5.2.2- Accuracy of Financial Analysts’ Earnings Forecast ........................................................... 81 
5.2.3-Impact of the Quality of Segmental Profit Disclosure on Capital Market ........................... 83 
5.3-Future Earning Response Coefficient (FERC) Methodology: .................................................... 84  
5.4- Conclusion: ................................................................................................................................ 87 
Chapter 6- Analysis of the Extent of Segmental Disclosure Pre and Post IFRS 8 ................... 89 
6.1-IFRS 8 compared to IAS 14R for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 ...................................................... 90 
6.2-Analysis of Disclosure According to Sectors ............................................................................. 98 
6.3Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 106 
Chapter 7- Segmental Information and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Accuracy .................... 108 
7.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations .................................................................................... 109 
7.2: Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy and Segmental Disclosure ......................................................... 118 
7.2.1: The Dataset and Variables’ Measurement ........................................................................ 119 
7.2.2: Variables Measurement and Specification ........................................................................ 121 
7.2.3: Non-Segmental Factors Affecting Forecast Accuracy ...................................................... 130 
7.2.4: A note on the Forecast Error Metric.................................................................................. 140 
7.3: Experimental Design and Results ............................................................................................ 142 
7.3.1:  Experimental Design ........................................................................................................ 143 
7.3.2:  Linear Additive Analysis ................................................................................................. 145 
7.3.3:  Multiplicative Analysis of Segment Variables ................................................................. 159 
7.3.4:  Fixed Effect Regression Results ...................................................................................... 172 
7.3.5:  Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests ...................................................................... 173 
Chapter 8- Segment Profit Disclosure and Market’s Ability to Predict Future Earnings. ..... 177 
8.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations .................................................................................... 178 
8.2: Segmental Profit disclosure and Share Price Anticipation of Earnings ................................... 186 
8.2.1: The Dataset and Variables’ Measurement ........................................................................ 187 
8.2.2: Variables Measurement and Specification ........................................................................ 189 
8.2.3: Control Variables Affection Association between Stock Return and Earnings Change ... 194 
8.2.4: The Underlying Assumption of FERC Model. ................................................................. 197 
8.3: Experimental Design and Results ............................................................................................ 200 
8.3.1:  Experimental Design ........................................................................................................ 201 
8.3.2:  Basic Stock Price Informativeness Model ....................................................................... 204 
8.3.3:  Multiplicative Analysis of Segment Variables’ Impact on Stock Price Predictability of 
Future Earnings ........................................................................................................................... 207 
8.3.4:  SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... 220 
Chapter 9- Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research .................................................... 221 
iv 
 
9.1: Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 221 
9.2 Overview of the Study ............................................................................................................... 221 
9.3: Research Objectives and Research Methods ............................................................................ 222 
9.4: Main Findings and Conclusions ............................................................................................... 224 
9.4.1: Implication of IFRS 8 ........................................................................................................ 224 
9.4.2: Relationship between Analysts’ Forecast and Segment Information ................................ 226 
9.4.3: Segment Information and Stock Return Anticipation of Future Earnings ......................... 229 
9.5: Limitations, Further Research, and Policy Implications .......................................................... 233 
9.5.1: The Form of Analysis ........................................................................................................ 233 
9.5.2: The Choice of Earnings Forecast....................................................................................... 233 
9.5.3: Measurement Error ............................................................................................................ 234 
9.5.4: Source of Segment Information and Segments Definitions .............................................. 234 
9.5.6: Segments’ Line Items ........................................................................................................ 235 
9.5.7: Large Forecast Error .......................................................................................................... 235 
9.5.8: Summary ........................................................................................................................... 235 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 239 
References .............................................................................................................................. 256 
  
v 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Main Changes in Segment Disclosure Post-IFRS 8 ................................................ 15 
Table 2.2: Summary of Major Changes in Segment Reporting Regulations (IFRS, USA, and 
UK) ........................................................................................................................................... 18 
 
Table 5.1: Frequency of Companies by Sector......................................................................... 77 
Table 5.2: Listing Status of Sample Companies....................................................................... 77 
 
Table 6. 1: Distribution of Sample Companies by Listing and Sectors ................................... 90 
Table 6. 2: Mean number of line of business and geographical segments pre and post IFRS 8 
by listing ................................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 6. 3: Number of companies reported a change in the number of segments.................... 92 
Table 6. 4: Mean number of line items of business and geographical segments pre and post 
IFRS 8 by listing ....................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 6. 5: Number of companies reported a change in the number of line items ................... 94 
Table 6. 6: Number of companies early adopted IFRS 8 and Identified CODM by listing ..... 96 
Table 6. 7: Number of companies reported LOB and GEO profits and reported reconciled 
profit pre and post IFRS 8 ........................................................................................................ 97 
Table 6. 8: Mean Quality of geographical segments pre and post IFRS 8 by listing ............... 98 
Table 6. 9: Number of companies reported a change in the number of segments by sector .... 99 
Table 6. 10: Mean number of line of business and geographical segments pre and post IFRS 8 
by sector .................................................................................................................................. 100 
Table 6. 11: Number of companies reported a change in the number of line items by sector 102 
Table 6. 12: Mean number of line items of business and geographical segments pre and post 
IFRS 8 by sector ..................................................................................................................... 102 
Table 6. 13: No. of companies early adopt IFRS 8, Identified CODM, reported LOB & GEO 
profits and report reconciled profit ......................................................................................... 104 
Table 6. 14: No. of companies reported LOB & GEO profits and reported reconciled profit 
pre and post IFRS 8 by sector ................................................................................................. 105 
Table 6. 15: Mean quality of geographical segment pre and post IFRS 8 by sector .............. 106 
 
Table 7. 1: Descriptive Statistics Whole Sample Period Analyst Forecast Model (IAS 14R & 
IFRS 8) ................................................................................................................................... 110 
Table 7. 2: Descriptive Statistics Analyst Forecast Model (IAS 14R only) ........................... 111 
Table 7. 3: Descriptive Statistics Analyst Forecast Model (IFRS 8 only) ............................. 112 
Table 7. 4: Frequencies Statistics Four Years Analyst Forecast Model ................................. 114 
Table 7. 5: Frequencies Statistics Four Years Analyst Forecast Model (IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8)
 ................................................................................................................................................ 114 
Table 7. 6: Correlation for IFRS 8 & IAS 14R Analyst Forecast Model ............................... 115 
Table 7. 7: Correlation for IAS 14R Analyst Forecast Model................................................ 116 
Table 7. 8: Correlation for IFRS 8 Analyst Forecast Model .................................................. 117 
Table 7. 9: Geographical Segment Scoring ............................................................................ 124 
Table 7. 10: STAND & QGEO Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years 
Regression) ............................................................................................................................. 147 
vi 
 
Table 7. 11: STAND & QGEO Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years 
Regression) No Single GEO Segments .................................................................................. 149 
Table 7. 12: All Segment’s variables Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years)
 ................................................................................................................................................ 152 
Table 7. 13: All Segment’s variables Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years) 
No Single GEO Segments ...................................................................................................... 153 
Table 7. 14: Linear Additive Analysis, Comparing STAND and QGEO vs. All Segment 
Variables over Four Years Period .......................................................................................... 155 
Table 7. 15: Linear Additive Analysis, Comparing STAND and QGEO vs. All Segment 
Variables over Two Years Period .......................................................................................... 156 
Table 7. 16: Linear Additive Analysis, Comparing STAND and QGEO vs. All Segment 
Excluding Single GEO Segment ............................................................................................ 157 
Table 7. 17: Regression Nine, Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO on 
Forecast Accuracy (Two Years) ............................................................................................ 163 
Table 7. 18: Regression Ten, Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO on 
Forecast Accuracy (Four Years) ............................................................................................ 164 
Table 7. 19: Regression Eleven, Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO 
on Forecast Accuracy (Two Years & No Single GEO Segment) .......................................... 165 
Table 7. 20: Regression Twelve Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO 
on Forecast Accuracy (Two Years & No Single GEO Segment) .......................................... 166 
Table 7. 21: Regression Thirteen Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of Different 
Segment’s Variables on Forecast Accuracy (Two Years) ..................................................... 169 
Table 7. 22: Regression Fourteen Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of Different 
Segment’s Variables on Forecast Accuracy (Four Years) ..................................................... 170 
Table 7.23: Regression Fifteen Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of Different Segment’s 
Variables on Forecast Accuracy (Four Years & excluding single segments) ........................ 171 
 
Table 8. 1: Table 8. 1: Market Reaction Analysis’s Descriptive Statistics for Whole Sample 
Period (IAS14 & IFRS 8)....................................................................................................... 179 
Table 8. 2: Market Reaction Analysis’s Descriptive Statistics for IFRS 8 Period only ........ 180 
Table 8. 3: Market Reaction Analysis’s Descriptive Statistics for IAS 14R Period only...... 181 
Table 8. 4: Means Difference of Segment Profit Variables (Market Reaction Model) ......... 182 
Table 8. 5: Market Reaction Analysis Correlation for Full Dataset ...................................... 183 
Table 8. 6: Market Reaction Analysis Correlation for pre-IFRS 8 ........................................ 184 
Table 8. 7: Market Reaction Analysis Correlation for post-IFRS 8 ...................................... 185 
Table 8.8: Basic Stock Price Informativeness Model ............................................................ 206 
Table 8. 9: The Impact of MAMRG on Stock Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings.... 210 
Table 8.10: The Impact of BOTHPROF on Stock Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings
 ................................................................................................................................................ 213 
Table 8. 11: The Impact of PROFMTCH on Stock Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings
 ................................................................................................................................................ 216 
Table 8. 12: Combined Impact of MAINMRG, BOTHPROF, and PROFMTCH on Stock 
Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings ............................................................................. 219 
vii 
 
Acknowledgment 
  
First and foremost, praise to Allah Almighty for his blessings and guidance in giving 
me  the  strength,  courage,  patience  and  perseverance  to  endure  this  long  and 
challenging study journey.  
 
I am so grateful for the wise council and supervision of my ‘super’ supervisor, 
Professor Simon Hussain. I have been fortunate, privileged and honoured to know and work 
under the supervision of such an academic who is responsible for two major and important 
positions within the Newcastle University Business School namely, the Head of Accounting 
& Finance subject group and Degree Programme Director - MA in International Financial 
Analysis and MSc in Strategic Planning & Investment. Simply, I could not wish for a better 
supervisor. Many thanks Simon for your invaluable guidance, inspirational support and 
encouragement, as well as your patience in respect of my shortcomings. I am also thankful to 
my second supervisor, Dr. Chen Su for his useful suggestions, insightful comments and 
constructive feedback.  
 
I owe a substantial debt of gratitude and thanks to my father, Ali Saleh Al-Aamri and 
my mother, Shikhah Ahmed Al-Aamri who have given me exceptional love, constant care, 
emotional support and encouragement throughout my life, and continues to do so. I am deeply 
grateful to you, and can never repay a fraction of what you have done for me. My special 
thanks must go to my brothers and sisters, for their invaluable support, care and prayers. All 
of you have offered untiring support and I truly cannot thank you enough.   
 
     I would also like to express my gratitude to my fellow PhD students who have helped me 
and given me constructive comments during this journey. 
 
 
 
Thank you all…. 
 
 
  
viii 
 
ix 
 
Abstract 
 
International Financial Reporting Standard No. 8 (IFRS 8) was issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in November 2006 and became effective 
for periods beginning on or after January 2009. IFRS 8 is issued as a part of the IASB 
convergence program with the USA Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB). IFRS 8 
provides guidelines on how segment information should be reported to external users. It 
requires segment information to be reported in accordance with the management approach. In 
particular, operating segments are to be identified in the same way they are reported to Chief 
Operating Decision Makers (CODM). It is worth noting that IFRS 8 replaced International 
Accounting Standard No. 14 Revised (IAS 14R). IAS 14R requires reportable segments to be 
identified in accordance with the (risk and reward) approach. 
 There are three main objectives to this study: (i) to evaluate and compare the 
disclosure of segment information pre and post the implementation of IFRS 8 for UK listed 
companies; (ii) to investigate the impact of the management approach on analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy; and (iii) to investigate the impact of the quality of segments’ profit 
information on stock market ability to anticipate future changes in earnings. For the purpose 
of achieving these research objectives a positivist theoretical framework is implemented. The 
three objectives of this study are investigated using two methods; descriptive statistics and 
mean difference tests; and regression analysis using Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed 
Effect and Tobit regressions.   
The findings of this study suggest that the disclosure of segmental information post 
the adoption of IFRS 8 has witnessed significant and sizable changes. The comparison of 
segment information reporting pre and post IFRS 8 indicates that UK listed companies 
provide more disaggregated information post the adoption of IFRS 8. The results show that 
the implementation of IFRS 8 has resulted in more segments reported for both Line of 
Business (LOB) and Geographical (GEO) segments. The mean number of reported segments 
increased from 2.98 to 3.34 for LOB segments and from 4.08 to 4.71 for GEO segments. 
Statistical tests show that the increase in the number of geographical segments is statistically 
significant.   In addition, the analysis documents a statistically significant increase in the 
quality (i.e. fineness) of geographical segments disclosed post IFRS 8.  
However, in contrast the results also show that post the implementation of IFRS 8 the 
number of line items disclosed has decreased for both LOB and GEO segments. The findings 
x 
 
show that the decline in geographical segments’ line items is statistically different from zero. 
Also, the results reveal that the most significant line item that is no longer provided for 
geographical segment is related to earnings/profit information. In addition, the analysis 
documents a decline in the quality of segment profit reported by companies post the adoption 
of IFRS 8. 
With regards to the impact of segmental information on analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy, the results indicate that the adoption of the management approach (IFRS 8), and 
reporting finer geographical segments provide financial analysts with a significantly better 
insight about future changes in earnings. In addition, the analysis shows that better quality of 
segmental earnings disclosure provides financial analysts with a better insight into future 
changes in earnings. Moreover, we find evidence that companies which defined their main 
operating segments based on line of business characteristics have been perceived by financial 
analysts as more informative about future earnings. 
With regards to the particular impact of the quality of segmental earnings disclosure 
on stock price ability to anticipate and reflect future changes in earnings, the study finds 
strong evidence for the impact of quality of segmental profit disclosure on the market ability 
to anticipate future changes in earnings. The regression results reveal that when the segmental 
profit margin is different from the consolidated margin, the market has better ability to foresee 
future change in earnings over short and long term periods. Reporting earnings figures for 
both main operating segments and entity-wide segments (mostly geographical) improves 
stock price’s ability to incorporate future earnings for short term periods (i.e. next year 
earnings). In addition the study shows that when segment profit matches the consolidated 
income statement the market anticipation power of the next year’s earnings is higher. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to the topic of this 
study and the link between general accounting disclosure studies and studies related to 
segmental disclosure. This chapter also discusses the research objectives, justification 
of the study, and research questions. This chapter is structured as follows:  
Section 1.1 provides a brief introduction to the corporate financial disclosure 
and the types of research that are carried out in this field. Then it links these areas of 
research with segment disclosure studies. It also provides a brief description of what 
segmental reporting is and introduces the latest amendments to segment reporting 
standards.  
Section 1.2 discusses the three main objectives of this study in association with 
the changes in segment reporting practices in the UK.  
Section 1.3 provides a justification for the study and states the study research 
questions.  
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1.1: Introduction 
The role and importance of firms’ financial information have been extensively discussed 
and studied in the accounting and finance literature. Financial information is useful for both 
internal and external users. Companies’ strategic decisions regarding future investments, new 
products, a major expansion and any other kind of project that involves resource allocation 
depends to a great extent on the quality, reliability and relevance of financial information. 
This also applies to external users; for example, investors rely heavily on the amount of 
corporate information that is publicly disseminated so they can make informed investment 
decisions. At the same time, their ability to make sound investment decisions depends on their 
ability to extract valuable and relevant information from firms’ annual reports. Ettredge et al., 
(2005) state that if amendments to international accounting standards provide better 
information to the market and ultimately better insight to market participants, then these 
amendments are likely to improve resource allocation. 
However, there are many factors that affect the quality and relevance of companies’ 
financial reports either positively or negatively. Factors such as conflict of interests (Agency 
Cost), lack of strong market regulation and proprietary cost of financial information could 
reduce the quality and usefulness of firms’ financial reports. In other words, managers may 
tend to hide some information from the market if this information will give a negative signal 
about the management or company performance because this will harm management 
reputation, value in the market and the benefits they could receive.  
Kothari et al. (2009) suggest that managers’ self-interest objectives such as career 
progression, market reputation, remuneration packages and wealth maximisation motivate 
them to withhold bad news from the market. In addition, companies tend to hide any 
information that might harm their competitive position in the market. Healy and Palepu 
(2001) highlight the effect of information asymmetry and agency problem in the firms’ 
disclosure decisions. 
On the other hand, there are some factors that could motivate and in some cases force 
managers to report more information to the market. For example, it is very common to see 
large firms disclose more information than do small firms. Small firms have a lower level of 
disclosure because they suffer from a higher information dissemination cost. Most 
information media are interested in large companies because they are followed by a wide 
range of investors. Another element that could determine the extent of firm disclosure is the 
firm’s future projects and future financial needs. It is possible to find companies with a 
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financing need providing extensive financial reports to obtain the required capital at the 
lowest possible cost.  
These differences in reporting practices from one company to another or from one country 
to another due to the previously mentioned factors have created pressure to have some sort of 
a common ground where every company should maintain a certain level of disclosure in their 
financial reports. This pressure aims at protecting the users of these reports from any possible 
management manipulation. One of the main influential bodies which govern the reporting 
practices of the companies is the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Foundation. The IFRS Foundation is an independent not- for-profit organisation whose main 
objective is to have well defined and harmonized accounting practice and disclosure among 
listed companies all over the world. IFRS Foundation is responsible for setting accounting 
standards and every now and then it introduces new standards or amends existing ones.  
Companies' information is disseminated to the external users through different ways, such 
as press release, newspapers, social media, and government publications. However, the most 
commonly used publicly available source of information is audited annual reports. Audited 
annual reports present financial and non-financial information in accordance with accounting 
standards and country-specific regulations. In addition, information reported in the annual 
reports conveys economic information, information about company’s financial position, and 
information about company’s performance.  
Segment information is a crucial part of the annual reports; it breaks down/disaggregates 
company’s financial information into different categories. There are different definitions for 
segment reporting. However, one of the clearest definitions is suggested by Roberts et al., 
(2010, p.428): “segment reporting involves breaking down the enterprise into its constituent 
parts or segments and reporting financial information for each of these segments”. 
Segment information can be categorised in different ways. A company can categorise its 
segment information based on the types of business or products and services which is known 
as the line of business. Another company can categorise its segment information based on the 
location of its customers or location of its operations which is known as a geographic 
segment. The aforementioned categorisations those which are the most used. However, some 
companies could use a mix of the line of business and geographic segmentation.  
Segment information is useful to both internal and external users. Internal users use 
segment information to evaluate different business units and segments. In addition, 
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company’s resources are allocated based on the segment’s performance and potential growth. 
Such information can only be extracted from segment disclosure. On the other hand, segment 
information provides additional value to external users such as investors and financial 
analysts. It provides them with a better insight regarding future earning, future cash flow, and 
firm valuation. Berger and Hann (2003), Ettredge et al., (2005) and Venkataraman (2001) 
document that analysts’ forecast error has decreased after the adoption of new segmental 
reporting standards (SFAS 131) in the USA. The findings of these researches highlight the 
fact that companies’ financial disclosure and analysts’ reports are complementing each other. 
In other words, the positive association between the disclosure and analysts’ accuracy implies 
that increasing firms’ level of disclosure does not substitute for or eliminate the role of 
analysts in the capital market. 
The detailed information presented in segment reports allows the users of the annual 
report to assess the performance of the company more accurately. Since the business 
environment is currently becoming more complex, segment information helps the users to 
evaluate the performance of multi-segments companies against industry benchmark and 
against each other. Nowadays, the majority of the companies are becoming multinational and 
operates in and sell their products in several geographical locations. This expansion in 
companies operations requires some sort of financial information that is disaggregated 
specifically to each of these geographical locations. Therefore, the users can determine which 
of the business activities or geographical locations is under-performing and which is over-
performing (Cotter, 2011). 
Given the significant role of segment information in companies’ performance evaluation 
and resource allocation, the IASB is constantly reviewing and modifying the requirement of 
segment disclosure. Segmental reporting has gone through series of developments over the 
last few decades. The most recent change in segmental reporting is the shift from the risk and 
reward approach (IAS 14R) to the management approach (IFRS 8). Chapter 2 provides more 
detailed background information about the development in segment reporting.  
The IFRS Foundation has reviewed and modified the accounting standard related to 
segment reporting and subsequently in 2006, it issued IFRS 8 (Operating Segment) which 
replaced IAS 14R (Segment Reporting).  IFRS 8 to be effective in fiscal year 2009. For many 
companies, the new standard involves a significant change to the way they used to report their 
segment information under IAS 14R. However, the IFRS Foundation hopes that the 
introduction of IFRS 8 will result in same benefits as the American SFAS 131. Therefore, this 
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study aims to evaluate the consequences of IFRS 8 adoption on segment disclosure practices 
and its implication for future earnings’ predictive ability.  
1.2: Study Objectives 
There are three main objectives of this study. Firstly, the study seeks to evaluate and 
compare the disclosure of segment information pre and post the implementation of IFRS 8 
(the management approach)1 of UK listed companies. Secondly, the study aims to investigate 
the impact of the management approach on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Thirdly, the 
study pursues to focus on the impact of the quality of segments’ profit information on stock 
market ability to anticipate future changes in earnings. 
Specifically, the analysis of the first objective is based on statistical comparison of 
segment information reported in annual reports for a sample of FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
companies over a four year period. The first two years are the last two years in which 
companies report segment information in accordance with IAS 14R. The second two years are 
first two years in which companies report segment information in accordance with IFRS 8. 
The comparison will include different aspects of segment disclosure such as the number of 
segments, the number of line items, the definition of the main segment, the fineness of 
geographical segments, and quality of profit disclosure.  
The second objective will be empirically examined by assessing the association between 
the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings prediction and segment information. This part of 
the analysis seeks to examine whether segmental information in general and the adoption of 
IFRS 8, in particular, to provide a better insight for financial analysts into future earnings. The 
analysis of this objective will be carried out using Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effect 
and Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value of Analysts’ Forecast 
Error (FE). The explanatory variables are the absolute change in earnings, several segment 
variables, and controls.  
The third objective of the study examines the correlation between the ability of stock price 
to reflect future earnings and the extent of segment’s profit disclosure. The analysis of this 
part of the study utilises Future Earnings Response Coefficient (FERC) model. The analysis is 
done by using OLS regression. The dependent variable of this regression model is current 
                                                          
1 Whenever management approach is used in this study, it refers to the implementation of the management 
approach in reporting segment information (i.e. adoption of IFRS 8) 
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stock return and the independents variables are future change in earnings, segment’s profit 
variables, and controls.  
1.3: Justification of the Study, Research Questions and Research Contribution 
Although there is relatively extensive amount of research related to the adoption of the 
management approach (SFAS 131) in the United State. However, few studies have examined 
and compared the changes in the segmental reporting practices in the United Kingdom (UK) 
in particular after the adoption of IFRS 8. After the introduction of IFRS 8, there is very little 
research about segment reporting practices of UK listed companies. Most of these studies 
evaluated the effect of IFRS 8 on segment disclosure over one year only. Also, most of these 
studies are either qualitative based researches (interviews or survey) or just evaluate the 
changes in segment reporting pattern. As far as the author is aware, there is no research which 
has evaluated the impact of IFRS 8 adoption on earning predictive ability. Thus, more 
evidence about the impact of this new standard on the impact of segment disclosure practices 
on analysts’ and market ability to forecast future earnings is needed. It is believed that this 
research will fill this gap in the existing literature about the impact of segment’s profit 
disclosure on predictive ability of earnings. This thesis will provide a great insight about the 
usefulness of segment profit information to financial analysts to anticipate future earnings 
accurately; and to the capital market to reflect future earnings in current stock price.  
Moreover, the new approach is considered to be controversial in the way segment 
information is reported. The new approach requires companies to report segment information 
in the same way it is reported to the management of company. In many cases these internal 
reports are not consistent with IFRS measures. Therefore, the new standard is expected to 
affect the quality of the financial information reported in segment reports in particular profit 
information.  
Baldwin (1984) argues that one of the major objectives for having new accounting 
standards is to enable the users of financial reports to assess the size and timing of future 
profit better. Therefore, segment profitability measures are critically important in the 
predicting future earning and ultimately in the firms’ valuation process.  
In addition, one of the most important concerns of the users of the financial reports is that 
companies will hide more information and aggregate more segments under the new standard 
particularly after new standards that do not require the disclosure of geographic segment. 
Moreover, the flexibility granted by the new standards to the management to report 
segment results in non-IFRS measure has raised some concerns about the predictive ability of 
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segment information if reported measures do not match with IFRS measure in the 
consolidated financial statements.  
Issues such as consistency and comparability in segmental reporting are hardly mentioned 
in the previous studies; for example under each of the aforementioned segmental disclosure 
standards, to what extent firms’ segment information is consistent over the years and to what 
extent it can be compared across the different companies within the same industry.  
In order to gain a better understanding of the implications and consequences of new 
segmental reporting standards (IFRS 8) on the segment information disclosure practices of 
UK listed companies, it is important to reflect on the reporting practices under the previous 
standards. Therefore, the three aforementioned objectives of this study seek to find answers to 
the following research questions:- 
1- Whether segment disclosure have changed significantly across different segment 
reporting standards (IAS 14, IAS 14R and IFRS 8) 
2- Under each segment reporting standards, have there been any changes in the segment 
information reporting pattern of companies over the years?   
3- Is there any significant difference in companies’ segment profitability disclosure under 
IFRS 8? If so,  
4- What are the implications of IFRS 8 profitability measures for the capital market? 
Although the main objective of this study is to answer these research questions, the 
findings of this research will cover a wide range of aspects regarding segment reporting in 
the UK.   
 
 The attainment of the above mentioned research questions will contribute to the 
existing literature in many ways.  To the researcher’s knowledge, it is the first study to have 
examined empirically the impact of segmental disclosure on the ability of analysts and stock 
prices to predict future change in earnings; specifically, the evaluation of the association 
between segmental profit disclosure and analysts’ forecast accuracy and stock price ability to 
reflect future change in earnings. The study also provides significant evidence for the 
important role of the fineness of geographical segments to reduce financial analysts’ forecast 
error. Therefore, the current thesis has contributed to the understanding of the usefulness of 
segmental information post the adoption of IFRS 8. Moreover, this study provides insights to 
the IASB and other regulatory bodies about the possible enhancements to IFRS 8, particularly 
in areas related to profit disclosure and disclosure of other line items.  
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Chapter 2- Segment Reporting Background 
Overview 
 The purpose of this chapter is historically to review segment reporting requirements, 
standards, and practices according to international, the USA, and the UK settings. 
 Section 2.1 provides brief background information about the development of segment 
reporting requirements under the USA Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and the early studies about segmental reporting that were carried out in the USA. 
 Section 2.2 reviews the segment disclosure requirements according to international 
accounting standards. It highlights the principle difference between the risk and reward 
approach and the internal management approach. 
 Section 2.3 compares segment disclosure requirements between IAS 14R and IFRS8; 
it highlights the main changes in the disclosure requirements in IFRS 8. It also highlights the 
expected changes in the segment disclosure practices post-IFRS8. 
 Section 2.4 compares IFRS 8 with the similar American accounting principle (SFAS 
131) and highlights the major difference between both of them in regards to segment 
reporting requirements.   
Section 2.5 reviews the legal requirements for segment disclosure in the UK, it begins 
with a description of segment requirements contained in the Companies Act 1985 and then 
moved to the time when UK companies were required to report financial information in 
accordance with International Accounting Standards.  
Section 2.6 is the conclusion to the chapter. 
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2.1- Segment Reporting Under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
In the USA, the call for disclosing segment sales and earnings information was 
initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1969. The SEC required U.S. 
companies to disclose LOB information in their registration documents. In 1970, the SEC 
extended their segmental disclosure to be included in 10-K form. Four years after that, it 
became compulsory for all firms filing with SEC to report LOB segments information in their 
annual report (Roberts et al., 2010).  Thus it can be noticed that researchers’ interest in 
segmental reporting empirical studies goes back to 1970s. Studies by Kinney (1971) and 
Collins (1976) are among the first studies that stressed on the importance of reporting 
company’s financial result into different segments. In 1976 the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board issued SFAS 14 (Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise). 
SFAS 14 was the first USA accounting standard on segmental reporting. Under SFAS 14 
companies are required to report their segment information based on risk and return into Line 
of Business (LOB) and Geographic (GEO) segments. SFAS 14 also identified the line of 
items to be disclosed under both GEO and LOB segments. There is no doubt that SFAS 14 
has made a significant contribution to the financial reporting practices.  
However, many companies exploit the flexible areas in SFAS 14 and do not provide 
the expected level of disclosure. The Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) reported that many companies aggregated segment information under one segment 
whereas they are supposed to have more than one. Consistently with AIMR concerns, 
Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that companies used the flexibility in SFAS 14 to aggregate 
segments under one segment and to hide information about profitable segments. Another area, 
for which SFAS 14 has been criticised, is that it does not provide sufficient information to 
external users in the same way it is provided to company’s management.  
Similar to AIMR concerns, the Special Committee of Financial Reporting from the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountant has listed some of the flaws in SFAS-14. 
The committee highlighted four areas in which SFAS 14 could be improved. First of all the 
number of reportable segments should be increased. Secondly, more line items about each 
segment should be increased too. Thirdly, the reported segments should coincide with what is 
reported internally for directors’ decision making. Finally, there should be more homogeneity 
between segment notes and other sections of the annual report (Street et al, 2000). In 1997 the 
FASB responded to the constant calls from AIMR to improve the segment reporting standards 
so that it provides more disaggregated information. Thus, FASB issued SFAS 131 (Disclosure 
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about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information) to improve segmental information 
reported by USA listed companies.  
SFAS 131 has totally a different approach in defining reportable segments compared 
to it preceding standard. Under SFAS 131 segments are defined based on the management 
perspective. In other words, companies should disclose their segmental information in the 
same way it is reported to executive managements for the purpose of decision making. SFAS 
131 on paragraph (10) clearly mentioned that operating segment is ‘whose operating results 
are regularly reviewed by enterprise’s chief operating decision maker to make decisions about 
resources to be allocated to the segments and assess its performance’. Under this approach, 
companies can define their operating segments based on different products or services, 
geographical location, organisation structure, mixed definitions, or any other way in which 
segmental information is presented to chief operating decision maker. The main motive 
behind this approach is that the external users can see financial performance of the company 
from the eyes of the management and at the same time this will result in more disaggregated 
segments.   
However, the new standard is still criticised as having some sort of management 
discretion which allows companies to aggregate segments under certain conditions. For 
example if there is no significant difference 
“(1) In the nature of the products and services; (2) in the nature of the production process; (3) 
the type or class of customer for their products and services; and (4) the method used to 
distribute their products or provide their services.” 
(Roberts et al., 2010, p 435.) 
 
2.2- Segment Reporting Under International Accounting Standards 
The first international accounting standard that required listed companies to provide a 
separate section on their segment operations was IAS 14 (Reporting Financial Information by 
segments). Firstly, in March 1980 International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) 
issued Exposure Draft (ED) 15, Reporting Financial Information by Segments, and asked 
different financial statements’ users, preparers and auditors to provide feedbacks and 
comments on the expected advantages and possible concerns for the implementation of the 
new standard.  
Then in 1981 IAS 14 was issued and was made effective as of 1st August 1983. IAS 14 
requires listed companies to report their segment information based on risk and reward into 
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two categories 1) Line of Business and 2) Geographic Area. According to this standard the 
companies were clearly asked to report line items related to revenue, inter-segment sales, 
operating results and assets. In addition, under IAS 14 companies tend to provide additional 
information related to capital expenditure, depreciation and amortisation, net assets and 
reconciliation of net operating assets to net assets.  
However, there were many concerns about IAS 14 in terms of the discretion given to 
management to identify significant segment information to be disclosed (Nichols & Street, 
2007) and in terms of having broad geographic segments such as continents or ‘the rest of the 
world’. It has also been criticised for its broad definition of term industry which gave the 
managers the ability to aggregate line of business segments. In addition to the industry 
definition problem, IAS 14 suffered from the discrepancy between what is reported externally 
from actual internal information particularly if the company is not organised in a way that is 
compatible with the standard requirement. This creates some sort of artificial picture about the 
true operation of the company.  
A few years later, specifically in 1995, the IASC issued Exposure Draft (ED) 51 as an 
attempt to modify 1981 IAS 14 and resolve some of the concerns that had been raised about 
it. At the same time, IASC introduced the concept of reporting the segment information based 
on the Management Approach. Although the management approach had long been mentioned 
in disclosure studies such as Emmanuel & Garrod, 1987; the Management Approach was 
initially introduced as a reporting standard in United States, as will be discussed in the next 
section (2.2).  
In 1997, the IASC issued IAS 14R (Revised) which was made effective for all listed 
companies on 1st of July 1998. Although IAS 14R introduced the management approach in 
the international accounting standards settings and allowed companies to report their segment 
information according to it but it is still mandatory for companies to report their segment 
information into primary and secondary segments based on Line of Business and Geographic 
Segments. This mix between risk and return criteria and internal structure has created some 
ambiguity to the firms on how to identify their reportable segments. In contrast the standard 
emphasised on the comparability and consistency element of segmental reporting. It is stated 
in the standard that segment information should be consistent both over time and across 
different companies within the same industry. Further, the identification of geographic 
segment should follow certain factors as indicated in paragraph 9 of the standard: 
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A distinguishable component of an enterprise that is engaged in providing products or services 
within a particular economic environment and that is subject to risks and returns that are 
different from those of components operating in other economic environments. Factors that 
should be considered in identifying geographic segments include:  
a- Similarity of economic and political conditions; 
b- Relationship between operations in different geographical areas; 
c- Proximity of operations; 
d- Special risks associated with operations in a particular area; 
e- Exchange control regulation; and 
f- Underlying currency risks. 
However, there are some studies which show that IAS 14R still allow companies to 
aggregate different segments under a single segment. For example, Nichols & Street (2007) 
state that IAS 14R suffer from the problem of eliminating the term industry when identifying 
business segments and that in their opinion has caused some companies to aggregate some of 
the segments that were previously reported separately.  
Despite the changes that have been made in segment reporting under IAS 14R but 
most of the users of financial reports were concerned about information asymmetry between 
what is reported externally and internal report to managements. This concern has motivated 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to modify the segment reporting 
standard again. There have also been many calls from the users of companies’ financial 
reports and particularly from financial analysts to have more disaggregated information than 
what is reported now. Epstein & Palepu (1999) report that financial analysts indicated 
segment information to be the most useful piece of information in the annual report.  
Another motivation for the changes in segment disclosure is to reduce the differences 
between American Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards. 
(IFRS 8, BC2) “The objective of the project is to reduce differences between IFRSs and USA 
generally accepted accounting principles”. Thus, in 2006 IASB issued International Financial 
Reporting Standards IFRS 8. IFRS 8 simulates USA SFAS 131 which is concerned with 
Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information. SFAS 131, as will be 
explained in more detail in the next section, requires companies to report segment information 
based on organisation internal units or the management approach.  
IFRS 8 (Operating Segment) was issued in 2006 and in2007 it was endorsed for use in 
the European Union (EU). In 2009 IFRS 8 became effective for all companies using IFRS, 
with early adoption encouraged. IFRS 8 requires companies to report their segment 
information on the bases of internal report that are regularly reviewed by the management (i.e. 
in the same way it is reported to Chief Operation Decision Maker). 
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Since IFRS 8 emphasises the internal structure of segment reporting it is expected that 
the new standard will increase the harmony between the information reported in the segment 
information notes to accounts and the other narrative parts of the annual report. The external 
users will have a better understanding of how the managers assess different segments and how 
resources are allocated among these segments because external users now are able to view 
different segments performance from the management point of view.  
The IASB pointed out that the new standard is expected to achieve the following 
benefits: 
(a) Entities will report segments that correspond to internal management reports; 
(b) Entities will report segments information that will be more consistent with other parts of 
their annual reports; 
(c) Some entities will report more segments; and 
(d) Entities will report more segment information in interim financial reports. 
(IFRS 8, paragraph BC 9) 
 
2.3- Comparing IFRS 8 with IAS 14R 
The main difference between IFRS 8 and IAS 14R is that IFRS 8 adopts the 
management approach compared to its predecessor, which was based on risk and reward. 
Prior to IFRS 8 reporting segmental information in a similar way as firm’s internal structure 
was very much a voluntary disclosure decision. Many users expect that the management 
approach will provide a better link between segment disclosure and other narrative parts of 
the annual report.  
Further, the new approach is expected to be less costly for the companies as the 
information has been already prepared for internal users while under the previous approach 
companies need to provide new set of segmental reports (i.e. one for the internal use and the 
other for external reporting).Another major difference is related to financial results disclosed 
for each operating segment, because IFRS 8 requires companies to report the segments’ 
financial results in the same way it is reported to Chief Operating Decision Maker (CODM) 
there is strong concern that these financial numbers will not be in compliance with IFRS 
measures.  
However, the measures that have been used to report total segment income (i.e. not for 
every individual segment) should be explained and reconcile with a line item in the 
consolidated financial statement to help users of financial statements to link what is reported 
in consolidated financial statements with what is reported under the segment section (see 
IFRS 8, BC39-BC42).  
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Moreover, while IAS 14R mandates the disclosure of segment information into 
primary and secondary and if one of them is based on Line of Business, the other should be 
based on Geographic areas, IFRS 8 requires the reporting of geographic segments only if they 
are reported to CODM and they constitute more than 10% of total sale, total profit or total 
assets. However, under IFRS 8, material geographic information should be disclosed in a 
country level compared to a broader classification of geographic segments under IAS 14R.   
Additionally, the items to be disclosed for the primary segment under IAS 14R are 
well defined compared to IFRS 8. (IFRS 8, BC26) “Therefore, the Board decided not to 
require defined measures of segment revenue, segment expenses, segment results, segment 
assets and segment liabilities”.  
Previously, under IAS 14R, companies could choose to report their Line of Business 
and Geographic segments information either separately or in a matrix form. Under IFRS 8, 
companies are additionally allowed to use mix reporting method. IFRS 8 gives firms’ 
management more freedom regarding reporting the earnings of secondary segments. For 
Example, if the company chooses to report its operating segments according to its line of 
business then it is not required to report its earnings for the geographic segments.  This is one 
of the fears that concern the external users such as investors and analysts. The flexibility 
given to the management to omit such information could affect the value-relevance of 
segment disclosure.  
Another major difference between the two standards is that under IFRS 8, companies 
are required to disclose secretly the name and transaction value with major customers if the 
transactions with this customer represent 10% or more of the company’s total revenue.  
The following table summarises the main expected changes in segmental disclosure post 
adoption of IFRS 8 which are reported by IASB as a result of the feedback it received for its 
Exposure Draft of IFRS 8: 
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Table 2.1: Main Changes in Segment Disclosure Post-IFRS 8 
1- Increases the average number of reported operating segments 
2- Increases the average number of reported geographic segments  
3- Increases country level geographic segments 
4- Reduces information preparation and dissemination cost 
5- Allows the users to view the company through management eyes 
6- Improves the consistency between segment notes and management discussion  
7- Reduces the number of line items disclosed particularly for the Entity-Wide section 
8- The use of non-IFRS measures, particularly in segment earnings 
 
2.4- Comparing IFRS 8 with SFAS-131 
Although IFRS 8 was copied from the American standard SFAS-131, still there are 
some differences between these two standards. First of all, the preceding standard (SFAS-14) 
was mainly based on risk and reward criteria and the introduction of a management approach 
was a totally new concept to the companies following American GAAP, whereas, the former 
standard to IFRS 8 was IAS 14R; although it was also based on risk and reward criteria, it 
also introduced the concept of internal-management approach.  
Another difference is that under IFRS 8 companies are required to report operating 
segments’ total liability if reported internally to CODM, while SFAS 131 does not require the 
disclosure of operating segments’ total liabilities. In addition, the two standards differ in 
defining assets line items that need to be disclosed in the Entity-Wide section. Under IFRS 8, 
assets line item is defined as total assets which include both tangible and intangible assets. 
Under SFAS-131, the assets line item is defined as long-lived assets, which basically ignores 
intangible assets (Nichols et al, 2012).   
In addition, SFAS 131 requires companies with a matrix organisation structure to 
define operating segments based on products and services, while IFRS 8 requires such 
companies to define their operating segments according to the way it is reported to CODM 
(i.e. it is up to the companies’ management to choose the best definition for their operating 
segments) 
2.5- Segment Reporting Under UK Reporting Regulations 
Previously in the UK, there were two main sources of regulations that influenced 
companies’ segmental reporting. These sources were the Companies Act 1985 and the 
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Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 25 (SSAP 25). According to the Companies 
Act 1985, companies were required to disclose their turnover by Class of Business (Line of 
Business) and Geographic Area. The Act required companies to provide additional disclosure 
about their Class of Business and Geographic Areas only if this information was material. 
However, there was no clear materiality threshold and materiality judgment was left to 
companies’ directors to decide upon. One of the major problems with the Companies Act 
1985 was the flexibility that has been given to the director. Paragraph 55 states that it is for 
the directors to determine whether the company has carried on business of two or more 
classes or has supplies markets that differ substantially from each other and that whether, in 
the opinion of the directors, the classes of business or markets do not differ substantially from 
each other they may be treated as one. Emmanuel & Garrod (1987) point out that one of 
major concerns regarding the segmental information in Companies Act 1985 was the 
ambiguous terms in the disclosure requirement which, in their view, were left to the discretion 
of the management to interpret.  
Emmanuel & Garrod (1987) also mention that more than 50% of companies did not 
comply with requirement of the Companies Act 1985 concerning segmental disclosure. In 
addition the interviews with the users of the financial statements reveal a common complaint 
against the segmental disclosure practice of UK companies under the Companies Act 1985, 
concern the discrepancy between segments reported and comments about segment operations 
in the chairman’s report.  
In 1990 and as many companies in the UK have witnessed substantial expansion in their 
global trading during which the SSAP 25 was issued and made effective to all UK companies.  
SSAP 25 requires companies to provide segment information about their Class of 
Business and Geographic Areas to help the users of financial statements to analyse different 
rates of profitability, different opportunities for growth and different degrees of risk 
associated with the company different segments. SAAP 25 was expected to help the users of 
this information: 
1- To appreciate more thoroughly the results and financial position of the entity by 
permitting a better understanding of the entity’s past performance and thus a better 
assessment of its future prospects; and 
2- To be aware of the impact that changes in the significant components of a business may 
have on the business as a whole.  
(SSAP 25, Para. 1) 
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Similar to the Companies Act 1985, SSAP 25 raised some concerns. The first concern 
was that SSAP 25 is not required from all types of companies (Part 1, Paragraph 4). The 
second concern was, there is a great scope for directors’ discretion such as in paragraph 6 
“ where, in the opinion of the directors the disclosure of any information required by this 
accounting standard would be seriously prejudicial to the interest of the reporting entity, the 
information need not be disclosed”. Management discretion could also be seen from the 
segment identification criteria which are subject to different interpretations. Hussain (1997) 
argue that segment identification factors under SSAP 25 are so diverse and many differing 
approaches are consistent with them.  
Item information to be disclosed under SSAP 25 includes Turnover, Net Assets, 
Associated Undertakings, common costs and segment results. The main point in the segment 
disclosure under SSAP 25 is that all item information should be based on the origin area 
which is the geographical area from which products or services are supplied.  The segment 
result should be reported before accounting for taxation, minority interest and extraordinary 
items. Under SSAP 25 the chances of having totally different segment reporting between 
internal and external users are high due to the discretion given to the directors.   
In 2005, UK companies were required to disclose their segment information based on 
IAS 14R, Segment Reporting, instead of SSAP 25. This was considered as significant change 
in segment reporting in the UK. Table (2.2) provides a summary of the major changes in the 
segment reporting regulation. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Major Changes in Segment Reporting Regulations (IFRS, USA and UK) 
IFRS USA UK 
YEAR EVENT YEAR EVENT YEAR EVENT 
1981 
IASC issued IAS 14 which required 
companies to disclose segment 
information based on line of business 
and geographic areas 
1969 
SEC required all issuers filing Form S-1, 
Form S-7 and Form 10 to disclose 
additional information based to line of 
business  
1985 
According to The Companies Act 
1985  UK companies are required to 
disclose their turn over by line of 
business 
1983 
IAS 14 was made effected to all listed 
companies  
1970 
US firms issuing Form 10-Ks were 
required to disclose line of business 
information according to SEC 
requirements 1990 
SSAP 25 was issued and made 
effective to all listed firms. SAAP 25 
required listed companies in the UK 
to provide segment information 
according to their line of business and 
geographic areas. 1997 
IASC issued IAS 14R to replace IAS 
14 
1976 
FASB issued SFAS 14, financial reporting 
of segments for a business enterprise.  
SFAS 14 was made effective to all listed 
US firms and required them to report their 
segment information into line of business 
and geographic areas 
1998 
IAS 14R was made effect to all listed 
companies and required companies to 
report segment information into 
primary and secondary segments 
2005 
UK companies were required to 
comply with IAS 14R and report 
segment information into primary and 
secondary segments 
2006 
IASB issued IFRS 8 to replace IAS 
14R 
1997 
FASB responded to the pressure from 
AIMR to improve the segment reporting 
standard and issued SFAS 131, disclosure 
about segments of an enterprise and 
related information 
2009 
UK listed companies complied with 
the requirement of IASB and adopted 
IFRS 8 to report segment information 
based on management approach 2009 
IFRS 8 was made effective to all 
listed companies and required 
companies to report segment 
information based on internal 
reporting approach  
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2.6- Conclusion 
The disclosure of segmental information has undoubtedly gone through a series of 
changes and developments both internationally and nationally. The latest change in the 
segment disclosure’s standard is a major step toward the harmonisation of financial reporting 
practices between the companies that follow IFRS and companies that follow the USA 
GAAP. 
IFRS 8 introduce a dramatic change in the way segmental information is reported 
compared to its predecessor IAS 14R. The fundamental criteria in which segment information 
is reported under IAS 14R is risk and reward, and as such, business activities or geographical 
locations that have different risk and reward characteristics should be disaggregated and 
reported separately. On the other hand, the core principle in which segment information is 
reported under IFRS 8 is internal reporting structure. According to IFRS 8, business activities 
and geographical location should be disaggregated and reported separately based on the way it 
is reported to internal managements for the purpose of decision making process.  
Due to the fundamental difference between IFRS 8 and IAS 14R in which companies 
various segments should be identified, the IASB argues that the new standards will result in a 
better disclosure practice and will provide better insights to the market. However, one of the 
areas that has raised some concern about IFRS 8 is in relation to the reporting of geographical 
segments. IFRS 8 requires that geographical segments to be reported only if they are reported 
to CODM and they constitute more than 10% of total sale, total profit or total assets. 
Additionally, the items to be disclosed for the primary segment under IAS 14R are 
well defined compared to IFRS 8. (IFRS 8, BC26) “Therefore, the Board decided not to 
require defined measures of segment revenue, segment expenses, segment results, segment 
assets and segment liabilities”.  
One obvious question to ask is whether reporting segment information in the same 
way it is viewed by company’s chief operating decision maker is actually an added value to 
the reporting practice; does this change really matter? If the new approach of defining and 
reporting segment information provides the users of financial information with an insight into 
a company’s future prospects, then improved segment disclosure may lead to more efficient 
resource allocation decisions. This research will evaluate the changes in segment information 
disclosed after the implementation of IFRS 8 and examine the impact of these changes in the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecast of earnings. It will also examine the impact of changes in 
reporting segment profit on market informativeness.  
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The next chapter sheds some light on the importance and rational of segmental 
reporting studies and discusses the problem of segment identification. 
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Chapter 3- The Rationale for Segment Reporting 
Overview 
This chapter discusses the importance of segment information (i.e. what is the 
added value for having disaggregated information in comparison to the consolidated 
information).  First of all, the importance of segment information is linked to general 
accounting disclosure. This section illustrates the importance of financial disclosure to 
the business environment and then links this to the usefulness of disaggregated 
information to the users of financial reports.  
In addition, this chapter presents the proposition of the fineness theorem and 
how the usefulness of disaggregated information should be at least similar to 
consolidated information. Moreover, the chapter discusses the issue of segment 
identification and the possible ways in which companies may disaggregate 
consolidated information. This part presents the specific characteristics and disclosure 
implications of each segment identification choice. This chapter is structured as 
follows: 
Section 3.1: Introduction (Importance of Accounting Disclosure to Business 
Environment) 
Section 3.2: The Proposition of Fineness Theorem  
Section 3.3: The Issue of Segment Identification 
Section 3.4: Importance of Segment Information to Users of Financial Reports 
Section 3.5: Conclusion to this Chapter  
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3.1- Introduction (Importance of Accounting Disclosure) 
The significant changes that have been witnessed in the world economy and in 
particular the expansion in companies’ operations to cover multinational areas have 
stimulated the accounting standards setter to cope with these changes. In order to facilitate the 
communication of the financial information of multinational or multi-operational companies, 
it was necessary to have some sort of clear reporting pattern that to be complied with by all 
entities that have public accountability. From here the notion of segment reporting has 
emerged.  
There is a great deal of evidence for the importance of corporate financial information 
dissemination either on macro (overall economy) or micro (specific company) levels. For 
example, Salter (1998) argued that the level of financial disclosure can be used as a 
measurement of a country’s economic development; the more adequate and appropriate 
(relevant and reliable) corporate financial disclosure is, the more likely the country will be 
considered as a developed country. 
On a company level for example, Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) show that increasing 
firm’s financial disclosure to reduce information asymmetry is negatively correlated with cost 
of capital because large investors will be attracted to buying its shares due to high liquidity of 
its securities. They also document that high disclosure will reduce the risk-bearing capacity 
available through market makers. 
Richardson & Welker (2001), in their analysis of the relation between corporate 
disclosure (financial and social) and cost of equity capital, report that financial disclosure is 
negatively related to equity cost of capital (the greater the financial disclosure, the lower the 
equity cost of capital) and reduce the estimation risk and uncertainty regarding distribution of 
return.  
Similarly, Easley & O’hara (2004) show that cost of capital is affected by the amount 
of information publicly available to the investors. They rationalised the relation between cost 
of capital and financial disclosure to the investors’ behaviour to demand higher return for 
holding the securities of low disclosing companies. They continue their argument by stating 
that in uninformed market, investors with private information are in a better position than 
uninformed investors by utilising the information they have to reallocate their investment in a 
different portfolio.  
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The finding of this study corresponds to the finding of other researches; for example 
Botosan (1997) argue that disclosure reduces cost of equity capital. Moreover, Sengupta 
(1998) explain that financial disclosure reduces cost of debt capital. Francis et al. (2008) 
investigate the link between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital for a sample of 677 
companies in the fiscal year 2001 and show that the greater the disclosure, the lower the cost 
of capital, unconditional with any other factors.  
In addition, Al-Akra& Muhammed (2012) find that voluntary disclosure is positively 
associated with firm value and that the value creation resulted from the reduction in the cost 
of capital. In many cases when companies are looking for new funding they tend to improve 
their financial disclosure. Singleton & Globerman (2002) attribute improved and extensive 
accounting disclosure of Japanese companies to the pressure they have to find funding for 
their operations and new projects.  
The above mentioned evidences in regards to the importance of general accounting 
disclosure in the business environment raise a question about the importance and the rational 
for having disaggregated information (segment information) in financial reports. The 
following section discusses the theoretical rational for segmental disclosure.  
3.2-The Proposition of Fineness Theorem 
 A theoretical rationale for segmental disclosure is provided by the fineness theorem.  
The fineness theorem indicates that a finer information set is at least as informative as a less 
fine information set.  Demski (1973) describes what is meant by fineness. 
"We say that ji is as fine asi if every signal from ji is fully contained in a signal from i.  
Alternatively, we say thatji is as fine as i when knowledge of a signal from jiis sufficient to 
construct the corresponding signal from i.... Hence, with ji as fine as i, we know that ji 
tells us all that i tells us, and possibly more."(Demski, 1973, p.722). 
  The quote above provides support for segmental disclosure because segment 
data fulfils the fineness criteria.  An information set consisting of sub-entity data (i.e. 
disaggregated or segment data) should be at least as informative as a data set consisting of 
aggregate data only.  This is because data contained in the consolidated report can be 
constructed from the equivalent data in the segment report, but the reverse is not true. To give 
a simple example, consider a manufacturing company, Company X in Figure 3.1 below, 
which consists of three Geographical (GEO) segments:  UK, USA, and Australia. 
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Figure 3.1: Sales Information for Company X 
 
Sales data in the segment report allow construction of the sales data in the 
consolidated report, but the sales data in the consolidated report do not allow construction of 
the sales data in the segment report.  Thus, the segment report should be at least as 
informative as the consolidated report. 
However, although the fineness theorem discussed above provides a theoretical proof 
of the importance of disaggregated information, there is one important aspect of segmental 
disclosure that might mitigate the usefulness of segment information. This aspect is related to 
the identification of reportable segments. Section 3.3 below discusses the issue of segment 
identification and its impact on the usefulness of segment information to the users of financial 
reports. 
 
3.3-The Issue of Segment Identification 
One of the implications of segment disclosure is the segment identification issue. It is 
all about the question of how segment information should be categorised. The first attempt to 
look at reportable segment identification issue was when SFAS 14 was issued in the USA. 
Some of the previous studies on segmental disclosure have explored the identification of 
reportable segments and the effect of segment identification on the usefulness of segment 
information. It is argued that lack of clear guidance on how reportable segments should be 
defined is a complex task and there are many ways in which the company can define its 
segments. Therefore many researchers argued that the flexibility of the accounting standards 
Consolidated Sales
£700
Australia 
£300
USA    
£150
UK       
£250
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relating to the definition of reportable segments has improved segmental disclosure because it 
allows the management to decide what is the best way to report segmental information so that 
it reflects the organisational units.  
Emmanuel & Gray (1977) evaluate the segment disclosure of 100 large industrial 
companies and find that the companies tend to use different patterns to report segment 
information. They also find that the reportable segments did not match the scope of the 
business nor the companies’ international operations. 
Emmanuel & Gray (1978) study highlight the shortcoming of UK segmental reporting 
requirements particularly in reference to the identification of reportable segments. The study 
also reveals some of the current identification practices that are followed by different 
companies from different sectors. The authors compare and evaluate these different 
identification practices and based on their analysis they made a proposal about how to define 
a reportable segment. They clearly state that the main concern of their study is related to the 
practicability and usefulness of identifying reportable segments and not with information 
content of the disclosure requirements. 
In addition, Emmanuel & Gray (1978) argue that similarity in the effect of economic 
conditions in which reportable segments have been identified is of a great importance to the 
users of the financial reports. In other words, reportable segments should have differing 
characteristics over time. Thus segments should be reported based on their response to the 
changes in the economic conditions. 
Emmanuel & Gray (1978) discuss four alternative ways for identifying reportable 
segments. First of all companies can report their segments based on industry and product line. 
Based on a previous study of disclosure practices the author finds that the majority of the 
sample companies have reported disaggregated information of sale and/or profit. However, 
less than dozen identified their segments based on SIC one digit code. While quarter of the 
companies have defined their segments based on SIC three digits code. This implies that even 
with the availability of industrial classification code companies tend to vary in their 
classification decisions. Despite this, Emmanuel & Gray (1978) argue that with the 
supplementary information about the industrial and product line activities, the identification 
of reportable segments on the basis of industry and product line could be improved.  
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The second alternative basis for identifying reportable segments is based on market. 
The logic behind defining segments based on markets is because each market has unique 
characteristics and has different degree of risk.  
The third classification method to report segment information is based on 
geographical areas. It is found that the majority of the companies have disclosed their 
segmental information based on geographical areas. But it was found that the geographical 
segmentation presented in segment reports does not reconcile with director reports and 
Chairman’s statement. 
The last alternative classification basis is according to organisational lines. Segment 
identification according to the company’s internal units, divisions, departments or subsidiaries 
is one way to report segment information. However, if these organisational lines do not match 
with the industry classification the reported segments will be vain to external users.  In 
support of this identification basis, Gray (2014) referred to Solomons (1968) argument that “if 
the internal accounting reports are the best that management can produce to guide their own 
decisions, then there is an initial presumption that the same statements, or less detailed 
versions of them, are likely best to serve the investor in making his investment and dis-
investment decision.”(Gray, 2014, p.209) 
At the end of their research, Emmanuel & Gray (1978) propose that the identification 
of reportable segments should be benchmarked with some external criteria. They proposed 
that these external criteria should base on SIC three digits code. They argue that by having 
this external yard-stick a long with having internal one the segment information will be more 
consistent across different companies. They also suggest that it is important to include a 
decision criterion in accounting regulation to define an organisational unit as reportable 
segments.   
Emmanuel & Garrod (1987) discuss segment identification issue by obtaining the 
opinion of both prepares and users of the financial reports. They believe that the way in which 
companies define their reportable segments has a significant and direct impact on the 
usefulness of segment reports. Although they approved of having a consistent form for 
defining reportable segments but they opposed having a rigid and arbitrary set of rules to be 
followed by all companies from different industry types.  
 For the purpose of their study, Emmanuel & Garrod (1987) interview 16 investment 
analysts in order to obtain the opinion of the users of segment reports on the preferable 
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definition for reporting segmental information. One of the major concerns the analysts have 
about the segment report is the lack of consistency between segment reported and the other 
section of the annual report. In addition, the analysts are concerned about the way reportable 
segments are identified and whether they are compatible with their forecasting models. The 
analysts suggest that the best identification basis should be used so that it will result in more 
number of segments to be reported. 
At the same time, the study viewed the opinions of the six companies which represent 
the opinion of the preparers of segment reports. Although the majority of these companies 
identified their reportable segment based on geographical areas but still there are some 
differences in which these geographic areas have been defined. Some of the reasons for the 
variation in companies’ identification of reportable segments are 1) the significance of the 
areas contribution to the total company’s performance, 2) the coincidence with legal entities 
within the group, 3) the need to avoid host government scrutiny, or 4) disguise dependence on 
politically unstable market (Emmanuel & Garrod, 1987).  
Some of the potential identification criteria as proposed by Emmanuel & Garrod (1987) are: 
1- By recognising legal entities /company and subsidiaries relationship 
2- By organisation structure 
3- By individual product or service 
4- By product line  
5- By industry  
6- By classes of customers 
7- By geographical areas 
Hussain & Skerratt (1992) examine the use of line of business disclosure by financial 
analysts to predict company’s future profitability. They argue that the way in which reportable 
segments are defined has a significant impact on the usefulness of segment information. They 
suggest that the best way to identify reportable segments is not necessary to be according to 
the organisational structure. In addition, the study documents that the segment measures could 
be used to map company performance with the industry. The study aims to provide a better 
insight to the preparers of segment reports into the best possible identification criteria for line 
of business segments. It also aims to provide some insight into the role of segment 
identification in improving forecasting company’s consolidated profit. 
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Hussain & Skerratt’s (1992) model proves that the wrong or misleading identification of 
company’s reportable segments will negatively affect the accuracy of financial analysts’ 
forecast of company future consolidated profitability. Their argument is based on the 
assumption that the prediction of future consolidated profitability is a function of changes in 
the industry profitability index (i.e. industrial gross margin) 
Hussain & Skerratt (1992) highlight that in the UK and since the issuance of SSAP 25 the 
issue of reportable segment identification has been considered as a key aspect of segment 
disclosure. However, the standard offers only abroad guideline regarding defining what is a 
reportable segment. The standard left segment identification to the judgment of the company’s 
management as long as these judgments meet the broad requirement of the standard. At the 
same time, it is equally true to say that leaving the identification of reportable segments to the 
judgment of the company’s management may not be in the best interest of the users of these 
reports particularly the financial analysts.  
Despite this, the subsequent segmental disclosure standard offered a little more detail on 
how reportable segments should be defined, specifically the classification based on line of 
business or geographical regions, although IAS 14R still grants the management great 
discretion to decide what a reportable segment under these two broad classifications is. Some 
of the criticisms of how segments are defined under the IAS 14R have been raised in the 
United States against SFAS 14. Street et al. (2000) have quote the users’ response to AICPA 
about segment identification criteria: “that many companies define industry segments too 
broadly for business reporting and thus report on too few industry segments.” In the same 
context the AIMR stated: 
“SFAS 14 requires disclosure of line of business information classified by industry segments, 
its definition of segment is necessarily imprecise, recognizing that there are numerous 
practical problems in applying that definition to different business entities operating under 
disparate circumstances. The weakness in SFAS 14 has been exploited by many enterprises to 
suit their own financial reporting purposes. As a result, we have seen one of the ten largest 
firms in the country report all its operations as being in a single, very broadly defined industry 
segment.” 
(Street et al., 2000, p.260) 
According to Hussain & Skerratt (1992), the previous studies which have examined 
segment identification issue either looked at the formal statistical properties of prediction 
model or examined the practical guidance for accounting regulators and policy makers. 
 The next section provides more details on the importance of segmental information 
and its usefulness to capital market and to the users of the financial reports. 
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3.4- Importance of Segment Information to the Users of Financial Reports 
The importance of segmental reporting is not exception from the importance of other 
components of annual report such as the director’s report, auditor’s report or financial 
statements. According to the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), 
segmental reporting is vital, essential, fundamental, indispensable and integral to the 
investment analysis process. In addition, in part one of the Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice No. 25 (Purpose of Segmental Information), segmental reporting has been 
highlighted as being useful to help the users of financial statements gain a better insight into 
the company’s past performance and a better prediction of future earnings.  
It also emphasised the point that by obtaining information about significant 
components of the company operations, users will be in a better position to evaluate the 
company’s overall performance. The FASB highlighted the importance of segmental 
reporting when it issued SFAS 131.  
The objective of requiring disclosure about segments of an enterprise and related information 
is to provide information about the different types of business activities in which an enterprise 
engages and the different economic environments in which it operates to help users of 
financial statements: 
a. Better understand the enterprise’s performance 
b. Better assess its prospects for future net cash flow 
c. Make more informed judgments about the enterprise as a whole 
(Objectives, Paragraph 3)  
One of the early studies that presented the importance of segment information is that of 
one conducted by Emmanuel & Gray (1977). They emphasised the importance of segment 
reporting and stated that if segment information is wrongly reported or has been manipulated 
nothing else could make up or correct for the damages caused by such manipulation.  
In support of Emmanuel & Gray’s (1977) contention about the role of segment 
disclosure in the evaluation and prediction of a company’s activities, many studies have 
provided empirical evidence indicating that improved segmental reporting has improved 
company valuation. For example, Ahadiat (1993) provide evidence of the importance of 
geographic segments disclosure on value prediction. Others have stressed on its importance in 
risk and earning evaluation, “segment information improves an evaluation of corporation’s 
principal risks and uncertainties of its main product lines and geographic areas of trade, 
components of earnings performance and strategic goals, and so increase the informativeness 
of the earnings number” (Leung & Horwitz, 2004, p. 239).  
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Further, Hope et al. (2008) report that implementation of SFAS 131 has improved the 
valuation of foreign and domestic earning. However, the level of improvement in the 
valuation of foreign earning is more significant. In the USA for example, and post the 
implementation of SFAS 131 it is found that the quality of segment reporting has improved 
and consequently information asymmetry between insider and outsider has declined. The 
reduction in information asymmetry has lowered the information-risk and ultimately reduced 
required cost of capital. Not only that, but based on the Market Efficiency Theory (MET), 
high quality financial information assists market participants to trade firms’ share in 
fundamental and intrinsic value. Another important aspect of segment disclosure is that it 
provides additional insight to investors and analysts regarding company different operations 
and helps them to predict future earnings.  
Therefore, it can be seen why segment reporting is important. Recently, a new 
accounting standard (IFRS 8) has been issued. Well in advance and before issuing IFRS 8, the 
IASB bet on the success of the new standard to reduce the gap between the insider and 
outsider and to improve the quality of segment information. However, IFRS 8 could be 
considered as radical change in the way external financial reports are presented. The new 
management approach that has been adopted in IFRS 8 and the significant changes it involves 
compared to the previous segment reporting standard (IAS 14R) trigger many concerns about 
its usefulness and whether it will improve the quality of segment reporting. Further, will the 
new standard result in a better insight to market participants?  
Before moving forward, it is very important to discuss the term “quality” in segment 
disclosure. There are many definitions and proxies which have been used in the accounting 
literature for segment disclosure quality. Some of these studies defined quality as the number 
of disclosed segments. Others defined it as the number of line items disclosed in segment 
notes. Also, the fineness of geographic segments has been used as a measure of segment 
disclosure quality. In this study all of these proxies will be utilised to evaluate the quality of 
segment information prior and post IFRS 8.  
Despite all these proxies for the quality of segmental information, the aforementioned 
questions about the usefulness of the internal-management approach is still crucial at this 
time. Berger and Hann (2003) highlight that the management approach to report segmental 
information has been subject to many criticisms. Some of these criticisms are lack of profit 
definition, segments figure no longer required to comply with GAAP/IFRS measures, internal 
cost allocations are subject to considerable discretion, and it gives the management (CODM) 
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more room for manipulating segment information which would reduce the ability to compare 
segment information between companies in the same industry. Hope et al. (2008) report 
empirical evidences that post implementation of SFAS 131 some firms did not report 
geographic earning information which resulted in reduction in event period private 
information of these firms (i.e. investors were not able to gain a better insight about firms 
segmental performance which reflected negatively in their security trading). Some of possible 
concerns about IFRS 8 are:- 
1- Inconsistency of firm segment reporting over medium- to long-term periods 
particularly if the company tend to modify its internal reporting patterns or go through 
organisation restructuring. 
2- Incomparability of segment reporting across different companies. 
3- Easy to manipulate segment information because of ambiguity in some parts of the 
standard. 
4- Decline in number of line items disclosed if there are not regularly reviewed by 
CODM. 
5- Decline in the geographical segment disclosure as it is no longer required in the new 
standard. 
6- The proprietary cost associated with extensive segment reporting particularly if it is 
reported to CODM. 
Very few studies have been done to explore the factors that contribute to companies’ 
different compliance of IFRS 8 or explore its impacts on capital market. For example, Nichols 
et al. (2012) examine the impacts of IFRS 8 adoption by European Blue Chip companies. 
Their paper focuses on the anticipated benefits of IFRS 8. They find that the operating 
segments reported under the new standards have increased. More importantly it provides 
strong evidence that refute the prior-implementation claims that IFRS 8 will result in less 
geographic segments. In addition, the fineness of geographical segments (i.e. more country 
wise disclosure) has also increased.  
On the other hand, the paper highlighted several concerns regarding the implementation of 
the new standard. For example the standard does not provide clear definition of Chief 
Operating Decision Making (CODM). This ambiguity has resulted in different interpretation 
by companies. IFRS 8 also resulted in decrease in the number of information items disclosed 
in segment disclosure section of the annual reports. Another major concern over the 
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implementation of IFRS 8 is the lack of comparability in segment profitability items and 
extensive use of non-IFRS measures (Nichols et al., 2012).  
Many professional institutions are concerned that the management approach will result in 
different segmental reporting pattern because each company has a unique internal structure. 
The way information reported internally affected by many firm-specific factors such as 
organisational structure, distribution of power and authorities, internal culture, business 
activities and historical evolution. Paul & Largay (2005) argue that expected benefits from the 
management approach are compromised by incomparability among companies.  
Nichols et al. (2012) did not include UK companies in the analysis due to prior research 
has been conduct in the UK by Crawford et al. (2012). Crawford et al. (2012) evaluate 
segmental reporting practice of UK companies after the adoption of IFRS 8. They find that 
the average number of reported segments have increase which coincides with the finding of 
Nichols et al. (2012).  In addition it was found that the number of geographic segments and 
extent of segmental note disclosure have increased too. Similarly to other research, it was 
found that the information items disclosed under the segment reporting section have declined.  
Hope et al. (2008) document that post implementation of management approach in 
segment reporting most multinational firms opt not to disclose earnings line item about their 
geographic segments. The interviews with different stakeholders of financial statement 
indicate that they are concerned regarding the lack of consistency between the narrative 
sections in the annual reports and segment notes. Not only this, but as a result of reporting 
segment information in the same way it is reported to the chief operating decision maker, this 
may create a problem of inconsistency and incomparability both within the company and 
across different companies within the same industry.  
In addition, the lack of a clear definition of who is CODM has resulted in different 
reporting practices. Some companies define CODM as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) some 
other defined him/her as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and so on. Although Crawford et al. 
(2012) provide some insight into the impacts of IFRS 8 adoption in the UK, they only 
reviewed the annual report of the sample companies in the year before and the year after the 
implementation of IFRS 8.  
The study did not look at other factors that might influence the segmental disclosure 
practices of UK companies. For example some of the companies are listed in other stock 
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markets where management approach of reporting segment information was mandatory long 
time before the introduction of IFRS 8.  
Moreover, under IAS 14R companies were given the flexibility to report segment 
information based on the organisation internal units. Moreover, the study shows some 
differences in the level of improvement of segment disclosure between FTS-100 and FTSE-
250 companies without providing any analysis on the factors that might attributed to these 
differences. Factors such as size, number of analysts following, board of directors structure, 
listing in many stock market, industry type, etc.  
Although it is noted that the segment reporting has improved after the implementation of 
IFRS 8 but this could change over time. It is also important to appreciate that changing the 
reporting pattern or providing more information (extensive disclosure) does not necessary 
provide better insight to the market. Some of the previous empirical researches documented a 
trade-off between extensive disclosure and information quality of these reports. 
Tasker (1998) reports a negative relation between voluntary disclosure through conference 
calls and the informativeness of companies’ financial statements. Companies’ additional 
information through-out the year particularly if containing revision in management earning 
prediction could be received negatively by the market. Volatility in earnings announcement 
due to voluntary disclosure is negatively related to forecast accuracy (Cox, 1985).  
In other scenarios, the market interpreted increased disclosure badly and motivated 
investors to acquire private information, which resulted in investors asking for higher return 
on their investments (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). Botosan (1997) finds no significant 
association between higher level of disclosure and cost of capital for the companies with low 
number of analysts following. It is very important to understand that there is a line in which 
positive impact of extensive disclosure could be reverse.  
Under a set of pre-defined conditions Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) illustrate that when 
information asymmetry is reduced beyond certain level many market participants responded 
by exiting the market rapidly, which led to increase in the cost of capital. Therefore, this 
present research aims to examine the implications and consequences of segment disclosure 
practice in the UK in a more comprehensive way. 
The most important difference between this study and previous studies is that in this 
study, more emphasis is given to the market reaction to the implementation of IFRS 8 in the 
UK. Does the change in the way segment information is reported provide additional value to 
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the market? Does it provide better insight for analysts’ investors? We will examine the 
relation between stock return and firms’ earnings and whether the adoption of management 
approach in reporting segmental information will improve market predictability power about 
future earnings.  
3.5-Conclusion 
 This chapter provides the rational segmental disclosure (i.e. how it is different from 
consolidated information; and what is the added value if any for disaggregating financial 
information). The chapter begins by highlighting the importance of accounting disclosure in 
general, particularly as a means to control for agency conflict. In addition, the theorem of 
fineness was discussed in this chapter, which illustrate theoretically the usefulness of segment 
information to the users of financial reports. While it is true that segment information 
improves users’ ability to evaluate firms operations, associated risks, and enables them to 
allocate resources efficiently, it is also true that these benefits depend to a greater extent on 
the way segment information is identified. This chapter discusses the issue of segment 
identification and show that the way in which segments are identified determines the 
usefulness of segment information.  
 However, despite the possible pitfalls of mangers’ ability to aggregate and conceal 
information from the market due to various possible ways to identify reportable segments, the 
chapter provide sufficient evidences about the importance of segmental information to the 
users of financial reports. This evidence are based on both empirical results of prior studies as 
well as on feedback and comments from regulation setters (FASB, AIMR, and SEC). 
The next chapter reviews in detail the prior literature on the usefulness of corporate financial 
disclosure in general and in particular usefulness of segment information.     
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Chapter 4- Literature Review 
Overview 
This chapter reviews the existing literature relating to general financial 
disclosure and those related specifically to segmental disclosure. A specific attention 
has been given to studies that explore the impact of the management approach in the 
disclosure practices of segmental information. This review of the previous studies 
seeks to help the reader to identify the type of researches that have been so far carried 
out in this area and therefore identify the current gaps in the literature. It also indicates 
the contribution of this study, based on the findings of these studies. The rest of this 
chapter is divided into the following sections:  
Section 4.2 reviews prior studies of the factors influencing accounting 
disclosure and the benefits of accounting disclosure to the companies.  
Section 4.3 reviews the factors influencing the extent of segmental disclosure. 
Section 4.4 discuss the prior researches evaluating the disadvantages or 
possible cost associated with extensive segmental disclosure. 
Section 4.5 reviews studies that have specifically investigated the impact of the 
adoption of the management approach on the extent of segmental disclosure. 
Section 4.6is divided into two parts: (i) the first part discusses prior studies that 
evaluated predictive gains to segmental information; and (ii) the second part discusses 
the prior studies that evaluated market reaction to segmental information. 
Section 4.7 is a review of applications of Future Earnings Response Coefficient 
methodology in accounting and finance research.  
Section 4.8 provides a summary and conclusion to the chapter. 
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4.1- Introduction 
Since the beginning of separation theory or agency theory there has been a strong 
debate about the reliability and relevance of the financial reports issued by firms to the 
external users. Managers will exploit the fact that they are inside the company and have more 
knowledge than investors in order to pursue their own objectives rather than those of the 
shareholders. Healy & Palepu (2001) argue that one of the most important reasons behind the 
demand for corporate disclosure is information asymmetry and agency conflict between 
managers and investors. 
It is also argued that managers tend to work toward achieving their goals which might 
not be in alignment with those of shareholders.  Many users claim that they are not satisfied 
about the extent, quality or the way in which financial and operational results of an enterprise 
are communicated to them. Users’ dissatisfaction could be attributed to many factors.  
For example, Jullobol et al., (2012) look at the factors that determining stakeholders’ 
satisfaction with the financial disclosure. They argue that media, attitude, problem experience 
before from using financial information and expectation have a significant impact on the 
stakeholders’ satisfaction toward the disclosed financial information. The study also shows 
that investment behaviour has significant impact on the level of satisfaction, i.e. the users of 
fundamental–analysis approach are more demanding of information and not easily satisfied by 
the disclosed information and they always ask for more.  
On the other hand, users of the technical-analysis approach tend to be less demanding 
and easily satisfied with minimum level of disclosure. Another reason for financial statements 
users’ dissatisfaction with financial reports is the lack of timeliness of these reports. Collins et 
al. (1994) examine the timeliness of earnings announcements to understand the weak 
association between stock return and firms disclosed earnings.  
They attribute the low association between return and earnings are due to the lack of 
timeliness in earnings announcement. The lack of timeliness of financial information could be 
explained by accounting policies and practices followed by firms when disclosing their 
financial and operational results. Again, how and when financial information is made publicly 
available make a significant difference on its usefulness and relevance. The ‘how’ part is what 
we are interested in exploring in this research. However, disclosure practices varies from one 
company to another and from one country to another, therefore it is possible to find a very 
good and informative financial reports. 
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In this chapter, the existing literature in some of the areas related to disclosure in 
general and segmental disclosure in particular is reviewed.   
4.2- Factors Influencing Accounting Disclosure 
4.2.1- Firm External-Environment Factors 
In today’s business environment companies are constantly facing new challenges. 
These challenges are mostly related to improving their financial performance. Accountants 
play a very important role to help companies to overcome some of these challenges. 
Accountants use their valuable skills and knowledge to facilitate managers and other 
stakeholders decision making process. In order to satisfy different stakeholders’ needs for 
making the most accurate decision, accountants supply them with information about the 
company financial performance, financial position, cash flow, and a forecast of future growth. 
This research is mainly concern about the information supplied by accountants to investors 
and financial analysts.    
However, there are many factors that might influence company disclosure pattern or 
choices. Some of these factors are based on overall economic, political, cultural and social 
conditions. Jaggi & Low (2000) test whether there is any relation between companies 
financial disclosure decisions and the country overall legal system (code-law vs. common-
law). Also they have looked at the impact of the culture on the financial disclosure choices. 
They find that there is some sort of relationship between country’s legal system and the 
financial disclosure, (i.e. it is found that firms from common law countries tend to disclose 
more information than firms in code law countries).  
However, Jaggi & Low’s (2000) findings indicate that there is an insignificant 
relationship between cultural values and financial disclosure choices of the firms in common 
law countries.  On the other hand, the impact of cultural values on financial disclosure in code 
law countries is not clear. Further, Jaggi & Low (2000) argue that the fact of being a 
multinational firm or not has not changed their findings.  
In a similar study Kantor et al. (1995) examine the financial reporting practices in 
selected Arab countries and find that in general, the disclosure practices in these countries are 
similar and that the level of disclosure is very limited and so many items are not provided in 
the annual reports produced by companies in these countries. They argue that one of the 
reasons for having poor financial disclosure in Arab countries is because the government 
control most companies and therefore there is no need to publicly disclose the financial result 
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of these companies. Actually, the government has access to information through private 
channels and private meeting with the management.  
Singleton & Globerman (2002) investigate whether Japanese companies listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange modified their accounting disclosure behaviour over the period of 
1990s. The paper implicitly tests whether the collapse of Japan’s Financial Bubble in the late 
1980s changed the incentives for Japanese managers to be more concerned about corporate 
disclosure. They find that Japanese disclosure practices are sensitive to economic conditions. 
It could be argued that this study implicitly refers to negative impact of bad financial 
reporting on the economy as a whole and how financial reporting could be linked to financial 
crisis.   
Dedman & Lennox (2009) assess the impact of the intensity of competition 
environment on the company level of disclosure given that the company is not seeking 
external financing. They study focus on three dimensions to measure the degree of current and 
potential competition. The first dimension is the number of current competitors to the 
company’s main products or services. The second dimension is the possible threat of new 
entry. The third dimension is company’s product price elasticity to change in demand. They 
measure the degree of competition based on the result of a large scale survey of managers 
which incorporated the three dimensions.  
Dedman & Lennox’s (2009) study was conducted in the UK and included medium-
size private companies. Medium-size private companies have the right to disclose the details 
of gross profit (i.e. sales and cost of sales) or to disclose abbreviated one. Therefore, the study 
tries to see whether the degree of competition will affect managers’ disclosure decision about 
sales and cost of sales of the sample companies. The results of the study show that companies 
labelled as having more current competitors, higher potential threat of new entry, and higher 
price elasticity to change in demand are more likely to abbreviate their gross profit in public 
reports. Despite the important findings of this study, one vital element in the evaluation of 
impact of competition on financial disclosure quality is missing. This element is a measure of 
whether these companies are making abnormal return in a particular market.   
 
4.2.2- Firm-Specific Factors 
Other factors that influence accounting disclosure practices or choices are based on 
firm-specific characteristics such as size, ownership structure, size of auditing firm, board of 
directors, etc,. For example Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) show that company size affects the 
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level of disclosure in order to reduce the cost of capital by attracting institutional investors. 
Large firms are more likely to be followed by a large number of investors, analysts and other 
market participants therefore it is in the firm best interest to provide them with more 
information otherwise they will acquire this information using private means and will ask for 
higher return. They also argue that the large firms need to provide the market makers with 
liquidity shocks through additional disclosure to maintain the equilibrium holding of 
institutional investors.  
Lang & Lundholm (1993) evaluate the determinants of firms’ disclosure level and 
divided the factors that could affect firms’ disclosure decision into three categories 
(Performance, Structural and Offer). Their regression results indicate that firms’ disclosure 
level is positively associated with firm size in structural category, return and analysts’ forecast 
error in performance category and with offer category measured as firm being active in 
issuing securities.   
Gelb & Zarowin (2002) compare the disclosure level of 821 companies and show that 
the higher disclosure companies tend to be larger, have better accounting performance (i.e. 
profitable), have better capital market performance. On the other hand, the companies with 
lower disclosure tend to have higher book-to-market ratio. One of the reasons that larger firms 
tend to have higher disclosure compared to small firms is because of low preparation cost and 
market pressure (more investors and analysts’ follows large firms, see Lang & Lundholm, 
1996; Botosan, 1997; and Roychowdhury & Sletten, 2012). However, it is important to 
mention that it is not always the case that higher disclosure is associated with good 
performance (see Harris, 1998; Bens et al, 2011; and Ellis et al. 2012).  
There is conflicting evidence regarding the effect of firm performance and level of 
disclosure, some studies document that companies with bad news tend to voluntary provide 
more information to the market. Managers’ incentive for voluntary disclosure in the case of 
bad performance could be attributed to their willingness to avoid legal consequences and ease 
market reaction to the forthcoming bad news. Another reason for managers’ incentive to 
disclose more information during bad performance period is to have all bad information in 
one period so that in next period their accounts look much better (Big Bath).   
Luo et al (2006) evaluate the voluntary disclosure practices and other firm specific 
factors such as ownership structure and firm size of firms listed in Singapore. They reveal that 
large firms in Singapore have better voluntary disclosure compared to small size firms. They 
also suggest that ownership structure affects the amount of voluntary disclosure. The more 
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shares owned by the management or by the government the less voluntary disclosure is 
provided to the market. On the other hand, they have stated that as the proportion of block 
outside-investors increase the management ability to conceal information decrease. 
Alsaeed (2006) examine the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual report of non-
financial firms in Saudi Stock Market and empirically tested the hypothesised impact of 
several firm-specific characteristics on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The results of this 
study show that the level of voluntary disclosure of the listed non-financial firms in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is relatively low compared to other markets which to some 
extent matches with the findings of Aljifri (2008). This could be attributed to the fact that the 
Saudi market is heavily controlled by the government owned companies and due to the use of 
Saudi accounting standards which greatly differs from international standards (Kantor et al, 
1995).   
Despite the low level of voluntary disclosure in Saudi, it is found that large firms tend 
to voluntary disclose more information whereas other variables namely debt ratio, ownership 
dispersion, firm age, profit margin, industry type and audit firm size show an insignificant 
relation with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The  
Lopes & Rodrigues (2007), in a study on the determinants of disclosure of Portuguese 
listed companies, argue that the degree of disclosure in accounting for financial instruments is 
significantly related to size, type of auditors, listing status and economic sector. In a similar 
study but on listed companies in Nigeria, Adelopo (2011) finds that there is a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm size and firm performance. On the other 
hand the study finds significant negative relationship between percentage of block share 
ownership and firm financial disclosure. The same negative relationship is found between 
management shares in the firms and financial disclosure.  
Aljifri (2008) evaluates the disclosure choices of listed companies in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). He examines whether there is any disclosure practices differences between 
different sectors (Banking, Service, Industrial, and Insurance). In this article the author 
assumes that three firm-specific characteristics (size, debt-to-equity, and profitability) plus the 
sector’s type influence the financial disclosure choices. The findings of this study indicate a 
significant relationship between sector type, specifically banks, and the level of financial 
disclosure. On the other hand it finds that firm size, debt-to-equity and profitability have 
insignificant relationship with the level of disclosure. Although the finding of this study 
indicates that the level of disclosure is positively associated with the banking sector. In fact, 
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this can be attributed to the fact that banking sector is governed by different set of rules and 
regulations compared to other sectors. Therefore most disclosed information provided by 
banks is in compliance with the regulatory requirements.  
Iatridis (2008) examines accounting disclosure and firm’s financial attributes of UK 
listed companies. He finds that extensive financial disclosure positively related to firm 
specific characteristics such as size, growth and leverage. He also testes the relationship 
between firms’ financing need and extensive financial disclosure and finds that companies 
with financing need tend to exhibit extensive financial disclosure. This finding is supported 
by much empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between financial disclosure 
and cost of capital (see Healy & Palepu, 2001 and Francis et al., 2008).  
Dedman & Lennox (2009) are interested in identifying the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure of private companies in UK. The sample size of the study comprises medium size 
companies that qualify to abbreviate their sales and cost of sales figure in the public report. 
They define the degree of disclosure variable (dependent variable) as a dummy variable which 
equal to one if the company disclosed the sales and cost of sales in the public reports and zero 
otherwise. The independent variables include many firm-specific characteristics such as firm 
size, the ratio of long-term debts to total liabilities, the ratio of company’s profit to total 
assets, company age, deviation of company’s profit from the industry, and the company’s 
products diversity. The results of their analysis indicate that companies with high long-term 
debts and higher profitability are more likely to conceal information from the public. On the 
other hand, large companies are less likely to report abbreviated profit figure. In addition, the 
study shows that the other variables are not statistically significant.  
Roychowdhury & Sletten (2012) compare the earning informativness of good and bad 
news firms. Their results reflect that information asymmetry is higher for bad news firms and 
that these firms are labelled as smaller in size, have lower number of analysts following and 
lower proportionate of institutional ownership compared to better disclosing firms. The 
difference in the firm size, analysts following and proportionate of institutional investors’ 
between bad news and good news firms is found to be statistically significant. They also point 
out that due to managers’ preference to delay the disclosure of bad news until the time of 
actual earnings announcement, bad news firms exhibited a stronger shock to the market and 
higher return volatility.   
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4.3- Factors Influencing Segmental Disclosure 
Compared to overall disclosure, fewer studies have investigated the factors that 
determine firms’ segmental reporting choices. Many factors can influence a firm’s segmental 
disclosure practices. For example, Hayes & Lundholm (1996) discuss the determinants of 
segmental reporting in competitive market. They find that in very competitive markets, where 
the margin is very small between the companies, different activities are reported as separate 
segments because the benefit of disclosure exceeds the competition cost. However, in partial 
disclosure equilibrium, companies tend to disaggregate segments only when these segments 
have similar results but if the results of these activities are different the companies tend to 
report less number of segments.   
Harris (1998) examine the impact of competition on segment disclosure under SFAS 
14 in the U.S. during 1987-1991.She argues that companies tend to aggregate segmental 
information in less competitive industries in order to protect abnormal return in these 
industries. Botosan & Harris (2000) find that in situations when the market witnesses a 
decline in the capital or analysts’ forecast accuracy, companies tend to increase the level of 
segment disclosure even beyond mandatory requirements.  
Leung & Horwitz (2004) assess the determinants of voluntary segmental disclosure in 
Hong Kong. They studied the effect of capital structure and corporate governance in the 
segmental reporting choice of 376 companies from Hong Kong stock market excluding banks 
and financial companies for 1996. Similar to many previous studies, they develop self-
constructed disclosure index which comprises 9 items. Each item available in the company’s 
report is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. In addition to the two main independent variables they 
controlled for firm size, leverage, big 6 auditors, exchange listing, minority interest, new 
share issue, competition, ROE, and industry fixed effect.  
The logistic regression of the full sample show that the level of voluntary segmental 
disclosure is statistically and positively associated with auditors being one of the big six, firm 
size, and company being listed overseas. In addition, the results reflect that the existence of 
non-executive directors in the board is positively related to voluntary segment reporting. 
However, higher directors’ ownership (i.e. more than 25%) mitigates the effect of non-
executive directors in segmental disclosure (Leung & Horwitz, 2004).  
In other words, only those companies which did not have concentrated board 
ownership have exhibited positive association between proportion of non-executive directors 
and level of voluntary segment disclosure. In the other hand the regression analysis indicates 
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that segmental disclosure is significantly and negatively related to the board ownership if it 
exceeds 25%. However, if the board ownership is between 1% and 25%, the companies tend 
to provide higher segmental disclosure (Leung & Horwitz, 2004).  
In another study, Botosan & Standford (2005) examine the management incentives for 
withholding segmental information under SFAS-14. They examine firms that reported as one 
segment under SFAS 14 and changed their reporting pattern under SFAS 131 to multi-
segment. They find that those companies that used to hide segmental information under SFAS 
14 were motivated by the desire to protect profit in less competitive industries. Similar 
finding is reported by Ettredge et al. (2006) they examine the association between proprietary 
cost and segmental disclosure under SFAS 131. They find that proprietary cost incline 
managers to conceal segment profit information.  
Berger & Hann (2007) examine whether managers’ aggregation decision regarding 
segmental information is determined by proprietary or agency cost. The motive for their study 
is based on the existing empirical evidences on the impact of managers’ expectation of 
competition harms on the disclosure quality. The main argument of the study is that this 
evidence is to some extent also applicable to expected effect of agency cost on disclosure 
decisions. They hypothesise that agency cost, when evaluated under the context of company 
performance, is expected to have opposite impact on company’s decision to disaggregate line 
of business profit information.  
The sample size was796 companies that reported multiple segments under the new 
segmental disclosure standard (SFAS 131).They capture managers’ disclosure decision by 
comparing the segment disclosure of the last year of SFAS 14 with the restated segmental 
disclosure of the same year under SFAS 131. If the restated segment information revealed 
more segments then the researchers have two hypotheses for withholding these segments 
under SFAS 14.   
The first hypothesis is if the new segment exhibits abnormal profit then it is assumed 
that the new segment has been concealed because of proprietary cost motive. The second 
hypothesis is if the new segment is underperforming then the motive for management 
aggregation decision is agency cost.  
Their analysis yield significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that managers tend 
to withhold information related to segments with relatively low abnormal profits. This 
indicates that under the risk and reward approach the managers use to have a greater room of 
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discretion compared to the management approach and they exploited this feature for their best 
interest. With regard to the proprietary cost hypothesis, the results revealed mixed evidence. 
Nichols & Street (2007) assess the relationship between the industry competition and 
business segment disclosure of 160 companies. The sample companies are from different 
parts of the world and produce their financial statement in accordance with International 
Accounting Standards. The result of their study shows a significant negative relationship 
between business segment disclosure and company return in excess of the industry average. 
This finding implies that companies’ concern over their competitive position drive them to 
minimize their business segment disclosure and protect themselves from new entrants. 
Bens et al. (2011) identify the determinants for companies’ decision to withhold 
segmental information. The main interest of their study is to explore the impact of both 
proprietary and agency cost on the level of segment information disaggregation. The total 
sample of this study comprises 1625 firms-years from 1987, 1992, and 1997 representing 
USA manufacturing establishments. Although the study cover the period in which segment 
reports are prepared according to the industry based approach, Bens et al. (2011) argue that 
the findings of the study could be applied to the new internal-management approach.  
 The findings of this study are consistent with the existing empirical evidence which 
reveals that both proprietary and agency cost increase information asymmetry between 
managers and investors for multi-segments companies. 
However, the study indicates that the effect of proprietary and agency cost occur in 
different context. For example, managers’ choice to withhold segment information as a result 
to agency cost motive is when the company has low profitability in a particular segment and 
when the internal capital allocation between different segments is inefficient, while, 
proprietary cost motives dominate when firms’ abnormal profit in particular line of business 
is higher than industry-average profitability. The results also show that multi-segments 
companies are more likely to withhold segment information when labour power is high. On 
the other hand, for private companies it is found that only proprietary cost is the motive for 
companies’ decision to conceal segmental information (Bens et al., 2011).  
Company capital structure and leverage could influence the degree and quality of 
segmental disclosure. According to Wang et al. (2011), company segmental disclosure is 
determined by firm’s reliance on external finance.  
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Pisano & Landriani (2012) explore the factors that determine managers’ decision 
regarding the disclosure of segmental information. They are mainly interested to see whether 
mangers withhold segmental information when competitive harm is expected from the 
disclosure of this information. They carry out their study on 124 non-financial companies 
listed in Italian stock market. A long with the main independent variable (proprietary cost) 
they have controlled for other variable such as firms size, leverage, and profitability.  
Pisano & Landriani (2012) find that companies operating in a very competitive 
industry are associated with higher segmental disclosure compared to those operating in less 
competitive industries. This finding indicates that companies tend to protect their most 
profitable segment and choose to conceal the information to protect those segments from new 
rivals. They also stated that the level of segmental disclosure is significantly and positively 
associated with firm size. On the other hand, the results show that both the level of debt and 
company profitability is significantly and negatively associated with the extent of segmental 
disclosure.  
Ellis et al. (2012) examine the determinants of the disclosure of firm’s customer 
information and they are mainly interested to see whether the disclosure of such information 
is affected by proprietary cost.  The study focus on the degree of compliance among USA 
firms to the requirements of SEC to disclose the sale and identity of major customers. A 
major customer is any customer how represents more than 10% of firm’s total sales. The 
sample size for this study include all firms from Compustat database over 1976-2006. From 
the total firms available in the database, utilities and financial firms were excluded.  
Segmental and major customer information was also obtained from Compustat. Their 
independent variable is a dummy variable which was coded as one if the firm disclosed the 
identity of its major customers and zero otherwise. The main dependent variables are 
proprietary cost and degree of industry competition. Proprietary cost is captured by two 
measures; the first one is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total sales. The 
second proxy is the proportion of intangible assets net of goodwill to the total assets. The 
level of industry competition is measured based on the industry average profit adjustment 
speed and based on Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Ellis at al., 2012).   
The analysis of this study reveals that the disclosure of major customers is affected by 
the degree of potential competition harm. Ellis et al. (2012) document that high research and 
development cost, high intangible assets and large marketing cost are significantly associated 
with lower disclosure practices regarding major customers’ sales.  
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In addition, they indicate that highly profitable firms tend to conceal information 
about major customers to protect their profit margin. The same conclusion is reported by other 
studies. Lail et al. (2104) find supporting evidence that managers are using the flexibility 
provided by SFAS 131 in defining reportable earning to aggregate segment earning 
information due to proprietary cost and agency cost.    
On the other hand, Ellis et al. (2012) find that large size firms and firms audited by 
distinct auditors are more likely to disclose the identity of major customers. Interestingly, they 
have observed that high proprietary cost firms tend to have higher voluntary disclosure about 
non-major customers. They argue that higher voluntary disclosure about non-major customers 
by high proprietary cost firms is due to higher benefits associated with the disclosure 
compared to the possible cost (Ellis et al., 2012).  
Well-performing companies tend to send positive signals to the markets through better 
disclosure practices which in some cases take the form of voluntary disclosure. The managers 
of these companies are motivated by the market to show the superiority over other managers. 
It could be argued that the performance of the companies and the managements are what 
determine the level of disclosure.  
Francis et al. (2008) evaluate the association between corporate disclosure and quality 
of announced earnings. They document that the level of disclosure is determined by earnings 
quality. They argue that financial disclosure complement earning quality and therefore we 
expect companies with higher earning quality to have higher disclosure score.  
In a similar type of study, Blanco et al. (2014) examine the relation between quality of 
earnings and segmental information disclosed under SFAS 131. They use a sample of non-
regulated and non-financial firms listed in the US stock market and find that there is 
statistically significant positive relationship between earnings quality and extent of segmental 
disclosure. 
 
4.4- Possible Costs Associated with extensive Segmental Disclosure 
There are many empirical evidences in favour of intensive financial disclosure and the 
benefits associated with it particularly its role in facilitating efficient allocation of capital and 
ultimately lead to efficient capital market. Despite the many calls for intensive corporate 
disclosure, the reality is that many companies are far from being fully transparent. 
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These firms retain a large amount of information undisclosed either due to 
management self-interest protection or for the sake of protecting shareholders interest. It is 
really important to note that management reluctant for extensive disclosure is not always 
because they are trying to hide bad information, although in many cases it will be interpreted 
wrongly in that way, but they are trying to protect the company they are running against any 
unintended negative consequence of disclosure. This is where the dilemma between 
improving corporate disclosure and confidentiality emerges.  
In the UK for example, before the introduction of SSAP 25, many companies were 
reluctant to provide detailed information regarding their segmental operations because they 
were concerned about the competitive harm that could occur from such disclosure. Also in 
USA, some companies try to exploit the flexibility granted by SFAS 131 to aggregate 
important information that could be used by the competitors. For example, Apple’s Finance 
Chief stated “our competitors would just love to know what our specific (Segment) gross 
margin and we just do not want to help them” (Nytimes.com, 2006) 
There are many studies which provide warning signals for the negative unintended 
consequences of intensive disclosure. Those unintended consequences could harm company’s 
competitive position in the market. Emmanuel and Garrod (1987) argue that the company’s 
directors may omit segmental information because the disclosure of such information might 
cause serious harm to the interest of the company. In their study they interviewed the Finance 
Director, Chief Accountant and Head of Accounting Policies of six companies and the 
majority of them believed that more segment disaggregation and identification of more 
segments may be harmful to the company and place it at a competitive disadvantage.  
Wrong or bad interpretation of extensive disclosure could also harm the company or to 
the management.  Extensive segmental reporting is one of the areas in which competitors 
could look at to obtain a sense of company’s areas of strength and use segment information to 
develop competing strategies. Choi & Levich (1991) argue that additional financial 
information is costly to prepare and may also increase firms competitive cost.  
Consistently Choi & Levich, & Gilotta (2012) argue that the area of segmental 
reporting is very controversial in the sense that although it is an accounting standard but there 
are strong empirical evidences concerning the competitive harm that might results from the 
implementation of such standard. He adds that the harmful effects of segmental reporting are 
not limited to rivals but also include the harm of losing bargaining power against suppliers, 
customers, and employees. 
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In the light of the many empirical studies which have compared segmental disclosure 
under risk and reward approach and management approach and which have documented that 
the country-level geographical disclosure has improved under the new approach, Tsakumis et 
al. (2006) is motivated to test whether, under the management approach, companies’ 
geographical country-level disclosure is affected by potential competition harm.  
The main hypothesis of Tsakumis et al.’s (2006) study is that firms with higher 
potential competition risk are associated with lower level of geographical disclosure fineness. 
Along with the main variable they have controlled for the number of countries in which the 
company operates, the company size, and previous reporting practice. They measure 
competition risk by taking the ratio of individual firm’s total revenue to its foreign revenue 
and they captured for the fineness of geographic disclosure by calculating the percentage of 
individual country revenue to total foreign revenue. For the purpose of this study, 115 
companies from Fortune 500 were included.  
Tsakumis et al. (2006) find that country-level disclosure has significantly negative 
correlation with the level of competition. The results indicate that firms with higher optional 
completion harm tend to disclose less country-level revenue. Also, they have observed 
significant negative correlation between fineness of geographic disclosure and number of 
countries in which the company operates. In addition, they have confirmed they previous 
literature that firm size is positively associated with better disclosure practices as measured by 
the country level disclosure. Finally, they reveal that firms which used to have more country-
level disclosure under the risk and reward approach continue to do the same under the 
management approach.  
 Another type of cost that might impact the level of disclosure and content of disclosed 
information is agency cost. Managers will be very conservative to disclose information that 
could harm their reputation and their market value in the labour market. Many managers tend 
to hide bad information from the market particularly if their remuneration and bonus scheme 
is linked to company’s share price performance (Berger and Hann, 2007).  
The new trend in business environment toward more environmental friendly methods 
of production and the other legal costs that could be incurred as a result of company 
operations could motivate the managements to conceal some of their information particularly 
if the company is a multinational (multi-segments) company and its business practices could 
be viewed and treated differently from one country to another.   
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Overall, the studies on the possible costs associated with extensive corporate 
disclosure in general and segment information in particular show conflicting results. Talha et 
al. (2006) evaluate the impact of segmental reporting on the degree of competitive 
disadvantage in the Malaysian market. The sample of the study consists of 166 companies for 
the period 2000 to 2002.  Competitive disadvantage is measured as Total Performance Index 
(TPI) which consists of three financial ratios. The three financial ratios are: operating margin, 
return on total assets, and value added ratio. The quality of segmental disclosure is measured 
by the Weighted Average Correlation (WAC).  
𝑊𝐴𝐶 = ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑗) 
Pi; is the portion of turnover in the business segment; Pj; is the portion of turnover in the 
geographic segment; rij; is the correlation between business segment turnover and geographic 
segment turnover.  
Talha et al. (2006) find that the level of competitive disadvantage, quality of 
segmental reporting, and firm size are significantly correlated with segment accounting 
standards adopted at 5% significance level. However, although the coefficient between the 
level of competitive disadvantage and quality of segment disclosure is positive in all three 
years, it is only significant in 2001. They also document that, given the same level of 
segmental disclosure; large firms suffered a higher degree of competitive disadvantage 
compared to small size firms. In addition, they find mixed evidences concerning the 
association between reporting geographic locations as primary segment and degree of 
competitive disadvantage.  
Despite the fact that there are many empirical studies which have provided some 
significant evidence on the negative impacts proprietary costs have on companies’ segmental 
disclosure but there is equivalent number of empirical evidence support the argument that 
there is positive association between disclosure and market competition (Harris, 1998; Ali et 
al., 2014). Blanco et al. (2014) show that proprietary costs has no significant effect on the 
disaggregation of segmental information for the companies with high quality earnings for a 
sample of listed companies in the US in the period between 2001 and 2006. The findings of 
these later studies are supported by the argument that companies tend only to conceal 
information in less concentrated markets where the company is making significant abnormal 
profit.  
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Berger & Hann (2003) evaluate the impact of SFAS 131 adoption by US companies 
on their profitability and prove that companies which used to aggregate their business 
segment did not experience a significant reduction in their profitability after the adoption of 
the new standard.  
 
4.5- Implications of the Management Approach on Segment Reporting 
The most important element in the IFRS 8 according to its supporters that it allows the 
users of the financial statements to see the segment results from a management perspective. 
Also, they argue that producing financial report in similar way as it is produced for internal 
use will reduce segment reporting preparation cost. In addition, the new segment reporting 
standard (IFRS 8) is expected to improve the financial reporting environment. Many of the 
previous research either in USA or Europe has shown that the change in segment reporting 
from line of business and geographic segments to management approach has resulted in an 
increase in the number of segments reported.  
There are many studies which compare and documented the differences in segment 
disclosure between the new management approach and previous risk and reward approach. 
Some of these studies have documented that under the management approach the market 
witnessed a reduction in the comparability feature of segment information across different 
companies (Herrmann & Thomas, 1997; and Emmanuel & Garrod, 2002). 
Street et al (2000) explore the impact of the management approach on the quality of 
segmental information disclosure. The sample of this study comprise 160 large companies 
from the USA market for the period between 1997 and 1998 excluding financial, energy, and 
early adopter companies. Street et al. (2000) also exclude any company that under goes 
through major acquisition and spins-off activities. The main question the study is trying to 
answer is related to whether the management approach in reporting segment information has 
resulted in; 1) an increase in the number of segments disclosed, 2)an increase in the number of 
line items reported in each segment, 3)reconciliation between segment notes and other 
sections of the annual report.  
The results show that most of the companies (106 companies) define their operating 
segments based on the line of business, while only 13 companies use geographical location to 
define their reportable segments. The rest of the companies either use a mixed approach or 
report a single segment (22 & 19 companies respectively).  
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The study also reveals that the management approach has resulted in an increase in the 
number of line of business segments reported. Many of the companies which had reported a 
single segment under the previous approach (risk and reward) have changed their reporting 
details and reported multiple segments post SFAS-131. In addition, it finds that 38 companies 
out of 78 companies that used to report single segment have reported multiple segments.  
Overall 55 companies of the 106 companies which defined their reportable segments based on 
line of business have witnessed an increase in the number of segments reported. At the same 
time it is found that only 6 companies have reported less number of operating segments 
compared to previous approach.  
One of the interesting finding of this study is that 12 companies have aligned their 
organisational structure in the first year of SFAS 131 adoption. The restructuring process has 
impacted the number and definition of segments reported of 6 companies. this part of the 
findings coincide with some of the concerns raised by the users of the financial reports that 
the management approach will encourage the management of the company to manipulate the 
reporting of segment information by changing their organisational structure(Street et al., 
2000).  
In addition to the above findings, Street et al (2000) document that the adoption of the 
management approach has motivated the companies to report more line items for each 
reportable segment particularly line items such as interest income, interest expenses and 
unusual items. Although the majority of the sample companies provided enterprise-wide 
information based on geographical location but only 15% of these companies reported 
profitability figures in this section. On the other hand, under the risk and reward approach, 
84% of the companies provided profitability measure for the information by location.  
Street et al (2000) argue that one of the advantages of the new approach is that it has 
improved the consistency of segmental information between segment notes and other sections 
of the annual report. The number of companies that reported inconsistent information has 
declined from 46 in 1997 to only 15 in 1998. 
Herrmann & Thomas (2000) compare the segmental disclosure of 100 of large size US 
companies under SFAS 131 with the disclosure under the previous standard (SFAS-14). They 
observed that the new standard has made a significant change in way segmental information is 
reported. They document that 68 out of 100 companies have changed the definition of their 
operating segment compared to the previous standard.  
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They also report that SFAS 131 has induced some companies to disclose segment 
information for the first time. The study shows that 10 companies have disclosed segment 
information for the first time after the adoption of SFAS-131. In addition, the total number of 
segments and the number of line items disclosed for each of the operating segments has 
increased. They document that 50 firms have increased the total number of segments 
disclosed while the total number of segments for 42 firms remained unchanged. The mean for 
the number of line items disclosed under SFAS 131 is 6.2 compared to 5.2 under SFAS 14. 
Moreover, they find that the proportion of country level geographic segments has increased. 
In the other hand, they state that the number of line items reported under each of the 
geographic segments has decreased significantly particularly those related to earnings. The 
mean number of line items for each geographic segment under SFAS 131 is 2.2 compared to 
3.3 under SFAS-14. 
Emmanuel & Garrod (2002) appraise the effect of management approach on the 
comparability and relevance of segment information. They are aiming to see whether segment 
identification method create any kind of competition between the two features. They compare 
company results to the industry benchmark. The industry benchmark was derived from two 
sources; namely, FT Extel and Lotus One Source. They use return on assets (ROA) as the 
proxy in which the relevance and comparability of segment information will be assessed. 
They calculate ROA for each segment, total segments, consolidated results and industry 
benchmark. Then they have self-constructed information relevance and comparability matrix. 
The matrix consists of four categories and based on these four categories the company 
segmental information will be classified as relevant, comparable, relevant and comparable or 
neither relevant nor comparable. 
The results of this study show that the majority of the companies are equally spread 
across the four different categories which indicate that comparability and relevance of 
segmental information do not compete with each other. However, for a significant portion of 
the sample the results show that the level of comparability and relevance is very low.  
Emmanuel & Garrod (2002) claim that the management approach could lead to the 
low level of comparability and relevance of segment information.  
Berger & Hann (2003) evaluate the segmental reporting of 2999 USA firms post the 
adoption of SFAS-13. They document an increase in the number of reported segments and 
that segment information became more disaggregated. The average number of reported 
operating segment has significantly increased from 1.41 to 1.79. 
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Moreover, the percentage of firms reporting three or more segments has increased 
after the adoption of SFAS 131 to 23% compared to 11% under the previous standard. Most 
interestingly they state that more than 78% of companies that reported an increase in the 
number of reported segments post SFAS-13 used to report as single segment companies. In 
addition, they find that the percentage of multi-segments firms has increased to 40% under 
SFAS 131 compared to 22% under SFAS-14. According to their study, 23% of the sample 
companies witnessed an increase in the number of reported segments. 
Moreover, Berger & Hann (2003) illustrate that SFAS 131 has positively affect the 
monitoring over managers decisions which coincide with the findings of Bens and Monahan 
(2004). This finding provides empirical evidence for the role of improved segmental 
disclosure in reducing agency cost. Crawford et al., (2012) and Nichols et al. (2012) report 
similar results in different contexts.  
 
Paul & Largay (2005) provide a summary of some of the previous studies that 
compared reporting quality of segment information under both SFAS 14 and SFAS-131. They 
summarise the finding of their review in the following points: 
After the implementation of the management approach in reporting segment information: 
1- the average number of reported operating segments increased; 
2- several firms reported segment information for the first time; 
3- most firms change how they defined their reportable operating segments; 
4- firms continue to report core financial data; 
5- line items related to geographic segments decrease; 
6- few firms changed their organisational structure  
In the second half of their study, Paul & Largay (2005) evaluate segmental disclosure 
of 30 large size companies in Dow Jones index before and after the adoption of SFAS-131. 
They find that the number of reported segments has increase and most of the firms redefined 
their reportable segments. However, they did not find material difference between the new 
and old approach in term of quality of line items disclosed. It is important to highlight that 
their quality judgment was very subjective. 
Ettredge et al. (2005) compare the segmental disclosure of 6827 companies before and 
after the adoption of SFAS 131. They find that the implementation of the new standard (SFAS 
131) resulted in increase in the number of segments disclosed by some of the companies 
which used to report one segment under the previous standards. Their results reveal that more 
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than quarter of the sample companies which reported a single segment under SFAS 14 
became multi-segment companies. 
Botosan & Standford (2005) provide additional evidence that the adoption of 
management approach in reporting segment information has resulted in reducing the number 
of companies reporting as single segment. From the 615 companies in their sample size, 55% 
have reported different operating segments post-SFAS 131. The result reflects managers’ 
exploitation of the leeway in SFAS 14 to hide some segments from the market. 
Valenza & Heem (2010) evaluate the changes in the segmental reporting of French 
companies prior and post the implementation of IFRS 8. They use half-yearly reports from 
CAC 40 companies. The CAC 40 companies represent the large size companies on the French 
stock market. Due to data availability, four companies have been excluded from the sample 
size, making the sample size 36 companies.  
The analysis shows that the majority of the sample companies are very conservative 
and only a few companies decided to early adopt IFRS 8.  Also, the mean of total number of 
segments reported under both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 was the same (2.8). The tabulated results 
reveal that only one company has reported more segments after the adoption of IFRS 8. This 
could arguably be related to previous empirical findings that large size firms tend to have 
more disclosure due to the market and market participants pressure.  
 In the second half of their paper, Valenza & Heem (2010) evaluate whether the line 
items disclosed under IFRS 8 has increase compared to IAS 14R. Similar to the previous 
finding, the mean of the number of line items disclosed under IFRS 8 was not different from 
the mean of line items disclosed under IAS 14R. 
Nichols et al. (2012) assess the differences in disclosure practices of European blue 
chip companies post the adoption of IFRS 8. They demonstrate that the average number of 
operating segments has significantly increase post IFRS 8 by 0.35. In addition, they show that 
some of the companies which reported as single segment prior-IFRS 8 have reported multiple 
segments under the management approach. In addition, the study provides a confirmation to 
some of the arguments that the new standard will result in many different definition for 
operating segments. It finds that blue chip companies defined their operating segments based 
on LOB, Geographic location, and mixed or matrix format. However, the study reveals that 
the adoption of IFRS 8 has caused a significant decrease in the disclosure of line items from 
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8.79 to 8.38. They find that decline in the line item is related to the disclosure of total 
liabilities, equity method income and investments, and capital expenditure.  
Pisano & Landriani (2012) measure the major changes in the segmental reporting of 
124 non-financial Italian companies post implementation of IFRS 8. They present that post-
IFRS 8, some companies defined operating segment differently from previously used 
definitions (i.e. LOB and GEO definitions). They also show that the average number of 
segments has increased from 3.71 to 3.85 and that 14% of the sample companies increased the 
number of reported segments. Similarly, they report that the average number of line items 
disclosed post implementation of IFRS 8 has increased by approximately 22%.  
Crawford et al. (2012) compare segment disclosure of a sample of UK FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 companies under both IAS 14R and IFRS 8. The main purpose of their study was 
to evaluate whether the implementation of IFRS 8 has led to a better segment disclosure. They 
present separate and consolidated findings for FTSE100 and FTSE 250. For FTSE 100 
companies they find that the average number of business segment disclosed post IFRS 8 
implementation is 3.98 compared to 3.61 prior to IFRS 8 implementation. The change was 
statistically significant at 5% level. While for FTSE 250 companies they pointed out that the 
average number of total business segments disclosed increased by approximately 1.5% and it 
was not statistically significant. For the geographic segments, the average number of 
segments disclosed under IFRS 8 has increase to 4.39 and 3.51 for FTSE100 and FTSE 250 
respectively. However, again, the change in geographic segments is only statistically 
significant for FTSE 100 companies. 
Out of the 150 companies in the sample size, 35 companies has reported an increase in 
their products/services segments after the adoption of IFRS 8 while 92 companies reported no 
change. In the other hand 28% of the companies disclosed more geographical segments post 
IFRS 8 with the majority of the companies reporting the same number prior to IFRS 8. 
Crawford et al. (2012) also demonstrated that average number of line items related to primary 
(IAS 14R)/operating (IFRS 8) segments post IFRS 8 has decrease to 6.43 compared with 
7.02. The difference is statistically significant at 5% confidence level.   
The line items that have dropped most from the primary operating segments post the 
adoption of the new standard are related to liabilities, capital expenditure and significant non-
cash expenses. However, after the implementation of IFRS 8 the decline in the average 
number of line items disclosed was much greater for geographic segments. The number of 
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line items for the total sample decreased from 2.02 to 1.06 and the items that have been 
dropped are mainly capital expenditure and non-current assets (Crawford et al., 2012).  
Mardini et al. (2012) examine the implications of the management approach of 
segment reporting on segment disclosure of Jordanian’s listed companies. Their sample size 
comprises 70 companies that report segment information pre and post the adoption of IFRS 8. 
They find that post IFRS 8 the average number of reportable segments has increased from 2.4 
to 2.7. However, despite the increase in the average number of reportable segments, the study 
shows that the majority of the companies (43 companies) have reported the same number of 
segments pre and post IFRS 8. In contrast to Nichols et al. (2012) and Crawford et al. (2012), 
Mardini et al. (2012) report a significant increase in the number of line item disclosed by 
Jordanian companies post IFRS 8. The average number of line items has increase from 6.4 to 
10.4.   
Kang & Gray (2013) analyse the impact of IFRS 8 adoption on companies listed in 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Their analysis show consistent results with previous 
studies. They show that the average number of reportable segments has significantly increase 
post the adoption of IFRS 8 from 3.19 to 3.69. They find that 75 companies have reported an 
increase in the number of operating segments compared to 29 companies which have reported 
a decrease in reportable segments.  
4.6- Advantages of Segmental Disclosure 
Market participants in general assume that managers have an advantage over other 
stakeholders because they have an access to more precise internal information about company 
performance. If the managers choose to conceal this information from the market the market 
will respond by penalising both the company and the managers in capital market. Therefore, 
companies tend to provide extensive disclosure and finer segmental reporting to send positive 
messages to the market about firm’s profitability, growth and risk and reward associated with 
each Line of Business and Geographic segment. According to Roberts et al. (2010), the 
assessment of the usefulness of segmental reporting is divided into three main categories. The 
first category concerned about the evaluation of the impact of segmental disclosure on users’ 
decision making. The second category examines market reaction to the segment information 
reported. The last category concerned about the effect of segmental disclosure on the forecast 
accuracy.  
The first category is more qualitative in nature, wherein group of people will be 
interviewed and asked to reflect how the change in segmental information has affected their 
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decision making process particularly in resources allocation. Or it could be carried out as an 
experiment where a group of users are observed under given conditions and under different 
set of information (with segmental information/without segmental information, or group one 
with type A segmental information/group two with type B segmental information) and 
evaluate whether their decision making will be substantially different.   
The other two approaches are more quantitative in nature compared to the first. 
Market reaction research, as will be discussed in more detail in section 4.5, concentrates on 
the evaluation of stock price reaction to different patterns of segmental disclosure and whether 
one type of disclosure perceived as more informative by the stock market compared to the 
other. The last method explores statistically whether segmental information leads to more 
accurate earning, sales or cash flow forecast. It evaluates whether segmental information 
provides an added value to forecast models. In this research, we are more interested in the last 
two approaches and the empirical evidence they provide regarding segment disclosure.  
 
4.6.1- Predictive gains to segment information 
A considerable amount of research has examined the association between the extent of 
segmental disclosure and predictive ability of market participants. Previous research has 
revealed that segment reporting has a significant usefulness to the predictability of future 
earning and future cash flow. Segment information is used to monitor firms’ segments growth 
and evaluate the risk associated to each of these segments individually which help investors 
and analysts to gain a better insight about firm overall performance and improve forecast 
accuracy (Hope, 2003).  
Many studies indicate that the disaggregated segmental information disseminated to 
the investor provides better insight compared to consolidated information. One of the early 
studies that assessed the impact of more disaggregated information on the forecast accuracy of 
future earnings is that of Rappaport and Lerner (1969). They compare the earnings forecast 
accuracy under two different situations. The first one is when individual segment information 
is used and the other one is when consolidated information is used. They reveal that the use of 
segmental information yield a better forecast compared to aggregated information.  
Kinney (1971) uses four forecasting models to test whether segmental information 
provides better insight to the analyst to predict future earnings. Two of the models were based 
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on segmental information and the other are based on consolidated figure. The four models are 
as provided in appendix (1- (a)). 
For his sample companies Kinney (1971) finds that the prediction using disaggregated 
information has resulted in more accurate results. The results imply that the users of financial 
reports in general and financial analysts in particular are better informed with disaggregated 
information than overall information. However, he finds that model number 4 which used 
segment sales and segment earnings gave the same results as model number 3 which used 
segment sale with consolidated earnings.  
Despite the findings of Kinney’s (1971) study about the use of segment earnings, it 
could be argued that his findings could be attributed to lack of accurate distribution of 
common costs. There is also an important aspect that has not been considered in his analysis 
which is related to the quality of segment profit disclosed. In addition, Collins (1976) 
discusses some of the possible problems in Kinney’s (1971) study which contributed to his 
findings. “the data were subject to problems of segment definition, transfer pricing, common 
cost allocations, and even earnings definition, thereby leading to a potential lack of 
comparability across firms” (Collins 1976, p.164). 
Further discussion about the importance of segment profit to the prediction of 
consolidated earnings is provided in Chapter 7.  
Collins (1976) tests the superiority of earnings prediction models that utilise segmental 
information compared to the prediction models that are based on consolidated information. 
His sample size include 96 companies which have only disclosed segmental information post 
the requirement of SEC 1971. For the purpose of his study, he uses nine prediction models, 
four of them are similar to the one used by Kinney (1971) and the other five models are based 
on consolidated information. Collins argues that the findings of Kinney (1971) are due to the 
insufficient in the consolidated models that he used. Therefore Collins adds five more models 
that utilise consolidated information to overcome Kinney’s shortcomings. The additional 
models that Collins used can be found in appendix (1-(b)).  
The results of Collins (1976) show that the prediction of company consolidated sales 
using segmental information has produced a more accurate prediction compared to 
consolidated models except for the GNP model. His results coincide with those of Kinney 
(1971), which indicate that the requirements of SEC 1971 to report disaggregated information 
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by line of business has provided better insight to the users of the financial reports about 
company future sales and profitability.  
Kochanek (1974) evaluates capital market reaction to segmental information 
disclosure by comparing two different sets of financial reports. One that contains segmental 
data and the other based on aggregated data. He finds that there is a strong positive correlation 
between current period return and future changes in earning for the companies that disclosed 
disaggregated information. He also documents that segmental disclosure has improved 
earning prediction and reduced weekly stock price volatility. 
Emmanuel & Gray (1978) mention that according to Mautz (1968) the financial 
analysts rely heavily on the disaggregated information to make earnings prediction and they 
tend to disaggregate consolidated information when they feel that the disclosed information is 
not segmented enough for their forecast function.  
Emmanuel & Pick (1980) is interested to provide empirical justification of the usefulness of 
segmental information on the prediction of total-entity sales and earnings in UK market. They 
review the predictive ability of segment information of 39 UK companies by using three sales 
forecast models and four earnings models. The results of their study indicated that sales and 
earnings predictions using segment information were more accurate compared to 
consolidated-based forecast. The three sales forecast were statistically more accurate at 1% 
significance level. While two out the four earning models produced more accurate predictions 
at 1% significance level and one model was statistically significant at 5% level. Their study 
provided strong evidences on the usefulness of segmental information to improve the 
prediction accuracy of different forecast models. It also provides evidence against Kinney’ 
(1971) findings that segment profit information does not provide a better insight to analysts 
about future earnings compared to consolidated profit. The forecast models used by 
Emmanuel and Pick (1980) are listed in appendix (1-(c)). 
In a similar study, Silhan (1983) re-examine the findings of Kinney (1971) and Collins 
(1976) by comparing income forecast using both consolidated and segmental data. The results 
suggest that for one –quarter the segment information provided more accurate prediction 
compared to consolidated data.   
Emmanuel & Garrod (1987) interview sixteen random investment analysts to assess 
the role of segment information in analysts’ forecast process. Most of the analysts declared 
that they refer to the segment information to make 12-24 months future earnings forecast.  
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They analysts tend to forecast individual segments turnover and profitability and then 
aggregate them to obtain the company’s consolidated turnover and profitability. It is clear that 
the analysts use segment information to improve their forecast accuracy.  
Roberts (1989) assesses the impact of geographical segment information disclosed by 
78 UK companies on earning prediction and whether segmental information has provided 
better insight compared to aggregated earning information. He finds that prediction models 
using geographical segment information provided better earnings forecast compared to 
consolidated random walk model. 
Balakrishnan et al. (1990) examine whether geographical segment information provide 
additional information regarding companies’ earnings. They have used two sets of geographic 
predictions and to control for errors in predicting exchange rates and regional growth. In the 
first set of predictions they assumed perfect foresight (PF) and uses the realised values of the 
macroeconomic variables. The results of these tests show that the geographical segment 
information improved the income and sale prediction compared to consolidated (aggregated) 
information. 
Emmanuel et al. (1992) investigate the predictive gain of segmental information to 
investment analysts. They test whether investment analysts are going to revise their 
investment recommendation if they are provided with disaggregated information compared 
with initial recommendation based on consolidated data. For the purpose of this study, they 
interview 16 investment analysts from different sectors in UK market. The sample was 
reduced to 15 because one of the interviewed analysts was able to figure out the identity of the 
company under examination. The researchers intentionally use actual financial statements of 
actual company so it will be easy to compare analysts’ prediction with actual results. The first 
stage of the study was to ask the 15 analysts to predict 12 month pre-tax profit based on 
consolidated information. The next step was to reveal disaggregated information and ask the 
analysts again to predict 12 month pre-tax profit. The results show that 10 out of the 15 
analysts have revised their prediction after receiving segmental information. Those analysts 
who revised their prediction exhibited an improvement in their forecast accuracy. The total 
sample error was -£92.8 million with the aggregated information and -£27.8 million with 
disaggregated information. Emmanuel el al., (1992) conclude that disaggregated information 
in consistent with the disclosure requirement and regulation has resulted in a significantly 
lower forecast error particularly for those analysts who revised their predictions.  
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Hussain & Skerratt (1992) evaluate the use of line of business segment identification 
in the analysts’ prediction of company’s consolidated profitability. They construct a 
prediction model based on the assumption that the expected profit of next period is a function 
of three elements. The first on is the level of segment activity in the company such as sales, 
employment and assets. The second element is the profit index for the industry in which the 
segment is located in. the last element is the deviation between segment profitability measures 
from the industry. The model assumes that both the activity level and the deviation in 
profitability between the segment and industry are following random walk.  
They argue that segment information is one source in which financial analysts 
knowledge about specific industry is essential and that analysts’ prediction of company’s 
consolidated profit is divided into two main components. The first one reflects industrial 
factor and used to link between the segment and the industry. The second one is to reflect 
company’s specific factor.  
Their model shows that the wrong identification of reportable segments and analysts 
inability to map the segment with the industry constrains them from utilising the segment 
information in their forecast of consolidated profitability. In other words, the use of segment 
information will be useless if it cannot be mapped to the industry due to the fact that their 
model assumes that the conditionally expected profitability is a function of industry 
profitability index.  
In another study, Herrmann (1996) examines whether increasingly disaggregated 
geographic segment information improved predictive ability of company operations. He tests 
whether forecast accuracy is significantly different when using country level measures 
compared to regional or continental level measures. He also tests whether forecast accuracy is 
significantly different between models using continental geographical segments and models 
using consolidated information and finds that prediction accuracy using increased 
disaggregated geographical information has improved significantly. The positive statistical 
results (mean and median) of the difference in Absolute percentage Error (APE) between 
country level model compared to continental level model and continental Level model 
compared to consolidated model indicate that the accuracy of forecast improve as sale and 
gross profit are disclose at amore geographic level..  
 
Lang & Lundholm (1996) investigate the effect of disclosure on the number of 
analysts following and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. They present empirical evidence 
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that firms with high disclosure practices are associated with a larger analysts following, lower 
analysts’ earnings forecast error, less dispersion in analysts’ forecast and less volatility in 
forecast revisions.  
 
One of the studies which have provided empirical evidence on the predictive gain to 
the segmental disclosure is that of Hussain (1997). He examines the determinants of earning 
forecast error generated by UK analysts. The main concern of this study is to evaluate the 
impact of segmental reporting fineness on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. The total 
number of sample of forecast was for 197 company announcement over the period from 1987 
to 1990.  
The finding of this study is consistence with other studies that quality segmental 
reporting improves earning prediction. ‘The quality of both line-of-business segments 
(QLOB) and geographic segments (QGEO) has a significant negative association with the 
forecast error’. Thus better segmental disclosure which is in this case measured by the 
fineness of geographic segments disclosed provide better insight to the market about the 
future.  
Analysts have been always a major concern to researchers since analysts’ earnings 
prediction and investments’ recommendations are important input to investors’ investment 
decisions and firms’ valuation. In this section of the literature, the relationship between 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and corporate disclosure will be reviewed.  
Behn et al. (2002) evaluate the forecast accuracy of geographical segment sale 
disclosure pre and post SFAS 131for 132 USA companies. The study assesses the added-
value of geographical segments sales information compared to consolidated sales information. 
The results show a significant increase in the forecast accuracy for all models that utilize 
geographical segment information (both pre and post SFAS 131). The study also finds a 
significant increase in the predictive ability for companies disclosing country-wide segment 
information. The study illustrates that disaggregated geographical segment information 
provide a better insight about the future compared to consolidated information.   
Hope (2003) examines the impact of companies’ disclosure choices in financial 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. He focuses on two aspects of financial disclosure. The first is 
related to level of disclosure in annual reports. The second aspect is related to the extent in 
which accounting standards are implemented. His study was carried out over a sample from 
22 countries.   
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After controlling for both firm-specific and country-level factors, the findings indicate 
that analyst’s earnings prediction is positively and significantly associated with firms’ level of 
disclosure in annual report. He also finds that strong enforcement of accounting standards 
compliance is positively and significantly related to analysts’ forecast accuracy. However, 
although many studies have found a strong positive association between analysts’ forecast 
accuracy and number of analysts following, Hope’s (2003), study surprisingly shows that 
there is a low association between number of analysts’ followings and forecast accuracy.  
Hope et al. (2006) analyse the impact of geographical segment’s earnings disclosure 
post SFAS 131 on analysts forecast accuracy. They find that although SFAS 131 motivates 
managers to conceal geographical earnings information, analysts forecast error is not 
significantly different between those companies which disclose geographical earnings and 
those companies which did not. Their findings suggest that non-disclosure of geographical 
earnings has no impact on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. These findings suffers from 
disregarding to have a measure for the quality of geographical segment. In addition, the study 
did not control for the quality of geographical earnings disclosed. Thirdly, the study does not 
differentiate between multiple geographical segment companies and single geographical 
segment companies.  
4.6.2- Market reaction to segment information 
Previous studies that have explored the impact of segmental reporting stated that 
reporting such information has a significant value to the company and also to the market. The 
new segment reporting standard (IFRS 8) is expected to improve the reporting environment 
(i.e. reduce information asymmetry) which in return expected to benefit the company in the 
capital market. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) state that new regulations and policies that 
results in reducing information asymmetry; will result in increasing the liquidity of the 
companies’ stock. 
Many researchers have stressed on the role of sound segmental reporting in reducing 
information asymmetry and agency cost (Bens & Monahan, 2004; Berger and Hann, 2007; 
Hope et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011). According to Hope et al. (2008) due to the increase in 
firms’ cross-border operations, information related to geographic segments affects investors’ 
information set.  They have reported a decline in the volume related to price changes for the 
companies that disclosed segment earnings after the adoption of SFAS-131. 
Clear and informative segmental disclosure could help companies to have better 
chances to enter into a new capital market and receive funding (Wang et al. 2011). Capital 
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markets participants tend to ask for lower cost of capital when companies financial statement 
include substantial amount of information.  
Choi and Levich (1991) state that firms whose financial disclosure tend to be 
relatively high are having better chances in accessing international capital market. They 
emphasise on the importance of segmental disclosure by illustrating that the companies in 
countries such as Japan and Germany where segmental disclosure is very low would suffer 
from inability to access to new funding in international markets. It could be argues that one of 
the reasons that segmental disclosure in Japan and Germany is low is due to the ability of 
banks in these countries to attend board meetings and can get information from private 
channels.  
Many empirical studies provide evidence on the benefits of extensive financial 
disclosure on the capital market particularly in term of reducing cost of capital. For example, 
Merton (1987) and Fishman and Hagerty (1989) illustrate that extensive financial disclosure 
reduces the cost of equity capital. 
Kinney (1972) evaluates the impact of disaggregated information in companies’ 
systematic risk. His analysis is based on the assumption that the multi-segment company 
could viewed as a portfolio of different individual activities. He argues that the evaluation of 
the company performance could be carried out by comparing the volatility of the consolidated 
earnings to the individual activity earnings.  
For the purpose of his study, Kinney (1972) evaluates the betas of 51 companies and 
he finds that the disaggregating consolidated information based on different line of business 
enables the users of this information to estimate market risk to each of these segments and to 
the company as a whole.  
Horwitz & Kolodny’s (1977) study is one of the first to look at the effect of mandatory 
segment disclosure in companies’ betas. They had two sets of samples; one for those 
disclosed segmental information and the other for similar number of companies but not 
required to disclose segmental information. They compare beta value for both samples prior 
and post segmental disclosure requirement and they find no difference in companies’ betas 
after the disclosure of segmental information. Emmanuel el al. (1992) comment on the finding 
of Horwitz & Kolodny (1977) that it should be treated with a certain amount of caution. 
Collins and Simonds (1979) examine empirically the effect of SEC requirement to 
multi-segment companies to disclose Line of Business information on market assessment of 
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these companies riskiness.  They find that there is significant decline in the market risk of the 
companies with no or minimal prior segmental disclosure after they comply with SEC 
requirements. The decline in the market riskiness is due to reduction in investors’ uncertainty 
about firms’ multi-segments. 
Prodhan (1986) examines the impact of segmental geographical disclosure on the 
systematic risk of UK multi-segments firms. He finds an association between segment 
geographical disclosure and systematic risk and that the geographic information has been 
reflected in the firms’ share prices. This implies that the better the segmental information 
dissemination, the lower the systematic risk.  
In a similar study, Prodhan & Harris (1989) examine 82 USA companies included in 
Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Stock Price Index. They examine whether geographical 
segment information reduce systematic risk for companies that newly disclosing such 
information. They find that uncertainty around multinational operation of the companies that 
reported geographical segment information for the first time has decline and this has reduced 
the systematic risk and cost of capital for these companies.  
Swaminathan (1991) provided empirical evidence on the usefulness of segmental 
information after the compliance with SEC mandatory disclosure in 1970. His analysis 
reflects that both systematic risk and volatility in share prices has been declined post the 
release of SEC requirements. This study refutes the claims of some of the previous studies 
about the insignificance of the disaggregation requirements.  
Lundholm & Myers (2002) evaluate whether sound disclosure practices bring the 
future forward (i.e. provide better insight about future earnings). They study the effect of 
companies’ different disclosure practices on the relationship between return and earnings. 
Their results show that current return better reflect future earning for those companies which 
have better disclosure practice score. They use disclosure index to measure the quality 
disclosure practices. Their results matches with the results of Healy, Hutton and Palepu 
(1999) which indicate that when companies decide to increase the level of disclosure in their 
reports they experience statistically significant increase in the earnings coefficient when 
regressed with current earnings. In support of this finding, Miller and Piotroski (2000) 
provide empirical evidence that better disclosure activities bring future earnings news to the 
current return. 
Bens & Monahan (2004) assess the relationship between the disclosure quality 
measured as the level of segment disaggregation and firm’s excess value related to 
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diversification of USA firms for the period from 1980 through 1996. The quality of segment 
disaggregation is measured as the natural log of ratio of the number of reported segments to 
the number of business units as indicated by two digits SIC code and they used Berger & 
Ofek to measure for excess value of diversification. They indicate that the level of segment 
disaggregation when used as an alternative proxy for disclosure quality is positively 
associated with the excess value of diversification. They attribute the positive association to 
the role of good disclosure practices in reducing information asymmetry.   
 
Similar to the studies examining the effect of disclosure activities on the relationship 
between the returns and earnings, it is possible to expect similar kind of effect that the 
improvement in segmental disclosure will have on the relationship between earning and 
returns.  
Ettredge et al., (2005) investigate the impact of the new segmental reporting standards 
(SFAS 131) on capital market ability to capture future earnings. They argue that the new 
segment disclosure practice by which the companies in the USA are required to provide 
segment information in the same way it is reported to the management of the companies will 
improve market ability to predict future earnings. Therefore the current earning will have 
higher coefficient with the future earnings in the period post implementation of the new 
standards compared to the prior period.  
They evaluate the association between current return and future earning by looking at 
Future Earnings Response Coefficient (FERC). Also there results show that for the companies 
which provided multi-segments information post-implementation of SFAS 131 witnessed and 
increase in FERC. Whereas for the companies which continue to report one segment their 
FERC has not increase which indicates that improving the segment disclosure provide better 
insight to market about firms future earnings. Although, Ettredge et al., (2005) findings point 
out the importance of the SFAS 131 to the investors ability to predict future earnings but the 
study does not explain what is it about the new approach that has led to better anticipation of 
future earnings in stock price. In other words, could it be attributed to the increase in the 
number of reported segment, or the fineness of reported segments, or maybe the quality of 
reported earnings? All of these important questioned have not been answered by Ettredge et 
al., (2005).    
Lambert et al. (2007) test the impact of high quality accounting information on 
estimation risks and cost of capital. They demonstrate that firm’s improvement in financial 
disclosure reduce its non-diversifiable risk and result in lowering its cost of capital. Their 
arguments were based on the link between degree of information quality and firms’ cash flow. 
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They believe that increasing the informativeness of accounting reports will reduce firms’ cash 
flow that firms managers appropriate for them and that would increase company value by 
reducing the cost of capital. 
Among other findings, Francis et al. (2008) find that earnings quality is significantly 
positively correlated to the number of segments disclosed. They use the number of line of 
business disclosed in companies’ financial reports as a measure for the complexity of their 
operations. 
Hope et al. (2009) investigate the impact of geographical segment earnings disclosure 
on investors’ ability to predict quarterly earnings announcements. They find that the 
disclosure of geographical segment’s earnings improves investors’ ability to predict and 
interpret quarterly earnings information. However, the impact of quarterly earnings 
information on investors’ decision is not as important as annual earnings information due to 
the reason that annual earnings information are certified and audited by external auditors. This 
is an important aspect of segment information which need further examination.  
Park (2011) evaluates the impact of SFAS 131 on stock price ability to adequately 
reflect earnings information. He divided earning information into two categories. The first 
category is based on industry-wide earnings components. The second category is based on 
firm-specific earnings components. The sample size of his study comprises 1745 companies 
for 1995 -2001.  
The results show that stock price ability to incorporate industry-wide earnings 
information is greater for those companies which provide more operating segments post 
SFAS 131. On the other hand, firm-specific earnings do not show significant results. In 
conclusion Park’s study demonstrate the significance of disaggregated segmental information 
to improve market ability to anticipate and interpret earnings information.   
Hollie & Yu (2012) examine the impact of SFAS 131 on stock price ability to reflect 
segment earnings. The study comprises 649 multi segment companies for the period between 
1998 and 2006.  The study aims to investigate whether the mismatch between segment 
aggregated earnings and consolidated earnings post the adoption of SFAS 131 affect market 
ability to reflect earnings information in current stock price.  
 Hollie & Yu (2012) find that stock price ability to incorporate the difference between 
segment earnings and consolidated earnings is greater when the difference is negative (i.e. 
consolidated earnings is lower that aggregate segment earnings). However, if consolidated 
earnings is greater than aggregate segment earnings, the results show that the market fails to 
fully incorporate earnings information.  
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They concluded that SFAS 131 provides companies with greater leeway in regards to 
the disclosure of segment’s earnings which lead to difficulties in reconciling segment 
aggregate earnings with consolidated statements earnings. Also, when segment aggregate 
earnings could not be reconciled with consolidated statements, the market is not able to 
interpret segment earnings information adequately which lead to mispricing of stocks in 
capital market.    
Alfonso et al. (2012) examine whether agency cost incline companies to misuse the 
flexibility provided by SFAS 131 and report segment earning that differ from consolidated 
earnings. They report that the mean difference between segment aggregate earning and 
consolidated earnings is significantly negative; indicating that segment aggregated earning is 
greater than consolidated earnings.  
Similar to Hollie & Yu (2012), Alfonso et al. (2012) find that when segments’ 
aggregate earning is greater than consolidated earning the market ability to incorporate 
segment earning information into current stock price is greater. However, there is no evidence 
so far about the impact of reconciliation between segments’ aggregate profit and consolidated 
profit on market ability to anticipate future earnings.    
Since one of the objectives of this study is to examine the association between 
segmental information and market ability to anticipate future changes in earnings, the FERC 
method will be adopted to explore this area. Therefore, it is essential to have a review over the 
previous studies which have used FERC models. The following section briefly reviews some 
of these studies. 
 
4.7- The Application of FERC in Financial Disclosure Studies 
Companies in general are motivated to improve their financial disclosure because that 
will lead to better and more intrinsic valuation to its securities in the capital market by 
investors. Many prior researches examined the usefulness of firms’ financial reports in 
general or the usefulness of particular items in theses financial reports such as management 
earnings, corporate government and segment information. These researches try to provide 
some understanding to value relevance of the financial reports in the capital market. They 
captured the link between financial reports and capital market through different types of 
measures. One of these measures is Earning Response Coefficient (ERC); ERC proves its 
ability in valuation and fundamental analysis in accounting research (Kothari, 2001). The 
return-earning association explain how much relevant and value-added information earning 
information has and to what extent this information can be reflected in share price movement. 
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The following model illustrates the use of earning response coefficient in accounting 
literature: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑋𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+1
𝑁
𝑘=1
∆𝐸𝑡(𝑋𝑡+𝑘) + 𝑒𝑡 
 
Rt:  The current return for period t 
Xt: The Growth rate of earnings 
𝑈𝑋𝑡:  The unanticipated portion of earnings growth rate 
∆𝐸𝑡: The reversion in market expectation about future earnings changes at the current period  
𝑒𝑡: The error term (i.e. unexpected element of current return or uncaptured factors that influence 
current return) 
 
There are many firm-specific factors that influence the magnitude and significance of 
ERC such as firm’s capital structure, corporate governance, firm’s size, firm’s profitability, 
and amount of disclosure. For example, Freeman (1987) provides an empirical examination of 
the impact of firm’s size in the ability and magnitude of security prices to anticipate 
accounting earnings. He evaluates 2263 firms-year observation between 1966 and 1982 listed 
in NYSE. He has documented a statistical difference between large and small firms in the 
ability to of their stock price to anticipate earnings. He states that current earnings of large 
firms tend to have lower impact on stock return. He argues that due to higher private 
information search associated with large firm stock price reflected accounting earning early in 
advance before earnings announcement made available. His findings provide an explanation 
of the documented low association between current stock return and current earnings.  
Dhaliwal, Lee & Fargher (1991) study the ability of stock return to reflect earnings 
information under specific firm’s characteristics. They assess the earning response coefficient 
of the sample firms given two main criteria; (1) All equity-capital firms versus levered firms, 
(2) high leverage firms versus low leverage vis-à-vis matched levered and high leverage 
firms. They demonstrated that stock price ability to reflect earning information is negatively 
associated with firms’ financial leverage. The finding implies that the market participants 
could not inference earnings information of high leverage companies into share prices and 
that firm’s financial leverage affect ERC. In a similar study, Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) 
examine the relationship between earnings (EPS) and stock return under the effect of bond 
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rating to proxy for default risk of debt. Consistent with the previously mentioned study they 
find that REC is negatively associated with default risk of debt. 
Gelb & Zarowin (2002) after controlling for earnings intrinsic timeliness and forecast 
ability have investigated the relationship between the level of financial disclosure, firms’ 
earnings and current return. Their results show that for the companies with better disclosure 
practice the current return have higher ERC on future earnings. The future response 
coefficient for the higher discloser firms was 0.593 compared to 0.005 for the lower discloser 
firms. The results indicate that better disclosure enable the market participant to predict future 
earnings and reflect that in current stock price.   
There are some researches which claim that the relation between earning and return is 
very low or even very negligible. For example, Lang & Lundholm (1993) argue that the 
negative correlation they find between disclosure and return earning coefficient is due to the 
earning lack of ability to capture value-relevant information. However, the low coefficient 
reported by Lang & Lundholm (1993) is attributed to the lack of timeliness which has been 
later proved by CKSS (1994). CKSS (1994) refute the claims against earning-return low 
association and clarify that the current return has large association with future earnings.  
Hussainey et al. (2003) used Collins et al. (1994) return-earning regression model to 
assess the effect of the level of disclosure in company annual reports on market participants’ 
ability to predict future earnings for UK firms. They present conflicting results about the 
impact of disclosure quality on the price-earning association. However, after redefining 
disclosure quality and ranked the companies using self-constructed disclosure index they 
observe different results and stated that better annual report disclosure practice contributed 
positively to the market anticipation of changes in future earnings and documented higher 
FERC for high discloser firms. Disclosure quality has been evaluated based on forward 
looking items in the narrative disclosure of the annual reports excluding the financial 
statements and directors’ report. 
Luo et al (2006) analyse the effect of corporate financial disclosure, ownership 
structure and competitive disadvantage on the association between current return and current 
and future earnings. They conduct their study based on Singapore capital market which 
allowed them to test the impact of government ownership as the government in Singapore has 
high controlling power over some of the listed companies. The sample size of this study 
comprise 172 companies from eight different industries over 1994-2000. They have followed 
Lundholm & Mayer (2002) study but instead of using analysts rating of companies’ 
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disclosure they have self-constructed a voluntary disclosure index which includes 82 items 
representing financial and non-financial information. 
They measure the proprietary cost as industry sales concentration ratio of the four 
largest firms in the particular industry. If a company sale is higher than the industrial median 
then they will give a value of one to the proprietary cost variable and zero otherwise. 
Interestingly the have added both current annual earnings and the change in current earning to 
the regression model. All earnings figures are deflated by the market value of equity at t-1. 
Most importantly their results refute the low association between return and earnings. They 
stated that the level of voluntary corporate disclosure is positively associated with ERC of 
future earnings when regressed with current return.  
The statistical analysis show that after adding the disclosure variable, the future 
earning response coefficient has increased from 0.214 to 0.6434 and the new coefficient is 
statistically significant at 1% level. The result implies that higher level of disclosure improves 
market ability to predict future earnings. However, they find opposite effect for proportion of 
management ownership, government ownership, and potential competitive harm. However, 
the government ownership was not statistically significant. They argue that higher 
management ownership, government ownership, and proprietary cost induce managers to 
conceal information from the public.  
Hanlon et al (2007) explore the impact of dividends payments on the relationship 
between current return and current and future earnings by implanting FERC methodology. 
They employed CKSS, 1994 and Lundholm & Myers, 2002 regression models. Beside their 
main independent variable (Dividends payments) they have controlled for firm size, level of 
disclosure, number of analysts following, return on assets, and book market ratio. Also, they 
have discussed the potential cross-sectional and time-series correlation issue with the 
regression model.  
More details about this problem have been included in the Methodology Chapter of 
this thesis. Their findings are in consistent with the previous literature regarding the ability of 
current return to reflect future earnings. They observe that dividends paying companies 
experienced higher Future Earnings Response Coefficient (FERC). It is important to note that 
their findings are robust after controlling for the effect of loss-making firms. They have 
provided two set of results; one for the full sample size and the other is without the loss-
making firms. 
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Hussainey (2009) applies again FERC methodology but this time to test the impact of 
audit quality, measured as firm’s financial statements being audited by one of the big four, on 
the investors’ ability to better anticipate future earnings. He further developed his study by 
differentiating between profitable and unprofitable firms. His results reveal that investors 
have better insight about future earning when financial statements are audited by one of the 
big four. He also observes that there is a significant difference in investors’ anticipation 
ability between profitable and unprofitable firms. The earnings response coefficient of future 
earning for unprofitable firms is very small and statistically insignificant when regressed with 
current return.  
Hussainey & Walker (2009) explore the relationship between cash dividend and 
voluntary disclosure with the ability of investors to anticipate future earnings. FERC has been 
utilised to observe the reaction of current return to future earning given the variation in firms 
voluntary disclosure level and dividends propensity. The study support the finding of previous 
literature that better disclosure is associated with significantly higher ERC of future earning 
when regressed with current return. The study also reveals that the distribution of cash 
dividend contributed to the improvement of market ability to predict future earning and reflect 
it in share price. They highlight that their result are different for high and low growth 
companies measured as the level of intangible assets.  
Schleicher et al., (2007) measure share price anticipation of earning through the regression 
of current return on the change of future earnings (FERC) given firms different disclosure 
quality. They use the number of forward-looking earnings statements in annual report 
narratives to proxy for disclosure quality. They confirm the positive association between 
disclosure quality and investors’ ability to anticipate future earning as being reflected in 
current price change. Their results show a material difference between profitable and 
unprofitable firms. The current price reflection of future earning is significantly greater for 
high disclosure unprofitable firms. Suggesting that for loss making companies the better 
disclosure in the qualitative parts of the annual report yield higher benefits and highly valued 
by the investors compared to financial statements part of the annual report. However, because 
their disclosure quality definition focuses on forward-earnings mentioned in the narrative part 
of annual report it is expected to have a greater impact for loss making firms tend to promote 
future earning to reduce the negative impact of current negative earnings.   
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4.8- Conclusion 
 The prior studies reviewed in this chapter indicate that segment information is very 
useful to the users of companies’ financial reports. In particular, segment information 
provides a better insight to financial analysts and capital market about future earnings. 
Although it is essential to critically interpret the findings of these studies individually, it is 
totally plausible to accept that the overall evidence of these studies provide some insight into 
the usefulness of segmental information. 
 Many of the prior researches reveal that segment information improves analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy over 12 to 24 months. In addition, there is a sufficient amount of 
studies which indicate that the ability of stock price to reflect future earnings is much better 
with disaggregated information compared to consolidate one.   
 Despite the many concerns about IFRS 8 and the new approach in reporting segment 
information, prior studies particularly in the USA have provided empirical evidence about the 
improvement in segmental disclosure prior to the adoption of SFAS 131. Similar evidences 
have been documented in the UK and blue chip European countries. Despite these findings, 
IFRS 8 is still viewed as a controversial standard.  
First of all, there are some aspects of differences between the requirements of IFRS 8 
and its counterpart SFAS 131 which might indicate that the findings of SFAS 131 studies 
might not be applicable to IFRS 8. Secondly, most of the studies that conducted about IFRS 8 
show that the adoption of IFRS 8 lead to decrease in the disclosure of some line items for both 
operating segment and entity-wide disclosure. Some of the items that no longer disclosed are 
total liabilities, capital expenditure and geographical segment earnings.  
 Most of prior IFRS 8 studies have covered the first year of adoption only; there is no 
study to the best of our knowledge which have examined the impact of IFRS 8 on the 
disclosure of segment information over a longer period. In addition, there is no study so far 
which have investigated the impact of segment information post IFRS 8 period on the analysts 
and capital market ability to predict future earnings. Thus, the current study seeks to cover 
these gaps in the existing literature.   
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Chapter 5- Data and Research Methodology 
Overview 
 The objective of the empirical analysis of this study is evaluate: (i) the impact of the 
management approach on the disclosure of segment information, and (ii) evaluate the 
impact of specific aspect of segment information on earnings predictive gain for financial 
analysts in particular and capital market in general. This chapter presents the targeted 
sample of the study and the methodology that is going to be utilised to answer this study 
research questions. This chapter is divided into four sections as follows: 
 Section 5.1 describes the datasets used in this study, detailing the type of information 
in the dataset and the distribution of the sample companies across different industries and 
listing status.  
 Section 5.2 discusses the three empirical analyses that will be carried out in this study. 
It also describes the aspects of segment disclosure which are examined in this study and 
the study hypothesis related to each empirical chapter. 
 Section 5.3 discusses the research methodology (FERC models) that is utilised to 
investigate the impact of segment information on stock price ability to anticipate future 
earnings. Different versions of FERC are explained in this section. 
 Section 5.4 is the conclusion of this chapter.  
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5.1- Sample selection 
The targeted market (sample) for this study is the top 150 publically listed companies 
in the United Kingdom excluding financial and insurance companies. UK market has been 
chosen because many UK companies operate in multiple segment (product/service wise or 
geographically). In addition, the chances of data availability in term of annual reports and 
analysts’ forecast are higher than any other European country.  
Because the aim in this study is to (1) examine the impact of the adoption of the 
management approach in market ability to predict future earnings and (2) compare the extent 
of segmental disclosure between the management approach (IFRS 8) and preceding risk and 
reward approach (IAS 14R), the time line of this study will be four years to each company. 
First two years are to cover for the last two years of reporting segmental information in 
accordance to IAS 14R and the other two years are to cover for the first two years in which 
companies adopted IFRS 8.  
It is important to note that this study does not distinguish between mandatory and 
voluntary segment disclosure. One of the main objectives of this study is to compare the 
overall segment disclosure under the two different segment reporting standards and policies 
regardless to whether the information disclosed is due to mandatory requirement or voluntary 
disclosed by the companies for other reasons. Actually many researchers argue that it is to 
some extent a very difficult task to distinguish or differentiate between the mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure because they believe that to some extent the voluntary 
disclosure could be derived from mandatory requirements. Another important aspect about the 
sample selection particularly regarding the earning forecast is that the data should be available 
from the same analysts for the same company for the whole period.  
For the purpose of executing this research, annual reports of the sample companies 
have been collected for the last two years under IAS 14R and first two years under the new 
segmental standard IFRS 8. We followed Crawford et al. (2012) sample companies which 
contained companies from both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. Our analysis is limited to the non-
financial firms from Crawford et al (2012) initial sample. We excluded the financial 
companies from our sample because the financial industry is governed by different set of rules 
compared to other industries and in most cases companies operating in the financial sector are 
required to provide additional sort of disclosure. From 150 firms we excluded 35 companies 
which are classified under financial and financial related industries.  
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Another 24 companies have been dropped from our sample due one of these reasons; 
unavailability of; a) annual reports for the two years under the IAS 14R segmental reporting 
standard; b) company EPS and share price for the study period, or c) analysts’ earnings 
forecast. The final number of companies in our sample is 91 companies from different 
industry types and different size. The tables below illustrate some basic descriptive statistics 
of the sample size. 
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Table 5.1: Frequency of Companies by Sector 
SECTOR NAME 
FTSE 
100 
FTSE 
250 
TOTAL 
Basic Material 10 1 11 
Consumer Goods 7 4 11 
Consumer Services 13 7 20 
Health Care 4 0 4 
Industrial 13 11 24 
Oil & Gas 8 1 9 
Technology 3 0 3 
Telecommunication 2 2 4 
Utilities 5 0 5 
TOTAL 65 26 91 
 
 
Table 5.2: Listing Status of Sample Companies 
Listing Status 
FTSE 
100 
FTSE 
250 
TOTAL 
Double Listing 28 1 29 
Single listing 37 25 62 
Total 65 26 91 
 
Segment and board of director information has been collected from companies’ annual 
reports. The segment information was mainly extracted from the segmental note prior and 
posts the implementation of IFRS 8. The information was inputted into an Excel spreadsheet 
which has been design according to the requirement of both IAS 14R and IFRS 8. The 
definition of primary and secondary segment under the previous standard has been clearly 
identified by the company due to the standard requirement. For IFRS 8, the definition of 
primary and secondary is no longer required instead the companies are required to report their 
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operating segments. However, for the purpose of evaluating whether the companies have 
changed their identification of main and secondary segments, the definition used by the 
companies to report their operating segments has been treated as main/primary segment. For 
example if the company defined its operating segment based on geographic location, then the 
main segment in this case is geographic segment.  
The capital market and earning information has been collected from both DataStream 
and Bloomberg Databases. DataStream data has been used to carry out the analysis about the 
impact of segmental information on market informativeness in Chapter 8. While the data 
obtained from Bloomberg has been used to carry out the analysis about the impact of 
segmental information on Analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy in Chapter 7.  
Variables measurements and specifications are explained in more details in each of the 
analysis chapters. 
5.2- Study Hypotheses and Models 
As can be noticed from the literature review section that the new segment reporting 
standard (IFRS 8) is a very controversial one. Although all UK listed companies must comply 
with IFRS 8 requirements when reporting segmental information, we would expect a 
substantial difference in the details and disaggregation level of segment disclosure among 
different firms and different industries due to the discretion in the managers reporting 
decisions. Therefore, it is expected that the adoption of IFRS 8 will cause some significant 
changes in the disclosure of segment information.  
Also, it is important to note that segment reporting is a very wide topic and it covers 
many aspects and dimensions. These different aspects and dimensions require a various 
investigation methodologies. Some studies concerning segment disclosure used qualitative 
methods such as Crawford et al. (2012) and Crawford et al. (2014). Some other studies used 
quantitative approaches such as Hussain (1997) and Hope et al. (2008). 
This study will mainly use a quantitative approach to examine the aforementioned 
research questions.  
Although many prior studies have provided some evidences on the improvement in 
segmental reporting practice in the USA after the adoption of SFAS-131, but SEC has issued 
a significant amount of comment letters to many companies concerning incompliance with the 
standard. Many of these companies have not disclosed the adequate number of segments, or 
have financial measurement and reconciliation issues. It is quite true that IFRS 8 is a replicate 
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of American standard SFAS 131. Therefore, in an attempt to facilitate the adoption of IFRS 8 
IASB argues that the new standard will help the users of the financial reports to better 
understand companies’ performance, make better forecast regarding companies’ future 
earnings and cash flow and ultimately enables them to make better investment decisions.  
This study will put these claims under test. Part One will evaluate and compare 
segmental disclosure practices pre and post IFRS 8. While Part Two and Three will examine 
the implication of changes of disclosure practices on the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
and capital market informativeness respectively.  
5.2.1- Comparability and Consistency 
The first step in this study is to analyse and compare the segment disclosure under IFRS 8 
with the previous standards. This part will be mainly descriptive analysis with few significant 
tests that will assess the difference in specific aspects of segmental disclosure before and after 
the adoption of IFRS 8. The main specific characteristics that will be looked at and compared 
between the different segment disclosure practices are: 
1- Number of reportable segments 
2- Fineness of reportable segments 
3-  Number of line items disclosed 
4- Consistency of reporting pattern 
5- Comparability across companies in term of line items disclosed 
6- Disclosure of both LOB and GEO profits 
7- Reconciliation of segment profit line items measures with consolidated statements 
The research hypothesis for this part of the study is,  
𝑯𝟏: Segment disclosures have improved over time as new standards are issued 
Figure one illustrates the concept which will be examined in the first hypothesis. 
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Figure 5.1: Improvement in Segment Disclosure as Regulations Changes 
 
For the purpose of this part of the study, the segment information will be hand-
collected from companies’ annual reports. In order to assess the consistency and 
comparability of segment reporting practices it is important that the annual reports of the 
sample companies are available for the entire study period. Also to facilitate the comparison 
process the segment information will be quantified and tabulated. The major part of the 
analysis will be based on the information disclosed in the segment note of the annual reports.   
All of the items that are examined can be identified straight forward from the segment 
notes except for the fineness of reported segment. The Fineness of Reported Segment (FRS) 
will be calculated using Hussain (1997) and Kou & Hussain (2007) index.  
𝐺𝐸𝑂𝐹𝑖 = ∑ (𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑚𝑖 ×
𝑆𝑚𝑖
𝑆𝑖
)
𝑚
𝑚=1
 
𝐺𝐸𝑂𝐹𝑖 : is the fineness of geographic segment disclosed for company (i), 
𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑚𝑖: is the geographic score for segment (m) for company (i), it is a discreet score 
which increases with fineness 
Smi: is sale for segment (m) for company (i) 
Si: is total sale for company (i) 
 
  
IAS-14R
IFRS-8
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5.2.2- Accuracy of Financial Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 
 
This part of the study will examine the impact of segmental information on analysts’ 
ability to predict future changes in earnings. It aims to evaluate whether the new segmental 
disclosure requirements under IFRS 8 improve the predictive power of segment information? 
The main motive of this analysis is based on previous literature which indicate that the 
segmental information improve company valuation and future earning prediction. Barefield & 
Comiskey (1975) report a high extent of segment disclosure reduce forecast error. In a similar 
study Baldwin (1984) finds that analysts’ forecasts have improved for the companies 
disclosed line-of-business information. Berger & Hann (2003) investigate the impact of SFAS 
131 on financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and showed that the forecast error has 
significantly decreased post SFAS 131 particularly for the firms that witnessed a change in 
the fineness of the reported segments. Also, Hossain (2008) document that quarterly segment 
information under management approach has improved the valuation of the USA companies.  
As mentioned earlier, IASB argues that the segmental information disclosed under IFRS 8 
provides investors and financial analysts with a better insight regarding future earnings.  
The concern of the study will be over the accuracy of analysts’ forecast. Analysts’ 
forecast will be used because previous researches on earning forecast accuracy which gives an 
advantage to analysts’ forecast models. It argued that rational investors will use the most 
accurate source of forecasts to form their expectations, and evidence that analysts’ forecasts 
are a superior proxy for market expectations of earnings is provided by Brown and Rozeff 
(1978), Collins & Hopwood (1980), Fried & Givoly (1982), Bhaskar & Morris (1984), 
O’Brien (1988) & Patz (1989). 
The general hypothesis of this part of the empirical investigation is: 
𝑯𝟐: Segment information provides better insight into future earnings for financial analysts. 
The specific hypotheses that are tested in this part are detailed in Chapter 7; the 
ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression will be used to test the hypothesis related to this 
part. The basic additive regression model for this analysis is as follows: 
FE =(Intercept, SGVi, and Controls) 
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𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + ∑ 𝛽1+𝑛𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑉
6
𝑛=1
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑉 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽10𝑁𝐸𝑅
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
 
Where, FE = analysts’ forecast error (absolute proportionate error); 
ERN= absolute proportionate change in earnings over the forecast period; 
SEGV= segmental variable, there are six segment variables in this model; these six 
variables are as follow: 
1- STAND, which proxy for the change in international accounting standards 
relating to segmental disclosure. This variable represent the change between 
IFRS 8 and its predecessor IAS 14R (IFRS 8=1 & IAS 14R=0); 
2- QGEO, which measure the fineness of geographical sales segments; 
3- MASEG, which proxy for the primary segments under IAS 14R and operating 
segment under IFRS 8 (LOB=1 & GEO=0); 
4- MAMRG, which measure the deviation in segments profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin; 
5- BOTHPROF, which proxy for the disclosure of both LOB segments profit and 
GEO segments profit (Both profits disclosed=1, Otherwise=0); 
6- PROMTCH, which proxy for profit match between segments profit line items 
and consolidated statements profits line items ( profits are matching=1, 
otherwise=0); 
MV= market capitalisation of the company whose earnings are being forecast; 
EPt-1= previous period earnings to price ratio; 
AG= assets growth; 
NER= the ratio of non-executive directors in the company board of directors; 
TOTBORD= total number of board of the company whose earnings are being forecast; 
NEG= decline in company’s earnings from one fiscal year to another; 
IND= industry sector, there are nine industry sectors included in this study; 
µ = error term which has constant variance and mean of zero 
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The study will also evaluate the impact of segmental profit disclosure on analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy. Due to the IFRS 8 specifications that companies are no longer 
required to provide earning information for their geographic segments if they choose to report 
their operating segment on any definition other than geographic location and since the 
majority of the companies define operating segments based on their line of business. It would 
be expected that the omission of geographic profit will have a negative impact for on the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy.   
5.2.3-Impact of the Quality of Segmental Profit Disclosure on Capital Market 
 
In this part a special concern is given to the changes in segmental profit disclosure. 
Under IFRS 8 companies are allowed to use non-IFRS measure when reporting segment data. 
Which means that the profit measures need not to equal net income in the Consolidated 
Income statement nor it is required to equal any sub-total such as operating profit. Also, the 
disclosure of profit information for entity-wide (geographical) segments is no longer 
mandatory under the new approach. Thus, these provisions could be exploited by companies 
to hide or aggregate some important financial items from their segment information and 
therefore the segment information cannot be reconciled with the consolidated IFRS-based 
financial statements. This research will focus on three different proxies of segment 
profitability measure.  
 
Berger & Hann (2007) argue that among the most important elements of company’s 
financial report is segment profitability and that managers are likely to use accounting 
discretion to report different profit definitions in the segment notes which may or may not 
reconcile with the consolidated income statement. This study will investigate whether 
segment profitability line items in segment note are different from those in the consolidated 
statements. The analysis will be extended to investigate the impact of such discrepancy on 
capital market informativeness.  
The main purpose of this part is to evaluate whether the discretion granted to 
companies from the internal structure approach under IFRS 8, particularly the flexibility in 
reporting non-IFRS measures and the omission of geographical profit reduce the predictive 
power of segment information?  
The main motive of this analysis is based on the observation of many studies which 
have reported that under the management approach companies reported different profit 
definitions from each other which makes is very difficult to compare the performance of these 
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companies with each other. Due to the requirement of the management approach to report 
segment information in the same way it is reported to chief operating decision maker 
companies are allowed to use any profit definition.  
Berger & Hann (2007) report that it was a very challenging task to compare 
company’s segment profit with the industry average performance because each company uses 
different profit definition. They have provided a descriptive statistics of the different profit 
definitions used by their 796 sample companies. They show that over 50% of the companies 
reported EBIT, 18% used Pre-tax income, 7% defined their profit as EBITDA, income before 
extraordinary items and net income both appeared in 4% of the sample size, gross profit used 
by 1%, and 8% of the companies used other definitions. We will add to the existing literature 
by exploring the impact of segmental profit disclosure on market ability to predict future 
change in earnings in the context of UK capital market. Thus, our hypothesis for this 
empirical chapter is 
𝑯𝟑: Segment information provide a better insight to capital market about future earnings 
This part of the analysis will be carried out using Future Earning Response Coefficient 
(FERC). The next section describes briefly the development of FERC methodology in finance 
and accounting literature and how it could be applied in this study. More details regarding 
FERC and its underlying assumptions, measurement specification, and hypothesis 
development in regards to this study are presented in part two of Chapter 8.   
 
5.3-Future Earning Response Coefficient (FERC) Methodology: 
Assessing the coefficient between return and earnings is a major part of market based 
accounting researches. Future Earning Response Coefficient (FERC) researches are motivated 
to facilitate the development of sound empirical tests of the voluntary disclosure or signalling 
hypotheses in accounting (Kothari, 2001). These kinds of researches are interested in finding 
whether the market appreciates information disseminated by the management and reflect it in 
the shares price. Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) examine how large increase in disclosure 
activities affects market participants. They find among other things, that firms with a large 
increase in disclosure activities witnessed an increase in the earnings coefficient when 
regressed with current return. Similarly, we expect that the new segmental reporting standard 
(IFRS 8) will improve the information environment in the capital market. Thus, we expect an 
increase in the coefficient of future earning when regressed with current return.   
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A considerable number of studies have used FERC in the analysis (Dhaliwal, Lee and 
Fargher, 1991; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Miller & Piotroski, 2000; Lundholm & Myers, 
2002; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Hussainey et al., 2003; Hussainey & Wlaker, 2009; Schleicher 
et al., 2007; Hussainey, 2009;  
 
Miller & Piotroski (2000) provide empirical evidence that better disclosure brings next 
quarter earnings news into the current period. We will evaluate the impact of IFRS 8 on the 
capital market and whether the new management approach provide better insight to investors 
and  analysts by using Collins, Kothari, Shanken & Sloan model (CKSS, 1994) which 
explained the low association between current return and current earnings. The model is based 
on discounted cash flow and assumed that revision in earnings expectation is linked with 
revision in dividends expectations. The main assumption in CKSS, 1994 model is that future 
earnings provide higher explanation to current stock price movement compared to current 
earnings. They have confirmed that adding future has improved current return explanation by 
three to six times. Collins et al. (1994:295) have regressed annual return with annual earnings 
using the following model: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑋𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+1
𝑁
𝑘=1
∆𝐸𝑡(𝑋𝑡+𝑘) + 𝑒𝑡 
 
Rt:  The current return for period t 
Xt: The Growth rate of earnings 
𝑈𝑋𝑡:  The unanticipated portion of earnings growth rate 
∆𝐸𝑡: The reversion in market expectation about future earnings changes at the current 
period 
𝑒𝑡: The error term (i.e. unexpected element of current return or un-captured factors that 
influence current return) 
 
The above equation assumes that current return is a function of the unobservable 
portion of earnings changes at current period, reversion in current period expectation about 
future earnings growth and the error term which represent the omitted factors that influence 
current return. However, due to the unavailability of unobservable components of the above 
equation, realised earnings growth is used as an alternative measure. According to Lundholm 
& Myers (2002) the unobservable portion of current earnings could be represented by actual 
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earnings in previous period plus the actual earnings of current period. “We proxy for (UXt) 
using the level of Xt and Xt-1. By including the past year’s earnings we allow the regression to 
find the best representation of the prior expectation for current earnings: if the coefficient on 
(Xt-1) is of similar magnitude but opposite sign as the coefficient on (Xt) then earnings is being 
treated by the market as if it follows a random walk; if the coefficient on (Xt-1)is 
approximately zero then earnings is being treated as a white noise process” (Lundholm & 
Myers, 2002, p.813) We can rewrite the regression model as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑋𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘+1
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑋𝑡+𝑘 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
Since the unobservable portion of the earning is the right element that should be 
included in the regression model, replacing it with actual earnings creates error-in-variables 
problem. The error-in-variable problem will result in model biasness and reduce R2. Due to 
the error-in-variables problem mentioned earlier, CKSS, 1994 suggest a partial solution by 
including three proxies that are expected to correlate with the unrealised portion of the 
earnings. These proxies are lagged earning to price ratio (EPt-1), assets growth in current 
period (AGt) and three years future return (Rt+k).  
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑋𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘+1
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑋𝑡+𝑘 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘+5
𝑁
𝑘=1
𝑅𝑡+𝑘 + 𝑏9𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑏10𝐴𝐺𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑡 
 
 
The higher the magnitude of the relationship between these proxies and the 
measurement error the higher the reduction in the error-in-variables problem will be. They 
explained that the sign of the coefficient of these proxies are opposite to the sign of their 
relationship with realised earnings. The inclusion of these proxies is driven from different 
assumptions. First of all, the current earnings consist of predictable and unpredictable portion 
and the actual earning at end of period t does not capture for the anticipated portion of current 
earning at period t-1. To mitigate this problem CKSS, 1994 add earning to price ration and 
assets growth which proxy for current earning prediction at period t-1. To control for the 
surprise of future earnings information that is not captured by the actual future earning at 
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period t+1 neither anticipated at current period return the future stock return (Rt+1) is added to 
the regression model. Because the surprise portion of future earning is not captured in current 
return and only reflected in future return we expect negative association between current 
return and future return (Schleicher et al, 2007 and Hussainey & Walker, 2009). 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽0∆𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
Where b0,intercept; b1 to b4,coefficient of slop parameters; e, error term; Rt, current 
period stock return; Rt+1, future period stock return; ∆Et, change in earning per share for the 
current period deflated by the share price three months after the year end of financial year t-1; 
∆Et+1,change in earning per share for the future period deflated by share price three months 
after year end of financial year t-1; EPt-1, earning to price ratio measured as earning per share 
at period t-1 divided by share price three month after the end of financial year t-1; INVt, total 
assets growth for period t. 
Hanlon et al. (2007) stress on the possible cross-sectional correlation and time-series 
correlation that is likely to affect our regression model. They explain that time-series 
correlation results from having same return figures in the dependent and independent 
variables. They control for these problem by following Petersen (2006) and including year 
dummies to mitigate time-series correlation. For the cross-sectional correlation they use error 
clustering within firms. 
Our regression model will be based on a three years future earning measure. We are 
using EPS three month after the year end downloaded from Thomson DataStream as a 
measure for earnings variable.  
To capture for the impact of IFRS 8 on the market predictability about future earnings 
we are going to include a three proxy for the extent of segment profit disclosure. The rationale 
behind using segment profit disclosure is because of the findings of prior studies about the 
reduction in the disclosure of different line items post the adoption of the management 
approach in particular profit line items.  
 
5.4- Conclusion: 
 This chapter provided a brief description of the research targeted sample, 
methodology, and research hypotheses. The targeted sample comprises 91 companies from 
UK capital market. The method that will be adopted to test the first hypothesis is descriptive 
statistical analysis, while the second and third hypotheses are tested using OLS regression.  
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The motivation for the adoption of analysts’ forecast error model is based on the 
superiority of analysts’ forecast model over statistical models (Brown & Rozeff, 1978; 
Collins & Hopwood, 1980; Fried & Givoly, 1982; Bhaskar & Morris, 1984; O’Brien, 1988; 
and Patz, 1989). The analysts’ forecast model has been used in prior research such as 
(Rappaport & Lerner, 1969; Kinney, 1971; Emmanuel & Garrod, 1987; Emmanuel el al. 
1992; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Hussain, 1997; Berger & Hann, 2003; Hope, 2003).  
The chapter also discusses the utilization of FERC model to provide additional 
examination of predictive gains to segment information. CKSS, 1994 model of association 
between market return and future change in earnings is the basis for our methodology in this 
part of the analysis. FERC models have been implemented in many prior studies (Kochanek, 
1974; Prodhan, 1986; Choi & Levich; 1991; Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Bens & Monahan, 
2004; Ettredge et al., 2005; Hope et al., 2008; and Wang et al., 2011) 
The current research methods are employed to gather empirical evidences about the 
impact of IFRS 8 on the extent of segment information disclosure of UK listed companies, 
and on predictive ability of future earnings. The next chapter is the first empirical chapter of 
this study; it provides a comparison of some aspects of segment information disclosure pre 
and post IFRS 8.    
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Chapter 6- Analysis of the Extent of Segmental Disclosure Pre and Post 
IFRS 8 
Overview 
This chapter covers an analysis of the difference in segmental disclosure between IAS 
14R and IFRS 8. The analysis is divided into two parts based on market listing and industrial 
sectors of companies. The first part compares the disclosure of segment information under the 
risk and reward approach (IAS14) and under the management approach (IFRS8) of two 
market listing; namely, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. The second part analyses the disclosure 
under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R for nine different sectors. 
Before providing the results of the analysis, information about the distribution of the sample 
companies under each defined categories is presented in table (6.1). 
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Table 6. 1: Distribution of Sample Companies by Listing and Sectors 
SECTOR NAME FTSE 100 FTSE 250 TOTAL  
Basic Material 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
10 
11% 
1 
1.1% 
11 
12.1% 
Consumer Goods 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
7 
7.7% 
4 
4.4% 
11 
12.1% 
Consumer Services 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
13 
14.3% 
7 
7.7% 
20 
22.0% 
Health Care 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
4 
4.4% 
0 
0% 
4 
4.4% 
Industrial 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
13 
14.3% 
11 
12.1% 
24 
26.4% 
Oil & Gas 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
8 
8.8% 
1 
1.1% 
9 
9.9% 
Technology 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
3 
3.3% 
0 
0% 
3 
3.3% 
Telecommunication 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
2 
2.2% 
2 
2.2% 
4 
4.4% 
Utilities 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
5 
5.5% 
0 
0% 
5 
5.5% 
TOTAL 
   Frequency 
   Proportion 
65 
71.4% 
26 
28.6% 
91 
100% 
 
Table (1) shows that there is a total of 91companies in the sample size, from nine different 
sectors and listed in FTSE100 and FTSE250. It is clear that 71.4% of the total sample 
companies (65 out of 91) are listed in FTSE100; and 28.6% are listed in FTSE250. It can also 
be noticed that the majority of the companies are operating in industrial and consumer 
services sectors which represent around 26% and 22% of the total companies respectively. 
Health care, Technology, Telecommunication, and Utilities sectors each represent around 3% 
to 5% out of the total number of companies.  Basic Material and Consumer Goods represent 
12.1% each.  
6.1-IFRS 8 compared to IAS 14R for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
Table (6.2) to table (6.8) analyse the extent of segmental disclosure of our sample 
companies given two different segmental disclosure standards (IAS 14R & IFRS 8). All 
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results are sorted into two groups: FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 according to the companies 
listing status. 
The results in table (6.2) below present the mean number of line of business and 
geographical segments during the pre and post IFRS 8 period. The results show that the mean 
number of business segments for the FTSE 100 companies increased from 3.23 under IAS 
14R to 3.53 segments under IFRS 8.  The parametric and non-parametric test for the 
difference in mean segments for LOB during pre and post IFRS 8 is not statistically different 
from zero (t-stat =0.696; Kruskal-Wallis 2 =0.446), implying that the adoption of IFRS 8 has 
not improve the number of LOB segments compared to previous standard. A similar kind of 
result is found for both FTSE 250 and total sample; for FTSE 250 the mean LOB segments 
increase by 0.46; while for total sample the increase is by 0.36.  
Table (6.2) also shows that the mean GEO segments increased by 0.75, 0.31, and 0.63 
for FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and for total sample respectively. The test of significance in mean 
difference shows that both FTSE 100 and total sample are statistically significant at 10% level 
using t-stat. However, the non-parametric test indicates that none of mean differences are 
statistically significant. Given the results of t-stat, it could be argued that management 
approach lead to higher number of geographical segments been reported compared to the risk 
and reward approach.  
Table (6.3) evaluate the number of companies that reported an increase, decrease, or 
no change in the number of LOB and GEO segments post IFRS 8. The results reveal that 21 
companies out of the 91 in our sample size reported an increase in the number LOB segments 
and only 7 companies reported less number of LOB segments compared to IAS 14R. The 
majority of companies which witnessed a decrease in the number of LOB segments are from 
FTSE 100. 
On the other hand, it could be noticed that 29 companies reported an increase in the 
number of GEO segments post IFRS 8 (22 from FTSE 100 and 8 from FTSE 250), while only 
8 companies had reported less number of segments. The majority of the sample companies, 
around 60% reported similar number of GEO segments to the number reported in previous 
period under IAS 14R.  
These results are consistent with the findings of previous studies such as Street et al 
(2000); Herrmann & Thomas (2000); Berger & Hann (2003); Paul & Largay (2005); Nichols 
et al. (2012); Pisano & Landriani (2012); and Crawford et al., (2012). 
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Table 6. 2: Mean number of line of business and geographical segments pre and post IFRS 8 by 
listing 
Notes: Both parametric (t-stat) and non-parametric test statistics (Kruskal –Wallis 2) are employed to test the 
difference mean LOB and GEO segments between Pre and Post IFRS 8.  *, **, and *** denote the result is 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 6. 3: Number of companies reported a change in the number of segments 
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
Line of Business/Products & Services 
Increase 13 8 21 
Decrease 6 1 7 
No change 46 17 63 
Geographical location 
Increase 22 7 29 
Decrease 5 3 8 
No change 38 16 54 
 
An analysis of mean number of line items of business and geographical segments pre 
and post IFRS 8 for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies are presented in table (6.4). The 
results reveal that there has been a drop in the number of line items reported under business 
segments for FTSE 100 companies post IFRS 8. However, the drop is not statistically 
different from zero. On the other hand, FTSE 250 companies witnessed an increase in the 
number of line items disclosed under business segments post IFRS 8 but this is also 
statistically insignificant.  
The most important finding of table (6.4) is related to the number of line items 
disclosed under the geographical definitions. It can be noticed that there has been a large drop 
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
Line of Business/Products & Services (LOB) 
Pre IFRS 8 3.23 2.38 2.98 
Post IFRS 8 3.53 2.84 3.34 
Difference in means 
T-stat 
Kruskal-Wallis 2 
0.3 
0.696 
0.446 
0.46 
0.833 
0.918 
0.36 
0.989 
0.903 
Geographical location (GEO) 
Pre IFRS 8 4.41 3.26 4.08 
Post IFRS 8 5.16 3.57 4.71 
Difference in means 
T-stat 
Kruskal-Wallis 2 
0.75 
1.636* 
1.476 
0.31 
0.511 
0.184 
0.63 
1.643* 
1.208 
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of line item disclosed for both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies. The difference in means 
between pre and post IFRS 8 for FTSE 100 companies is -1.45 and it is statistically 
significant at 1% level under both parametric and non-parametric tests. For FTSE 250 
companies the drop in the mean post IFRS 8 is -1.3 which is statistically different from zero 
according to Kruskal-Wallis 2test.  
It is worth mentioning that the most important line item that has been dropped from 
geographical segments is related to profit disclosure. These changes in the disclosure of line 
items particularly the one related to profitability could reduce the usefulness of segmental 
information. These findings are in alignment with the concerns of the users of the financial 
statements about the leeway of the new standard which might be exploited by managers to 
hide information from the public (Crawford et al., 2012). 
Table (6.5) show details about the number of companies that have reported a change in 
the number of line items pre and post IFRS 8. For FTSE 100 companies many companies (26) 
reported a decrease in the number of line items disclosed under line of business segments, 
while only 8 companies reported more line items after the adoption of IFRS 8. For the 
remaining 31 companies, there were no changes reported. In terms of geographical segments, 
the majority of companies (69%) reported less number of line items under IFRS 8 compared 
to previous standard (IAS 14R), while only 4 companies reported more line items after the 
adoption of IFRS 8.  
The second part of table (6.5) looks at the disclosure of line items for FTSE 250 
companies, it shows that 8 companies reported more line items in their line of business 
segments, at the same time 8 companies reported a decrease in the line items under IFRS 8. 
The remaining 10 companies reported the same number of line items under IFRS 8 compared 
to IAS 14R. The analysis of geographical location indicates that the majority of FTSE 250 
(54%) companies disclosed less number of line items under IFRS 8 compared to IAS 14R. 
However, only 3 companies reported an increase in the number of line items, while 9 
companies reported no change.  
Our results regarding the decline in the number of line item disclosed post the adoption of the 
management approach (IFRS 8) are consistent with those of previous studies such as 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000; Nichols et al., 2012; and Crawford et al. 2012.   
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Table 6. 4: Mean number of line items of business and geographical segments pre and post IFRS 
8 by listing 
Notes: Both parametric (t-stat) and non-parametric test statistics (Kruskal –Wallis 2) are employed to test the 
difference mean of line items for LOB and GEO segments between Pre and Post IFRS 8. *, **, and *** denote 
the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 6. 5: Number of companies reported a change in the number of line items 
 
The main difference between IAS 14R and IFRS 8 is regarding the identification of 
reportable segment. IAS 14R requires companies to identify the reportable segments based on 
risk and reward criteria, while IFRS 8 requires identification of reportable segments based on 
internal reporting criteria such as that segmental information should be reported in the same 
way it is reported to Chief Operating Decision Maker (CODM).  
However, there are no specific details in the standards regarding this CODM; it could 
be company CEO, CFO, or even the whole board of directors. The lack of this detail in the 
standard has raised some concern. There is even greater concern that the companies will not 
identify who is the CODM “many FTSE 100 companies do not disclose the identity of this 
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
Line of Business/Products & Services 
Pre IFRS 8 5.49 4.92 5.32 
Post IFRS 8 4.96 5.23 5.04 
Difference in means 
T-stat 
Kruskal-Wallis 2 
-0.53 
(0.886) 
(0.614) 
0.31 
0.328 
0.123 
-0.28 
(0.574) 
(0.278) 
Geographical location (GEO) 
Pre IFRS 8 5.15 3.96 4.81 
Post IFRS 8 3.7 3.00 3.51 
Difference in means 
T-stat 
Kruskal-Wallis 2 
-1.45 
(3.367)*** 
(13.174)*** 
-0.96 
(1.613) 
(3.648)** 
-1.3 
(3.679)*** 
(16.494)*** 
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
Line of Business/Products & Services 
Increase 8 8 16 
Decrease 26 8 34 
No change 31 10 41 
Geographical location 
Increase 4 3 7 
Decrease 45 14 59 
No change 16 9 25 
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CODM; thus, readers of the financial statements do not know who is reviewing the 
information which they are provided with.” (Crawford et al., 2012, p. 22). 
“The identification of the CODM may help users to assess how the group is organised 
and where important operating dictions are made” (Crawford et al., 2012, p. 22). However, 
our descriptive results in table (6.6) do not coincide with Crawford findings. The results show 
that 66% of FTSE 100 companies and 73% of FTSE 250 have identified who is the CODM.  
The table also provides information about the number of companies that opt to early 
adopt IFRS 8. The adoption of IFRS 8 is effective for annual financial statements for periods 
beginning on or after 1 January 2009. It can be noticed that only 16 companies out of the 91 
companies in our sample chose early adoption of the standard; 13 from FTSE 100 and 3 from 
FTSE 250.  
In the previous table number (6.5), it is found that companies do not provide 
information about some line items that used to be reported under the previous standard 
particularly profit line items for their geographical segments. Table (6.6) supports that finding 
and reveals that only 16 companies out of the 91 companies reported both LOB and GEO 
profit under IFRS 8. 
Another controversial aspect of the new standard is regarding the use of non-IFRS 
measures to report segments line items. IFRS 8 does not define segment revenue, expenses, 
assets, profit or liabilities. It does not require segment information to be prepared in 
accordance to accounting standards used for the preparation of financial statements. 
 Table (6.6) shows that around 32% of the sample companies provided a profit figure 
that reconciles with one of income statements profit figures. More details about the drop in 
segment profit disclosure and reconciliation of segment profit with consolidated statement 
post IFRS 8 are provided in table (6.7).  
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Table 6. 6: Number of companies early adopted IFRS 8 and Identified CODM by listing 
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
Early Adopt 13 3 16 
CODM Identified 43 19 62 
Both Profits 13 3 16 
Reconcile Profit 20 9 29 
 
Table (6.7) details the number of companies reported both LOB and GEO profits and 
the number of companies reported reconciled segment profit pre and post IFRS 8. After the 
adoption of IFRS 8 companies tend to conceal information related to profit disclosure. Most 
of the drop in profit disclosure is related to entity-wide disclosures (geographical disclosure). 
In total, 16 companies reported both profit under IFRS 8 compared 22 companies under IAS 
14R. This result coincides with the findings of Nichols et al. (2012). It could be argued that 
due to IFRS 8 lack of specific requirement to disclose entity-wide profit information 
companies choose to stop reporting profit information for their geographical locations to 
reduce potential proprietary costs. 
 The analysis also indicates that the implementation of the management approach lead 
to a reduction by 41% in the number of companies which have reported segment’s profit that 
reconciles with consolidated statement. This finding could be attributed to segment 
information being prepared in accordance with non-IFRS measures.  
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Table 6. 7: Number of companies reported LOB and GEO profits and reported reconciled profit 
pre and post IFRS 8 
 
Many previous studies in segmental disclosure evaluated the quality of segmental 
disclosure based on the number of segments disclosed. It is true that the new standard results 
in an increase in the number of geographical segments reported. However, there is hardly any 
evidence to support the claim that a greater number of reported segments provide better 
insight to market participants.  
On the contrary, it can be suggested that the quality of geographical disclosure rather 
than the number of segments reported is what improve information utility (Hussain, 1997). 
Table (6.8) examines whether there is any difference in the quality of geographical segments 
disclosure pre and post IFRS 8. The results suggest that large companies reported a finer 
quality of geographical segments. Both parametric (t-stat) and non-parametric (Kruskal-
Wallis 2) show a significant improvement in the quality of geographical segments disclosure 
at 5% level. The results may be interpreted as more companies tend to disaggregate segmental 
information and report segment information in country-wise level. The importance of finer 
geographical segments to financial analysts and capital market will be examined in detail in 
the next chapters. 
  
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
LOB and GEO Profits 
Pre IFRS 8 16 6 22 
Post IFRS 8 13 3 16 
Reconciled Profit 
Pre IFRS 8 31 8 39 
Post IFRS 8 20 9 29 
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Table 6. 8: Mean Quality of geographical segments pre and post IFRS 8 by listing 
 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Total Sample 
Quality of GEO identification 
Pre IFRS 8 3.49 3.85 3.58 
Post IFRS 8 3.82 4.15 3.91 
Difference in means 
T-stat 
Kruskal-Wallis 2 
0.33 
2.145** 
4.488** 
0.30 
1.116 
0.867 
0.33 
2.401** 
5.523** 
Notes: Both parametric (t-stat) and non-parametric test statistics (Kruskal –Wallis 2) are employed to test the 
difference mean of QGEO segments between Pre and Post IFRS 8. *, **, and *** denote the result is 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
6.2-Analysis of Disclosure According to Sectors 
This part of the analysis evaluates the changes in segmental disclosure after the 
adoption of IFRS 8 according to different sectors. The results are presented in tables (6.9) to 
(6.15). It is argued that different industries will have different motives, practices, and choices 
in regards to the level of information disclosed to the public.  
Table (6.9) shows the number of companies reported a change in the number of 
operating and geographical segments. The result shows that companies in the basic material 
and oil and gas sectors exhibited the greatest increase in the number of LOB segments by 
36% and 33% respectively. In term of GEO segments, the Technology sector witnessed an 
increase in the number of segments by 67%. In second place comes basic material, with 55% 
of companies in this industry reporting more number of geographical segments. The increase 
in the number of reportable segments by these three industries could be explained by the great 
diversify of their business activities by which internal reports are prepared. On the other hand, 
the majority of the companies in consumer services, health care and industrial reported no 
change in the number of LOB and GEO segments.  
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Table 6. 9: Number of companies reported a change in the number of segments by sector  
LOB GEO  
Increase Decrease No Change Increase Decrease No Change 
Basic Material 4 1 6 6 2 3 
Cons. Goods 3 1 7 4 0 7 
Cons. Services 4 1 15 6 0 14 
Health Care 1 0 3 0 0 4 
Industrial 5 1 18 7 2 15 
Oil & Gas 3 1 5 2 2 5 
Technology 0 2 1 2 0 1 
Telecom. 1 0 3 1 1 2 
Utilities 0 0 5 1 1 3 
Total Sample 21 7 63 29 8 54 
 
As we know, IFRS 8 has a fundamentally different approach in defining reportable 
segments. From previous tables it can be seen that the new approach has led to more segments 
being reported by companies. However, table (6.10) evaluates the mean difference of reported 
LOB and GEO segments pre and post IFRS 8 by different sectors. Although only one 
company out of the 3 in the health care sector reported an increase in the number of LOB 
segments after the adoption of IFRS 8, what really matters is the magnitude of this increase.  
The findings indicate that companies in this sector have the highest increase in the 
mean of LOB segments among all sectors. It has increased by 1.5 from 2.0 under IAS 14R to 
3.5 under IFRS 8. On the contrary, companies in technology sector reported the only decrease 
in the mean number of reported LOB segments. The mean number of segments decreased 
from 4.0 under IAS 14R to 2.0 under IFRS 8. It is known that technology companies are faced 
with rapid change in their market, products, and activities which encourages them to 
aggregate their business activities into broader categories.  
Again, these large differences in the mean number of reportable segments for these 
two sectors could be due to the difference between internal and external reporting. In terms of 
GEO segments, all sectors have experienced an increase in the mean number of segments 
reported after the adoption of IFRS 8 except for Health care, which has the same mean pre 
and post IFRS 8. Among all sectors, technology sector shows the greatest increase in the 
mean difference. It has increased by two points from 4.33 pre-IFRS 8 to 6.33 post-IFRS 8. 
This finding refutes the claim that the new standard will result in less geographical segments 
to be reported. 
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Table 6. 10: Mean number of line of business and geographical segments pre and post IFRS 8 by 
sector 
 
Both table (6.11) and table (6.12) present a summary of the disclosure of line items 
disclosed in the segment note according to different industry sectors. Table (6.12) shows that 
the average number of line items disclosed for LOB segments decreased upon the adoption of 
IFRS 8 almost across all sectors.  
Basic material, health care, and technology sectors exhibited the biggest decrease in 
the number of LOB line items disclosed after the adoption of IFRS 8. For the basic material 
the mean number of line item decreased by 1.09 from 6.36 under IAS 14R to 5.27 under IFRS 
8, while for both health care and technology the mean number drop by one point each.  
The reporting of line items for geographical segment represents a major concern in 
regards to the adoption of IFRS 8 (the management approach). The results show that all 
sectors have on average reported fewer line items under IFRS 8 compared to IAS 14R. The 
amount of decrease in items is very significant for some industries such as 
telecommunication, consumer goods, oil and gas, and basic material. For example, companies 
in the telecommunication sector reported a mean of 5.25 items under IAS 14R, while under 
IFRS 8 they reported only 2.75 items. The mean differences for consumer goods, oil and gas, 
and basic material are -2.27, -2.11, and -1.81 respectively.  
Table (6.11) on the other hand, presents information about the number of companies 
which reported an increase, decrease, or no change in the number of line items. It can be 
 
LOB GEO  
Pre IFRS 
8 
Post IFRS 
8 
Means 
Difference 
Pre IFRS 
8 
Post IFRS 8 
Means 
Difference 
Basic 
Material 
4 4.45 0.45 5.82 7.18 1.36 
Consumer 
Goods 
2.36 3 0.64 3 3.9 0.9 
Consumer 
Services 
2.6 2.9 0.3 3.25 3.7 0.45 
Health Care 2 3.5 1.5 6.25 6.25 0 
Industrial 3.29 3.75 0.46 4.33 4.91 0.58 
Oil & Gas 3.33 3.55 0.22 4 4.11 0.11 
Technology 4 2 -2 4.33 6.33 2 
Telecom. 2 2.25 0.25 4.75 5 0.25 
Utilities 2.6 2.6 0 2.6 2.8 0.2 
Total 
Sample 
2.98 3.34 0.36 4.08 4.72 0.64 
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noticed that most of the companies in each of the sectors reported fewer LOB line items upon 
the adoption of IFRS 8, except for the industrial and oil and gas sectors. 
 The results also show that three companies (60%) in the utilities sector reported fewer 
items for their LOB segments under IFRS 8.  In addition, none of the companies in the basic 
material sector reported an increase in LOB’s line items, while 6 companies (55%) reported 
fewer items and 5 companies reported the same number. The same thing with the companies 
in health care sector, 50% of the companies reported a decrease in the number of LOB line 
items, and the remaining 50% reported no change in the number of items disclosed.  In total, 
57 companies out of 91 in our sample have reported either an increase in the number of LOB’ 
line items or the same number.  
Further analysis of the disclosure of line items under IFRS 8 provides important 
insight into the impact of the management approach in the decline of line items disclosed for 
GEO segments. Table (6.11) indicates that majority of the companies in each sector have 
reported lower number of line items under IFRS 8 compared to IAS 14R. For example all 
companies in telecommunication sectors have decreases the items reported for their GEO 
segments. Also, the results show that 9 companies (82%) of each of basic material and 
consumer goods sectors reported less items. In general, under the new standard, companies 
have strong tendency to conceal/hide information regarding different line items from their 
geographical/entity-wide segments.  
According to tables (6.11) and (6.12), GEO segments are influenced by IFRS 8, 
greater number of companies reported less line items and the decline in the mean of reported 
line items is greater for geographical segments. Companies tend to reduce the amount of line 
item information reported for the GEO segment in a greater extent post-IFRS  
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Table 6. 11: Number of companies reported a change in the number of line items by sector  
LOB GEO 
 
Increase Decrease No Change Increase Decrease No Change 
Basic 
Material 
0 6 5 0 9 2 
Cons. Goods 3 5 3 1 9 1 
Cons. 
Services 
4 8 8 2 10 8 
Health Care 0 2 2 1 2 1 
Industrial 6 5 13 1 13 10 
Oil & Gas 1 2 6 0 7 2 
Technology 0 1 2 0 2 1 
Telecom. 1 2 1 0 4 0 
Utilities 1 3 1 2 3 0 
Total Sample 16 34 41 7 59 25 
 
 
Table 6. 12: Mean number of line items of business and geographical segments pre and post 
IFRS 8 by sector 
 
 
  
 
LOB GEO 
 
Pre IFRS 
8 
Post IFRS 
8 
Means 
Difference 
Pre IFRS 
8 
Post IFRS 
8 
Means 
Difference 
Basic 
Material 
6.36 5.27 -1.09 4.54 2.73 -1.81 
Consumer 
Goods 
4 3.72 -0.28 6 3.73 -2.27 
Consumer 
Services 
5.15 5.1 -0.05 4.4 3.55 -0.85 
Health Care 5 4 -1 5.5 4 -1.5 
Industrial 5.91 6 0.09 4.21 3.5 -0.71 
Oil & Gas 5 4.78 -0.22 6 3.89 -2.11 
Technology 7.67 6.67 -1 5.67 4.33 -1.34 
Telecom. 3.25 3.25 0 5.25 2.75 -2.5 
Utilities 5 4.6 -0.4 3.8 3.6 -0.2 
Total 
Sample 
5.33 5.04 -0.29 4.81 3.5 -1.31 
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Table (6.13) looks at four aspect related to the adoption of IFRS 8, namely, early 
adoption, identification of CODM, reporting both LOB and GEO profit definition, and 
reporting segment profit that reconciles with consolidated income statement. First, despite 
IASB calls for the companies to early adopt IFRS 8, none of the companies in basic material, 
health care, or utilities sectors have opted to adopt the standard early. The rest of the sectors 
also seem to be reluctant to adopt the standard before its effective date as only 16 companies 
out of 91 adopted the standard early.  
The identity of the chief operating decision maker is one element which has raised 
some concerns in previous studies, as explained earlier in this chapter. However, the analysis 
below shows that the majority of companies in all sectors except for basic material have 
identified their CODM.  
Profit and sale information are two very important pieces of information that the users 
of segment information are looking for. The extent of profit and sale disclosure, determine 
users ability to understand company performance and thus anticipate future risks and 
opportunities. Table (6.13) evaluates two proxies of segment profit disclosure quality under 
IFRS 8.  
The first is related to the disclosure of profit definition for both operating segment and 
for entity-wide information. The second one refers to whether the reported segment profit 
reconciles with any profit figure in the consolidated income statement. 
 It is found that very few companies in any sector reported both operating and entity-
wide profits. On the other hand, there are some variations between the different sectors in 
term of reporting a segment profit that matches the consolidated statements. It can be noticed 
that 75% of the telecommunication sector companies reported a matching profit. 
Further, the segment profit of 4 companies out of 11 each for basic material and 
consumer goods reconciles with consolidated profit. Nevertheless, only a small proportion of 
consumer services and industrial companies’ segment profit reconciles with consolidated 
income statement profit. Due to the importance of segment profit disclosure, a further analysis 
was carried out to compare the two aforementioned profit proxies pre and post IFRS 8, which 
is presented in table (6.14).  
  
104 
 
Table 6. 13: No. of companies adopting IFRS 8 early, identified CODM, reported LOB & GEO 
profits and report reconciled profit 
 
No. Companies Early Adopt CODM Both Profit Profit Match 
Basic 
Material 
11 0 4 1 4 
Cons. Goods 11 1 9 3 4 
Cons. 
Services 
20 5 16 5 5 
Health Care 4 0 3 0 2 
Industrial 24 4 18 4 5 
Oil & Gas 9 3 4 2 3 
Technology 3 1 2 0 1 
Telecom. 4 2 2 0 3 
Utilities 5 0 4 1 2 
Total Sample 91 16 62 16 29 
 
Table (6.14) compares the number of companies reported both LOB and GEO profit 
and companies reported a segment profit that reconciles with consolidated statement for the 
same sector under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R. The figures show that around 27% of the companies 
which reported both profits under IAS 14R have stopped doing so under IFRS 8. Almost all 
the sectors except for two have witnessed a decrease by one or two in the number of 
companies which reported both profits.  
At the same time, it can be noticed that four sectors, namely, oil and gas, technology, 
telecommunication, and utilities have the same number of companies which have reported 
reconciled segment profit. However, consumer services, health care and industrial sectors 
have recorded a noticeable drop in the number of companies reporting matching profits post-
IFRS 8.  
This decrease in number of companies reporting both profits and profit match post-
IFRS8 might not be very significant to the users of these reports. This argument will be tested 
in next two chapters and assess whether reporting profit for operating and entity-wide 
segments have any impact on analysts and market informativeness. 
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Table 6. 14: No. of companies reported LOB & GEO profits and reported reconciled profit pre 
and post IFRS 8 by sector 
 
LOB & GEO profits Profit Match 
 
Pre-
IFRS8 
Post-IFRS8 Difference Pre-
IFRS8 
Post-IFRS8 Difference 
Basic 
Material 
2 1 -1 5 4 -1 
Consumer 
Goods 
2 3 1 5 4 -1 
Consumer 
Services 
6 5 -1 9 5 -4 
Health Care 1 0 -1 4 2 -2 
Industrial 6 4 -2 7 5 -2 
Oil & Gas 3 2 -1 3 3 0 
Technology 1 0 -1 1 1 0 
Telecom. 0 0 0 3 3 0 
Utilities 1 1 0 2 2 0 
Total 
Sample 
22 16 -6 39 29 -10 
 
Table (6.15) presents the mean quality of geographical segment definition as such to 
what extent sample companies report sales information to more disaggregated geographical 
locations. The analysis assesses the difference in the quality of geographical segments by 
sectors. It could be noticed that most of the sectors reported a finer geographical segments 
post adoption of IFRS 8 except for health care and telecommunication. The mean quality of 
geographical segment for health care sector dropped by 0.4 from 3.92 under IAS 14R to 3.52 
under IFRS 8, while technology showed a slight decrease by 0.08 upon the adoption of IFRS 
8.  Among all the sectors, oil and gas reported the greatest increase in the mean quality by 
0.61 followed by technology sector which increased by 0.55. Based on the information 
presented in table (6.15), it is clear that the adoption of IFRS 8 has improved the quality of 
geographical segment across most sectors.   
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Table 6. 15: Mean quality of geographical segment pre and post IFRS 8 by sector 
 
Pre-IFRS8 Post-IFRS8 Difference in Mean 
Basic Material 3.73 3.96 0.23 
Cons. Goods 3.1 3.41 0.31 
Cons. Services 3.59 3.93 0.34 
Health Care 3.92 3.52 -0.4 
Industrial 3.51 3.94 0.43 
Oil & Gas 3.4 4.01 0.61 
Technology 3.21 3.76 0.55 
Telecom. 4.29 4.21 -0.08 
Utilities 4.51 4.75 0.24 
Total Sample 3.59 3.91 0.32 
 
 
6.3- Conclusion 
To summarise, the adoption of IFRS 8 has made noticeable changes in the way 
segmental information are reported. In general, the overall disclosure of number of LOB and 
GEO segments has increased for both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies and across most 
sectors. On the other hand, the disclosure of some line items has decreased post IFRS 8 
particularly for GEO segments. Profit line item may be considered as the most important 
element that has been concealed from GEO segments.  
Nevertheless, the new standard has improved the mean quality of geographical 
segment disclosure for both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 and almost across all sectors. It is worth 
mentioning that large companies (FTSE 100) tend to show more statistically significant 
changes in segmental disclosure post-IFRS8. In addition, putting together the findings 
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obtained in this chapter, it is noticeable that geographical segment disclosure has been 
affected to a greater extent than the line of business disclosure.  
Some of the claims against IFRS 8 such as the identification of CODM has been 
refuted. In addition the analysis shows that there are some variations in the disclosure of 
segment information between different sectors. Some of the areas in which the difference 
between sectors exist are related to the disclosure of segment profit matching with 
consolidated statements, disclosure of GEO line items, and the quality of geographical 
segments. 
To sum up, the impact of the adoption of IFRS 8 on the disclosure of segment 
information of UK listed companies could be summarised in the following points: 
a) Average number of LOB segments has increased (statistically insignificant),  
b) Average number of GEO segments has increased (statistically significant), 
c) Average number of LOB line items has decreased (statistically 
insignificant), 
d) Average number of GEO line items has decreased (statistically significant), 
e) Around 68% of the sample companies have identified their CODM, 
f) The number of companies which reported a profit line item for both LOB 
and GEO segments has decreased, 
g) The number of companies which reported a segment profit that reconciles 
with consolidated statements has decreased, and 
h) The mean fineness of geographical segments has increased (statistically 
significant). 
The impact of the differences in the disclosure of segmental information pre and post 
IFRS 8 on earnings predictive ability will be examined in more details in the next chapters. In 
particular, we will evaluate the effect of these changes on analysts’ and capital market ability 
to predict future change in earnings.  
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Chapter 7- Segmental Information and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 
Accuracy 
Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the impact of segmental disclosure on the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecast. The analysis will cover several aspects of segmental disclosure 
but the focus will be mainly on the disclosure of segments profit. This chapter details the 
variables to be used in the analysis, the hypothesis of the expected association between 
segment disclosure variables and analysts’ forecast, and non-segmental variables that are 
expected to affect analysts’ forecast. The rest of this chapter will be divided into three 
sections as follows: 
7.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
7.2: Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy and Segmental Disclosure 
7.3: Experimental Design and Results  
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7.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
In this part, the summary descriptive statistics for forecast error, segments variables 
and controlling variables are presented for the whole sample period.  
Tables (7.1) to (7.5) present descriptive statistics of the variables included in our 
analysts’ forecast model. Tables (7.2) and (7.3) compare the mean, median, standard 
deviation, maximum and minimum for each variable prior and post implementation of IFRS 
8. It can be noticed that the change in earnings is higher post IFRS 8 by 13.6% which is 
expected to increase the forecast error in the period post IFRS 8. However, the mean of FE 
under IAS 14R is 0.45 compared to 0.36 under IFRS 8. The decline in the forecast error is 
expected to be associated with many factors such as improvements in segmental disclosure.  
The two tables also indicate that the adoption of IFRS 8 has improved the fineness of 
geographical segment disclosure. Both mean and median of QGEO have increased from 3.58 
and 3.53 to 3.89 and 4.18 respectively post IFRS 8. However, on average, both disclosure of 
profit line items and profit matching with consolidated statements have witnessed a decline 
post IFRS 8. This match with the concern raised earlier by the users of the financial statement 
about the flexibility granted to management by the new standard.  
Although the total number of board members has declined in the period post IFRS 8; 
the mean and median of the size of board members has drop after the adoption of the 
management approach but interestingly, the mean of the proportion of non-executive directors 
to the executive directors (NER) has increased by 0.07, which is expected to improve 
analysts’ prediction about future earnings.    
Another interesting finding is that there is little difference in mean value of NEG 
between post and prior to adoption of IFRS 8. The mean of NEG (drop in earning at time t 
compared to earnings at time t-1) under IAS 14R is 0.33 compared to 0.32 under IFRS 8.  
  
110 
 
Table 7. 1: Descriptive Statistics Whole Sample Period Analyst Forecast Model (IAS 14R & IFRS 8) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
FE 348 0.41 0.1 1.48 20.05 0.00 
ERN 346 0.72 0.22 2.31 28.95 0.00 
QGEO 348 3.74 3.76 1.26 5.00 0.00 
MAMRG 348 0.33 0.05 2.46 38.81 0.00 
AG 343 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.76 -1.70 
EPt-1 346 0.00 0 0.00 0.41 -0.01 
NER 348 2.51 2 1.75 13.00 0.40 
TOTBOARD 348 10.05 10 2.67 20.00 5.00 
MV 348 13518.61 3597.64 25285.11 155859.23 66.38 
NEG 346 0.33 0 0.46964 1 0 
Table 7.1 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum for each of the variables of 
our forecast model. FE is Analysts’ forecast error ERN is earnings variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), 
QGEO measures the fineness of geographical segment, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin 
from consolidated profit margin, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, 
NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets 
Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share 
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Table 7. 2: Descriptive Statistics Analyst Forecast Model (IAS 14R only) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
FE 174 0.45 0.11 1.33 12.24 0.00 
ERN 172 0.68 0.2 2.14 24.53 0.00 
QGEO 174 3.58 3.53 0.47 1.93 5.00 
MAMRG 174 0.49 0.0580761 3.45 38.81 0.00 
AG 171 0.10 0.0865629 0.22 0.76 -1.74 
EPt-1 172 0.00 0.0006202 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
NER 174 2.48 2 1.77 13.00 0.40 
TOTBOARD 174 10.18 10 2.76 20.00 5.00 
MV 174 12450.71 2884.8442 24257.81 124542.94 154.68 
NEG 172 0.33 0 0.47 1.00 0.00 
Table 7.2 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum for each of the variables of 
our forecast model under IAS 14R.FE is Analysts’ forecast error ERN is earnings variability measured as 
ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), QGEO is a measures the fineness of geographical segment, MAMRG measures deviation of 
segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, 
TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price 
ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share 
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Table 7. 3: Descriptive Statistics Analyst Forecast Model (IFRS 8 only) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
FE 174 0.36 0.0898848 1.62 20.05 0.00 
ERN 174 0.75 0.2432268 2.48 28.95 0.00 
QGEO 174 3.89 4.18 0.88 5.00 1.96 
MAMRG 174 0.16 0.0591712 0.47 5.61 0.00 
AG 172 0.05 0.0439824 0.14 0.55 -0.85 
EPt-1 174 0.00 0.0007456 0.00 0.04 0.00 
NER 174 2.55 2 1.73 12.00 0.55 
TOTBOARD 174 9.91 9 2.58 17.00 5.00 
MV 174 14586.51 4006.046 26298.93 155859.23 66.38 
NEG 174 0.32 0 0.47 1.00 0.00 
Table 7.3 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum for each of the variables of 
our forecast model under IFRS 8. FE is Analysts’ forecast error ERN is earnings variability measured as 
ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), QGEO is a measures the fineness of geographical segment, MAMRG measures deviation of 
segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, 
TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price 
ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share 
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Table (7.4) shows the frequency of the pooled sample for main segment (MASEG), 
disclosure of both LOB and GEO profits (BOTHPROF), reconciliation between segment 
profit and consolidated profit (PROFMTCH), and decline in future earnings (NEG). The 
table reveal that 68% of the sample companies have identified their main segment based on 
LOB classification. It can be also observed that only 21% of the companies have reported 
both LOB and GEO profit line items. Most of the companies choose to report the profit of 
the main segment only which for the majority of the sample companies is mainly LOB. 
Moreover, the companies which have reported a segment profit which matches with 
consolidated statements profit line items represent only 38%. The table also indicates that 
one third (33%) of the sample size experience a decline in their future earnings.  
Table (7.5) compare the disclosure pattern of MASEG, BOTHPROF, PROFMTCH, 
and NEG between IAS 14R and IFRS 8. The result show that 69% of the company reported 
their main segment as LOB post IFRS 8 compared to 66%. This might indicate that some of 
the companies tend to report segment information differently to internal operating decision 
maker than to external users. The table document a drop in the proportionate of the companies 
which have reported both LOB and GEO profits. Prior to IFRS 8, 25% of the companies 
reported both LOB and GEO profits compared to 18% post IFRS 8. Similarly, under IFRS 8, 
only around 57 companies have reported a segment profit that reconciles with consolidated 
statements compared to 76companies under IAS 14R. This finding support the previous 
conclusion that IFRS 8 has led to lower disclosure of segment profit line items. Interestingly, 
the table shows no difference in the number of companies which have suffered a decline in 
their future earnings post and prior IFRS 8.  
The correlation tables (7.6-7.8) reveal the high positive correlation between level of 
earning change and absolute forecast error particularly for the IFRS 8 period. The correlation 
between ERN and FE for the IFRS 8 period is 0.903 and it is significant at 1% level, while for 
the pooled sample, the Pearson correlation between ERN and FE is 0.661. The high 
correlation supports our argument of the expected impact of earnings variability and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy.  
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Table 7. 4: Frequency Statistics Four-Year* Analyst Forecast Model 
Variable Sample Size NO. of Firms Percent 
LOB  348 235 68% 
GEO 348 113 32% 
BOTHPROF 348 74 21% 
PROFMTCH 348 133 38% 
NEG 346 113 33% 
*Four-ear refers to two years pre IFRS 8 and two years post IFRS 8 
 
 
Table 7. 5: Frequency Statistics Four-Year Analyst Forecast Model (IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8) 
Variable N IAS 14R Percent N IFRS 8 Percent 
LOB  174 115 66% 174 120 69% 
GEO 174 59 34% 174 54 31% 
BOTHPROF 174 43 25% 174 31 18% 
PROFMTCH 174 76 44% 174 57 33% 
NEG 172 57 33% 174 56 32% 
*Four-year refers to two years pre IFRS 8 and two years post IFRS 8 
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Table 7. 6: Pearson’s Correlation for IFRS 8 & IAS 14R Analyst Forecast Model 
 
Variable FE ERN STAND QGEO MASEG MAMRG BOTHPROF PROFMTCH AG E/P NER TOTBOARD NEG MV 
FE 1 .661
** -.048 -.052 .014 .024 .028 -.049 -.077 -.018 -.088 .121* .201** .116* 
ERN .661
** 1 -.008 -.018 -.023 .070 .021 .026 -.085 -.259** -.002 .107 .146** .112* 
STAND -.048 -.008 1 .167
** .020 -.072 -.098 -.128* -.165** .045 .016 -.060 -.010 .027 
QGEO -0.052 -0.018 .167
** 1 .104 .124* -.216** .105 -.066 -0.070 -.196** -.090 0.063 -.171** 
MASEG .014 -.023 .020 .104 1 -.120
* .136* -.088 .004 .217** -.034 .033 .033 .017 
MAMRG 0.024 0.070 -.072 .124
* -.120* 1 -.044 .110* -.519** -0.037 -.051 -.070 .123* -0.025 
BOTHPROF .028 .021 -.098 -.216
** .136* -.044 1 -.002 .006 .051 .015 .264** -.056 .127* 
PROFMTCH -0.049 0.026 -.128
* .105 -.088 .110* -.002 1 -.009 -0.105 .013 .081 -0.070 -0.043 
AG -.077 -.085 -.165
** -.066 .004 -.519** .006 -.009 1 -.031 .039 .061 -.160** .038 
EPt-1 -0.018 -.259
** .045 -.070 .217** -.037 .051 -.105 -.031 1 .146** .049 .252** .259** 
NER -.088 -.002 .016 -.196
** -.034 -.051 .015 .013 .039 .146** 1 .219** -.041 .465** 
TOTBOARD .121
* 0.107 -.060 -.090 .033 -.070 .264** .081 .061 0.049 .219** 1 0.080 .501** 
NEG .201
** .146** -.010 .063 .033 .123* -.056 -.070 -.160** .252** -.041 .080 1 -.009 
MV .116
* .112* .027 -.171** .017 -.025 .127* -.043 .038 .259** .465** .501** -0.009 1 
FE is Analysts’ forecast error ERN is earnings variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness of 
geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of 
segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy 
which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the 
ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period  earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share ,(**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed), (*) Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7. 7: Pearson’s Correlation for IAS 14R Analyst Forecast Model 
Variable FE ERN QGEO MASEG MAMRG BOTHPROF PROFMTCH AG E/P NER TOTBOARD NEG MV 
FE 1 .294** .035 -.004 .008 -.095 -.052 -.123 -.068 -.107 .096 .204** -.043 
ERN .294** 1 .083 -.087 .052 -.094 .079 -.151* -.304** .049 .072 .120 -.049 
QGEO .035 .083 1 -.009 .145 -.019 .160* .032 -.218** -.040 .043 .017 .042 
MASEG -.004 -.087 -.009 1 -.147 .241** -.030 .026 .174* -.059 .082 .058 .043 
MAMRG .008 .052 .145 -.147 1 -.057 .117 -.629** -.012 -.054 -.114 .133 -.040 
BOTHPROF -.095 -.094 -.019 .241** -.057 1 .006 .076 -.012 .047 .249** -.121 .139 
PROFMTCH -.052 .079 .160* -.030 .117 .006 1 -.056 -.129 .038 .128 -.046 .050 
AG -.123 -.151* .032 .026 -.629** .076 -.056 1 -.079 .022 .043 -.149 .017 
EPt-1 -.068 -.304** -.218** .174* -.012 -.012 -.129 -.079 1 .037 .044 .062 .096 
NER -.107 .049 -.040 -.059 -.054 .047 .038 .022 .037 1 .190* -.048 .437** 
TOTBOARD .096 .072 .043 .082 -.114 .249** .128 .043 .044 .190* 1 .017 .511** 
NEG .204** .120 .017 .058 .133 -.121 -.046 -.149 .062 -.048 .017 1 -.020 
MV -.043 -.049 .042 .043 -.040 .139 .050 .017 .096 .437** .511** -.020 1 
FE is Analysts’ forecast error ERN is earnings variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy has a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness of 
geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of 
segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy 
which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio 
of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share ,(**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), 
(*) Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7. 8: Pearson’s Correlation for IFRS 8 Analyst Forecast Model 
Variable FE ERN QGEO MASEG MAMRG BOTHPROF PROFMTCH AG E/P NER TOTBOARD NEG MV 
FE 1 .903** -.140 .053 .147 .128 -.075 -.179* .105 -.089 .115 .221** .221** 
ERN .903** 1 -.179* .061 .181* .119 -.060 -.139 .386** -.074 .109 .208** .212** 
QGEO -.140 -.179* 1 .028 .122 -.060 -.014 .097 -.276** -.131 -.069 -.035 -.170* 
MASEG .053 .061 .028 1 -.134 -.012 -.088 -.103 .106 -.018 -.018 .037 -.016 
MAMRG .147 .181* .122 -.134 1 -.043 .158* .083 -.038 -.099 .124 .145 .070 
BOTHPROF .128 .119 -.060 -.012 -.043 1 -.037 -.116 -.025 .004 .284** .001 .144 
PROFMTCH -.075 -.060 -.014 -.088 .158* -.037 1 .040 -.078 .007 .042 -.088 -.097 
AG -.179* -.139 .097 -.103 .083 -.116 .040 1 -.151* .111 .081 -.256** .122 
EPt-1 .105 .386** -.276** .106 -.038 -.025 -.078 -.151* 1 -.012 -.017 .209** .032 
NER -.089 -.074 -.131 -.018 -.099 .004 .007 .111 -.012 1 .268** -.043 .500** 
TOTBOARD .115 .109 -.069 -.018 .124 .284** .042 .081 -.017 .268** 1 .138 .509** 
NEG .221** .208** -.035 .037 .145 .001 -.088 -.256** .209** -.043 .138 1 -.008 
MV .221** .212** -.170* -.016 .070 .144 -.097 .122 .032 .500** .509** -.008 1 
FE is Analysts’ forecast error ERN is earnings variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy has a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness of 
geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of 
segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy 
which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the 
ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share ,(**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed), (*) Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
118 
 
7.2: Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy and Segmental Disclosure 
The aim of this section is to discussthe dataset of this chapter and the measurement 
specifications of the variables included in the analysis. It also describes the aspects of segment 
information that are examined in this chapter and the variables that are controlled for. 
Moreover, this section discusses the different approaches to calculating analysts’ forecast 
error and highlight the reason for the adoption of forecast error measure of this study. The rest 
of this section will be divided into five sub-sections as follows: 
7.2.1: The Dataset and Measurement of Variables7.2.2: Measurement Specifications 
7.2.3: Non-Segmental Factors Affecting Forecast Accuracy 
7.2.4: Analyst’s Forecast Error Matric 
7.2.5: Summary of the Chapter 
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7.2.1: The Dataset and Variables’ Measurement 
Analysts’ Forecast 
Before starting the description of the dataset and variables measurement mechanism, it 
is important to explain why analysts’ forecast is used.  
There is a great debate between academics with regard to whether to use predicted 
earnings that are generated by financial analysts or the one generated by statistical models. 
However, since the main objective of corporate disclosure in general and segment disclosure 
in particular is to better inform the users of these reports to help them to make rational 
decisions regarding their resource allocation, it is evidenced that analysts’ forecast that is 
highly used by investors in making their investments decisions. Therefore, analysts’ forecast 
is more relevant than statistical models in evaluating the impact of segmental disclosure on 
the market predictability future earnings.  
Although some of the very early academics claimed that there was no significant 
difference between the accuracy of analysts’ forecast and forecast generated by statistical 
models (Cragg & Malkiel, 1968; and Elton & Gruber, 1972), later studies documented that 
analysts’ forecasts are better than statistical models’ forecasts (Brown and Rozeff, 1978; 
Collins & Hopwood, 1980; Fried & Givoly, 1982; Cooper & Taylor, 1983; Cooper, 1984; 
Bhaskar & Morris, 1984; O’ Brien, 1988; and Patz, 1989). 
Studies which have shown that analysts’ forecast is more relevant to investment 
decision have examined the association between forecast error and stock return. For example, 
Brown et al. (1987) find that abnormal stock return is highly correlated to analysts’ forecast 
rather than statistical model forecast. Their finding is consistent with the findings of Fried & 
Givoly (1982).  
Another noteworthy point is that if financial analysts use more detailed information 
than statistical models, it cannot be concluded that the impact of segmental information for 
both statistical models and analysts’ forecast will be the same. Thus, it is the analysts’ 
forecast that we are interested in testing and using in this analysis.   
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Descriptions of Dataset 
The dataset to be used in this analysis has been obtained from the Bloomberg database. It 
comprises the following information for 87 companies over 4 year period.  
a) Annual EPS for fiscal year t 
b) 12 month analyst forecasts of EPS for fiscal year t  
c) Annual EPS for fiscal year t-1 
d) Stock price at the beginning of year t 
e) Market capitalisation 
f) Total assets at fiscal year t and t-1 
The segment data has been obtained individually from companies annual reports. More 
details of the collection of segment variables have been given in Chapter 5, section 5.1, on 
sample selection. 
The advantage of this dataset is that all figures have been calculated using the same 
assumption and therefore the data are consistent across all companies. In regards to earnings 
forecast, using the analyst consensus enable us to evaluate the impact of segmental disclosure 
from the same perception of investors. In addition, using database analysts’ forecast is very 
common among researchers so it is easy to compare the finding of this study with those of 
other studies. In addition to that, database earnings estimate is based on consensus forecast, 
which represents the overall market prediction of the company earning. Consensus estimates 
are perceived as a very powerful estimates, due to the fact that share price is highly sensitive 
to these estimates.  
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7.2.2: Variables Measurement and Specification 
This analysis examines the impact of four aspects of segmental disclosure on analyst’s 
forecast accuracy.  
The four aspects are: 
1) Segment standard ( This aspect represents the accounting standard that is used to 
report segment information - either IAS 14R or IFRS 8) 
2) Quality of Segment profit Disclosure (This aspect evaluates the quality of segment’s 
profit disclosure; three proxies are used to capture this aspect as explained later in this 
section) 
3) Main segment ( This aspect seeks to differentiate between the various possible ways to 
define company’s main/operating segments; either based on LOB or based on GEO) 
4) Quality of geographical segments (This matrix measures the fineness of geographical 
segment identification as proportionate of sale figure; the more narrow and specific 
the GEO segment the higher the score is given)  
Each of these aspects is examined in relation to the analyst’s forecast accuracy. Thus, 
several hypotheses have been developed and will be tested using statistical analysis method. 
For the purpose of conducting the statistical analysis all of these variables are in numeric 
form. The segment variables have been calculated using companies’ annual report. More 
details on the selection of annual report have been given in Chapter 5. 
(1) Segment standard 
(a) Hypothesis development 
The previous literature presented in Chapter 4 indicates that disaggregated 
financial information provides better insight for financial analysts. Hope (2003) state 
that the use of segment information help the users of annual reports to evaluate the risk 
and growth of each business segment of a company individually which improve their 
assessment of company performance and improve their future earnings prediction. 
 
However, because the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has 
imposed a major change in the way segmental information is reported (change from 
IAS 14R to IFRS 8), the users of this information has raised some concerns about the 
usefulness of the new approach (Crawford et al., 2012). Since the new approach has 
been copied from American standards, many researches which have been conducted in 
USA show that the implementation of the management approach is positively 
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associated with market predictability of future earnings (e.g. Venkataraman, 2001; 
Ettredge et al., 2005; and Hope et al., 2008;). This study examines whether the 
implementation of IFRS8 in UK capital market has improved analysts’ insight about 
future earnings. 
 
The hypotheses relating to segment standard are presented below. 
H10: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is not associated with the segment 
standard.  
H11: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is associated with the segment 
standard.  
 
(b) Measurement of variable 
The standard variable is a dummy variable, which has a value of one for IFRS 8 and a 
value of zero for IAS 14R. 
 
(2) Segment identification 
(a) Hypothesis development 
In addition to segment standard, this study also examine whether defining the 
main segment (primary segment in IAS 14R or operating-segment in IFRS 8) as either 
Line of Business (LOB) or geographic (GEO) has any impact on analysts’ ability to 
predict future earnings. It is important to highlight that analysts tend to have 
specialised knowledge, and such knowledge could be based on industrial classification 
and risk attitude or based on geographical classifications and macro-economic 
conditions. There is growing evidence to suggest that segment information is used in 
association with analyst specialised knowledge (Backer and McFarland, 1968; Day, 
1986; and Hussain, 1997).  
The International Accounting Standard Board and Financial Accounting 
Standard Board have emphasised on the importance of segment definition to the users 
of financial reports. Therefore, both IFRS 8 and SFAS 131 require companies to 
report their segment information in the same way as it is presented to the management.  
In addition, Backer and McFarland (1968) examined analysts’ forecast 
accuracy in the USA and find that segment definition is a vital element in determining 
the usefulness of segment information. Further, Hussain (1997) conduct a study of the 
UK segmented reporting and suggest that segment definition was significantly 
associated with analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
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Two variables are used to capture for segment identification. The first variable 
is Main Segment, which represents the major segment classification (whether LOB or 
GEO). The second variable is Quality of Geographical Segment, which represents the 
fineness of geographical segment.  
 
The hypotheses relating to segment definition are presented below.  
H20: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is not associated with the main 
segment defined as LOB 
H21: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is associated with the main segment 
defined as LOB 
 
H30: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is not associated with the main 
segment defined as GEO 
H31: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is associated with the main segment 
defined as GEO 
 
H40: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is not associated with the quality of 
geographic segment 
H41: The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is associated with the quality of 
geographic segment 
 
(b) Measurement of variables 
(i) Main Segment is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if main 
segment is LOB and a value of zero if main segment is GEO 
(ii) The quality of geographic segment, which is denoted as QGEO 
QGEO scores for each company are determined by weighting each segment’s 
score by its proportionate sales and then aggregating the weighted scores.  
The quality of geographic segment is calculated as follows:  
 QGEO = ∑ 𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑆𝑗𝑖
𝑆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (7.1) 
Sales are a convenient weighting variable. Firstly, segmented analysis is common for 
sales than for other items. Secondly, the use of profit as a weighting variable would pose 
problems because of loss making segments. In addition, profit figures are subject to a wide 
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range of different accounting treatments, assumptions, and estimations. Additionally, due to 
the changes in the disclosure requirement for segment information, it is not uncommon to 
conceal segment profit of geographical segments. 
With regard to the use of assets as a weighting variable, it is worth mentioning that the 
disclosure of geographical segment assets is less frequent than geographical segment sale. In 
addition, the definition of segment assets differs across companies (i.e. Total Assets, Net 
Assets, and so on). 
One important aspect in relation to the calculation of QGEO is the assignment of fineness 
score. Fineness score are categorised into two main categories; single segment companies and 
multiple segments companies. The multiple segments companies have been categorised as 
follows: 
(i) Individual country (e.g. UK, USA, China, etc.) 
(ii) Multi-countries, between two to three countries (e.g. UK and Ireland) 
(iii) Continents (Asia, Africa, etc.) 
(iv) Multi-continents (Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa) 
(v) Rest of the world 
 
The score for each category is presented in table (7.9) below: 
Table 7. 9: Geographical Segment Scoring 
Score Category 
0 Single segment 
1 Rest of the world 
2 Multi-continents 
3 Continents 
4 Multi-countries 
5 Individual country 
 
Geographical segment can be identified either by geographic origin (i.e. when products 
are produced) or geographic market (i.e. location of customers). The majority of companies 
do not distinguish between the two classifications. They simply refer to geographical 
information as ‘Analysis by geographical area’. Therefore, this study does not distinguish 
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between geographical information by origin or by market. If one classification has more sales 
details than the other, that classification is the one used in this study. If the two classifications 
have the same sales details, the one with more additional information is used. 
(3) Quality of segment’s profit disclosure 
(a) Hypothesis development 
Another element of segmental disclosure that is investigated in this study is segment 
profit. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to evaluate the effect of segment profit in the 
accuracy of analysis forecasts. Baldwin (1984) revealed that profit figures are critically 
important in earnings prediction and firm valuation process. Balakrishnan et al. (1990) 
demonstrate that predictive ability of segment profit is greater than that for consolidated 
profit.  
Mautz (1968) carry out a survey for the Financial Executives Institute (FEI), analysing the 
views of over 200 financial analysts.  The survey is quite extensive and sheds light both on 
analysts' preferences for segment definition, and on what segmental disclosures (sales, profits, 
etc.) analysts find most useful. 
 
 In addition to segment definition, Mautz’s study also investigates precisely which 
segmental disclosures analysts regard as being most useful for analytical purposes.  Mautz 
(1968, Graph 10, p.117) finds that segment sales and net-income data are considered the most 
useful; segmental disclosure of other items, like total assets and net assets, appears to be 
considered much less important. 
 
 
  Backer & McFarland’s (1968) study for the National Association of 
Accountants (NAA) includes a survey of 72 financial analysts.  The study provides some 
important insights into the way in which segmental information is used by analysts to forecast 
total company earnings, or income.  Backer and McFarland describe the forecasting process in 
the following terms: 
 
"Forecasting begins with the external economic environment to establish the probable demand 
for a company's products, the price outlook, and expected changes in operating costs.  The 
economic outlook is not the same for all industries and forecasts need to be made for each industry 
in which a company has a major participation.  By application of its expected market shares, sales 
by industry for the specific company are determined.  These are, in turn, converted into income 
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with the use of margins with adjustment for expected cost changes.  The basic historical 
information used for such forecasting procedures is a breakdown of sales and income margins for 
product or market segments which respond differently to changes in economic conditions and 
which have a material effect on consolidated earnings." (Backer and McFarland, 1968, pp.9-10). 
 
Thus, analysts’ forecast income for each segment using historic segment sales and 
income data, in conjunction with industry forecasts.  This process provides an explanation of 
the importance that analysts attach to segment sales and net-income data, identified in the 
Mautz (1968) study. 
Emmanuel & Pick (1980) examined the usefulness of segment information in 
forecasting future earnings. In particular they used segments’ sales and profit information and 
find that the models that utilised segment profit information have resulted in better prediction 
of future earnings compared to utilizing consolidated profit information.  
Similarly Silhan (1983) find that segment profit information contributes to the 
improvement of earnings forecast but over short time horizon (one quarter). However, Silhan’ 
study suffer from lack of segment profit disclosure quality measure. It is difficult to capture 
the added value of segment profit information if the profit information contains a lot of noise 
such as unallocated cost, non-GAAP profit measures, or transfer pricing.  
Roberts (1989) examine whether geographical segment profit information improves 
earnings forecast accuracy and outperforms forecast made based on past consolidated data. He 
documents that the forecast of the models based on geographical segment profit outperform 
the forecast of the model based on consolidated information.    
Hussain & Skerratt (1992) provide a theoretical explanation for the importance of 
disaggregated profit information in predicting next period earnings. Their theoretical evidence 
is based on the availability of well-defined segments by which analysts can used their 
expertise to map the segment performance with specific industry.  
 They have two main assumptions in their discussion. The first one is that firm’s 
consolidated profit is the sum of individual segment profits. the second assumption is that 
segment profit comprise three components; i) level of segment activities; ii) industry profit 
index; and iii) the deviation of segment profit from industry profit index. Therefore they write 
company’ expected segment profit as follows: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡+1) = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑖) ∗ (1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
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Given that 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑑𝑖𝑡are non-zero values, this model provide a theoretical evidence on 
the importance of segment profit information and that it provide additional insight to analysts 
that are different from segment sales information. Detailed mathematical prove of this model 
is provided in appendix (2).  
Berger & Hann (2007) argue that among the most important elements of company’s 
financial report is segment profitability and that managers are likely to use accounting 
discretion to report different profit definitions in the segment notes which may or may not 
reconcile with the consolidated income statement. 
However, the management approach in segment reporting does not require the 
companies to report segment profit for their geographical segment unless geographical 
segmentation is company’s operating segments. In other words, if a company report its 
operating segments based on industrial classification, according to IFRS 8, the company 
can chose to not report geographical profit. Due to this amendment in IFRS 8, many of the 
users of financial reports are concerned about the usefulness of segment information if the 
company omit geographical profit. And yet it is generally accepted that geographical 
profit has greater information content than LOB profits. The allocation of common costs 
may reduce or eliminate the information content of segment profit data. It is less likely for 
costs to be common to different geographical segment, particularly when geographical 
segments are classified by origin.  
To evaluate the effect of segment profit on analyst’s forecast accuracy; three proxies 
for segment profit are used in this study: 
(i) If both profits (LOB profit and GEO profit) are disclosed. 
(ii) If the profit of primary segment (IAS 14R) or operating segment (IFRS 8) is 
matching with consolidated profit. 
(iii) The deviation of profit margin of primary segment/operating segment from 
consolidated profit.  
The following hypotheses are investigated for these variables:  
H50: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecast is not associated with the disclosure of 
both profits 
H51: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecast is associated with the disclosure of both 
profits. 
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H60: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecast is not associated with the deviation in 
segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin. 
H61: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecast is associated with the deviation in segment 
profit margin from consolidated profit margin. 
 
H70: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecast is not associated with the profit matching 
between segment notes and consolidated statements. 
H71: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecast is associated with the profit matching 
between segment notes and consolidated statements. 
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(b) Measuring the variables 
Segment profit is captured by three different proxies. Two of these proxies are dummy 
variables and the third one is measured by the deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit. The detail of these proxies is presented below:  
(i) BOTHPROF: a dummy variable that indicates if both LOB profit and GEO profit 
are disclosed in segment notes. The variable take the value of one if both profits 
are reported and zero otherwise.  
(ii) PROMTCH: a dummy variable that indicates if segment profit matches with 
consolidated profit in the financial statement. Due to the wide diversity in profit 
definitions (i.e. operating profit, profit before tax, profit before interest and tax, net 
profit, etc.) companies tend to report different profit definitions. However, for 
practical reason, this study does not attempt to distinguish between these profits 
definition. A company obtains a value of one if the profit definition reported in 
segment notes matches with a profit definition in consolidated statements and a 
value of zero otherwise. 
(iii) MAMRG: This measure is calculated for primary segment (IAS 14R) or operating 
segment (IFRS 8). This variable indicates whether individual segments’ profit 
margin reveals different information from consolidated profit. The rationality 
behind this variable is that if individual segments’ profit margin is similar to 
consolidated profit margin then segment profit has no added value to financial 
analysts. This variable is calculated as follows: 
(iv) MAMRG = ∑ |𝑆𝐺𝑀𝑗𝑖 −  𝐶𝑀𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1
/𝑁 (7.2) 
Where SGMji: profit margin of segment j for company i 
       SGMi: 
𝑃𝑗𝑖
𝑆𝑗𝑖
; Where Pji: profit of segment j for company i 
             Sji: sales of segment j for company i 
       CMi: consolidated profit margin for company i 
       CMi =
𝑃𝑖
𝑆𝑖
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7.2.3: Non-Segmental Factors Affecting Forecast Accuracy 
In order to evaluate the impact of segmental disclosure in the market predictability of 
future earnings, it is necessary to control for some non-segmental variables which are 
expected to affect financial analysts’ forecast accuracy. For the purpose of this study, six 
controlling variables are included.  
(1) Firm size 
(2) Earning variability 
(3) Industry membership 
(4) Assets growth 
(5) Earning to price 
(6) Board structure 
For each of these six controlling variables, evidences from previous literature have 
been reviewed, and based on these evidences; the rationality for including these variables 
has been explained. Furthermore, the methods for measuring these controlling variables 
are presented in this section.  
(1) Firm size 
a. Evidence 
The possible effect of firm size on analysts’ forecast accuracy is linked to the financial 
incentives which may motivate analysts to gather and process more information for larger 
firms. Freeman (1987) has pointed out that the reaction of capital market to a piece of 
information about mispriced large firms is greater than information about adjustment in the 
price of a small firm.  
“Grossman & Stiglitz (1976) note that trading by informed investors partially reveals 
private information and thereby limits the potential profit from knowledge that a particular 
security is mispriced. The smaller the firm and the more thinly traded the stock, the easier the 
trading by informed investors is spotted” (Freeman, 1987, p.198).  
Moreover, Prencipe (2004, p.326) present many valuable justifications for why 
segment disclosure may be a function of firm size. First of all, large size firms tend to have 
more information asymmetries which require a better disclosure to keep investors informed 
about the company’s operations (e.g. Herrmann & Thomas, 1996). Secondly, larger firms 
usually have better resources and capabilities to protect themselves from the threat of 
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competitors resulting from extensive disclosure. Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) report that 
large firms are more likely to be followed by larger number of analysts than small firms. 
They attributed this finding to the higher level of financial disclosure of large size 
firms. Lang & Lundholm (1993), Gelb & Zarowin (2002), and Luo et al. (2006) proved that 
firm size is positively associated with firm’s financial disclosure (e.g. Kinney, 1971; Collins, 
1976; Kochanek, 1974; Emmanuel & Pick, 1980; Emmanuel el al., 1992; Hussain & Skerratt, 
1992; Hussain, 1997; and Gelb & Zarowin, 2002). 
Two UK studies have used analysts’ earnings forecast in their analysis and reached 
different conclusions regarding the effect of firm size in forecast accuracy. Bhaskar & Morris 
(1984) indicate that there is no positive relationship between firm size and analyst forecast 
accuracy. However, their finding could be attributed to the fact that they used consolidated 
profit as a measure of firm size rather than market value. On the other hand, Patz (1989) 
confirm the positive association between the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast and firm 
size measured as market value of equity.  
A more direct evidence of the relationship between analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
firm size is suggested by Brown et al. (1987) who find that the high level of analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy is positively related to firm size. A similar finding was obtained by Stickel 
(1989), who examines the impact of firm size on the analysts’ revisions of earnings forecast. 
The findings of the study revealed that analysts’ revision of earnings forecast is negatively 
associated with firm size. Thus, based on the aforementioned studies, it is clear that firm size 
as measured by market value is an important element that affects analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
Therefore, it is expected that firm size is positively associated with the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecast.  
b. Variable measurement 
Firm size is measure by market value which has been downloaded from 
Bloomberg data base; these data are in the dataset. 
 
(2) Earnings variability (Volatility) 
a. Evidence 
Due to the reason that earnings figures are one of the most crucial elements in 
analysts’ forecast process, it is argued that volatility in previous earnings has a 
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significant impact on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast (Baldwin, 1984). The 
more volatile the earnings are, the more difficult it is for analysts to predict future 
earnings. Barefield & Comiskey (1975) have confirmed the negative effect of earnings 
volatility on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast. They stated that “the results 
suggest that it is more difficult to forecast earnings of companies with greater historic 
earnings variability” (Barefield & Comiskey, 1975, p.321). Earnings volatility is a 
proxy for market inability to anticipate earning changes, and this unobserved portion 
of the previous earnings change is what contributes to deviation of the forecasted 
earnings from the actual. Elton & Gruber (1972) point out that the unanticipated 
earnings change of past earnings is a measure of security risk and that the higher the 
risk, the more difficult it is for financial analysts to predict future earnings. Therefore, 
it is concluded that the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast is negatively related to 
the volatility in earnings change.  
b. Variable measurement 
For the purpose of this study, volatility in earnings change is measured as the 
change in earnings between the reported actual earnings of the one forecasted by 
analysts and one year past earning. The measure of volatility is based on the new 
information analysts must predict. O’Brien (1988) argued that “forecast error consists, 
in part or entirely, of new information revealed over forecast horizon, i.e. between 
forecast and realization” (p.63). Thus, the uncertainty in future earning prediction 
could be measured by the anticipated portion of the realised earnings at the time when 
the forecast was made. In other word, it is measured as the change in earnings over the 
forecast horizon (i.e. the difference between the actual earnings and last year realised 
earnings for 12 months forecast horizon) 
New information = Et-1 - Et  
Where, Et-1 is the most recent earnings announcement to the fiscal year t-1; when the 
forecast was made. 
Et is the realised earnings that have been forecasted 
However, the absolute differences between these two values because we are 
interested in the magnitude of volatility in earnings and not in its direction. In 
addition, the measure of earnings volatility must be standardised and therefore the 
change in earnings is scaled by actual earnings (Et). Actual earning is chosen because 
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the dependent variable in this study, the Forecast Error, is also deflated by actual 
earnings.  Thus, the measure of earnings volatility is measured as follows:  
 ERN = |
𝐸𝑡−𝐸𝑡−1
𝐸𝑡
| (7.3) 
One of the disadvantages of earnings volatility is that it does not differentiate 
between anticipated earnings changes, which is not part of the uncertainty risk of 
earnings, and unanticipated earnings changes which represent the uncertainty risk. 
However, because the forecast horizon in this study is only 12 months; this suggests 
that ERN may be a good measure of unanticipated risk. The anticipated earnings 
changes will be controlled for by the next variable (Earning-to-Price).  
 
(3) Earning to price (E/P) 
a. Evidence 
To control for previous earning-to-price ratio has been first introduced by 
Collins et al. (1994). They examined market predictability of future earnings (more 
details on this study were provided in Chapter 5, section 5.3). According to this study, 
the rationale behind controlling for previous earnings-to-price is coming from twofold 
reasons. Firstly, it provides a proxy for market’s forecast of earnings growth. Because 
EPt-1 is calculated as earning for period t-1 over the price at beginning of period t, it 
represents market ability to anticipate earnings. It is argued that earnings comprise 
anticipated Et-2(Xt-1) portion, which is reflected in the price of current period (Pt-1) and 
unanticipated (UXt-1) portion which will be realised in next period price (Pt). 
Therefore, they expected that anticipation of previous earnings to be positively 
associated with market ability to forecast future earnings. Secondly, they controlled 
for EPt-1 because it is proved that annual earnings have a serial negative correlation 
and it is expected that earning-to-price ratios to be mean reverting.  
Collins et al. (1994, p.298) noted “A second reason EPt-1 will proxy for 
expected earnings growth is that there is some negative serial correlation in annual 
earnings (e.g. Ball and Watts, 1972). Easton & Harris (1991) suggest that, as a result, 
earnings to price ratios will be mean reverting (see Beaver and Morse, 1987 for 
evidence). Kendall & Zarowin (1990) and Lipe & Kormendi (1991) argue that higher-
order negative serial correlation in annual earnings is also important”. 
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Gelb & Zarowin (2002) have applied Collins et al.’s (1994) model and 
documented that controlling for EPt-1 improved market anticipation of future earnings. 
Similar findings have been proved by Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al. (2007); 
Hussainey, 2009; and Hussainey & Walker, 2009.  
Based on the findings of the abovementioned studies, it can be concluded that EPt-1 is 
expected to positively correlate to the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast.  
b. Variable measurement 
The measurement of EPt-1is based on the same measure implemented in previous 
studies. It is measured as last period earnings per share (EPSt-1) divided by the price at 
the beginning of current period (Pt-1). 
 
(4) Industry membership 
a. Evidence 
There is mixed evidences on the effect of industry type on the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings forecast. For example, Cragg & Malkiel (1968) and Ferris (1976) 
find no significant association between type of industry and earnings forecast 
accuracy. On the contrary, Richards (1976) and Richards et al. (1977) indicate that 
forecast accuracy is a function of industry type. Two studies in the UK show that 
industry membership is not an important factor in relation to forecast accuracy 
(Bhaskar & Morris, 1984; and Patz, 1989).  
One rational explanation of the expected association between industry type and 
forecast accuracy is that if industry type is an important factor, its effect will be 
identified only if the sample comprises single industry companies or companies with a 
single dominant industry segment. From the findings of the above-mentioned studies, 
it can be concluded that it is expected to find some associations between industry type 
and forecast error.  
b. Variable measurement 
The sample companies of this study are from nine different industry types. The 
details of these industries are presented in Chapter 5, section5.1.The industry type 
variable is a dummy variable which has a value of one if the company is from a 
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particular industry type and zero otherwise. The process is repeated nine times, which 
means the industry variable comprises nine dummies.  
 
(5) Board membership 
a. Evidence 
There has been always a great emphasis on the agency cost problem (conflict of 
interest between owners and managers). Many studies have examined this problem in 
the light of corporate-governance mechanisms. One important factor of corporate 
governance is Board Size and Board Structure. It is argued that board of directors are 
referees who ensure that the management of the company is working towards 
achieving shareholders objectives (wealth maximisation) (Fama, 1980). 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) examine the association between the structure of 
board members and level of voluntary disclosure. They find that there is a significant 
positive correlation between the proportion of non-executive directors in the board of 
directors and level of voluntary disclosure. However, they have also revealed that 
board size is not associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. This finding 
indicates that board size is not a key factor of firms’ disclosure decisions unless it has 
high proportionate of non-executive directors.  
In addition, it is found that non-executive directors is negatively associated with 
earnings manipulation by managers (Be´dard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 
2005; Xie et al., 2003). Anderson et al. (2003) examine the effect of the structure of 
board of directors and find that companies with high level of non-executive directors 
exhibit larger earnings response coefficient. Some studies report that the positive 
effect of non-executive directors on the level of disclosure is reduced when directors’ 
ownership is high.  
Leung & Horwitz (2004) investigate the impact of directors’ ownership on the 
level/quality of segmental disclosure. They find that, companies listed in Hong Kong 
Stock Market tend to aggregate segmental information when Board ownership exceeds 
25%. However, they document that a higher proportionate of non-executive directors 
mitigated the negative effect of board ownership on segmental disclosure.  
Gul & Leung (2004) explore the linkages between the structure of the board of 
directors and companies’ voluntary disclosure. They are interested in two aspects of 
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board structure, the first one is CEO duality (if CEO is a board chairman) and the 
second aspect is the proportion of non-executive directors. They find that CEO duality 
is negatively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. However, they present 
some evidences on the positive impact that the proportion of non-executive directors 
has on voluntary disclosure. The later finding reflects that having higher proportion of 
non-executive directors moderates the effect of CEO duality on company disclosure.  
However, there are some studies which did not report any association between the 
ratio of non-executive directors and company’s performance (Walsh & Seward, 1990; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Baliga et al. 1996; and Kren & Kerr, 1997).  
Many studies show other benefits of non-executive directors, for example, Ajinkya 
et al. (2005) show that companies with higher ratio of non-executive directors are 
more likely to issue earnings forecast in frequently basis. Beasley (1996) stats that 
high proportion of non-executive directors protects companies from financial fraud.  
Donnelly & Mulcahy (2008) conduct across-sectional analysis of the impact of the 
number of non-executive directors on voluntary disclosure in Ireland. The main 
argument of the study is that non-executive directors facilitate a reduction in 
information asymmetry between owners and managers. The findings of the study 
indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between the number of non-
executive directors and level of corporate voluntary disclosure. However, the study 
reveals no association between disclosure and non-executive directors when 
controlling for other variables, namely, Institutional ownership, management 
ownership, Herfindahl index of management ownership, firm size, and board size.  
Eng & Mak (2003) investigate the relationship between board composition 
measured by the ratio of non-executive directors and companies voluntary disclosure 
measured by aggregating disclosure index of non-mandatory strategic, non-financial 
and financial information. The findings of the study, contradict the findings of 
previous studies that level of corporate disclosure is positively related to the 
percentage of non-executive directors.  
Chen & Jaggi (2001) investigate the impact of the percentage of non-executive 
directors on firm’s comprehensive financial disclosure. Their finding supports the 
argument that the ratio of non-executive directors is positively related to the overall 
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level of corporate disclosure. However, they point out that the significance of this 
relationship appears to be weaker for concentrated ownership firms.  
Lim et al. (2007) examine the reporting pattern of 181 companies listed in 
Australian Stock Market. They are mainly interested in evaluating the impact of non-
executive directors in the level of comprehensive voluntary disclosure of these 
companies. The results of the study suggest that there is a significant positive 
association between the percentage of non-executive directors and the voluntary 
disclosure of information in the annual reports.  
On the other hand, the size of board of directors tends to be a very controversial 
factor in regards to its usefulness to company performance or to the reporting 
environment. Two independent reports (Higgs, 2003; and the combined code on 
corporate governance, 2003:6) have emphasised on the advantages of smaller boards 
“the board should not be so large as to be unwieldy”. Alexander et al. (1993) argue 
that CEO’s in companies with large board size tend to control the decision of board 
members in their favour.  
Moreover, John & Senbet (1998), Lipton & Lorsch (1992), and Jensen (1993) 
reveal that smaller board size are more effective than large boards because of poor 
communication and inefficiency in decision making associated with large size boards. 
Yermack (1996) confirm the negative impact of large boards on firms’ value. His 
findings have been proved by those of Conyon & Peck (1998), and of Eisenberg et al. 
(1998).  
Donnelly & Mulcahy (2008) find that board size has no impact on company’s 
voluntary disclosure. Mak & Kusnadi (2005) assess the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms of the value of the firm. One of the factors that have been 
used in the study to proxy for quality of firms’ corporate governance is board size. The 
results of the study is consistent with Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998), it 
indicates that board size is negatively associated with firm value. They attributed the 
negative impact of board size on firm valuation to the stock market regulation. The 
stock market requires a minimum number of non-executive members rather than a 
percentage. 
Guest (2009) evaluate the impacts of board size on firm performance for the UK 
listed companies over 1981-2002. The finding of the study confirms the negative 
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impact of board size on firm profitability, Tobin’s Q, and share returns. Interestingly, 
the result also shows that the negative impact of board size is higher for larger 
companies. According to this study, “it is argues although larger board size initially 
facilitates key board functions, there comes a point where larger boards suffer from 
coordination and communication problems and hence board effectiveness” (Gust, 
2009, p.385) 
Based on the above literature on the impacts of board of directors on the level of 
disclosure and firm’s valuation, it can be concluded:  
(i) The ratio of non-executive directors to be negatively associated with analyst’s 
earnings forecast error.  
(ii) The board size is positively associated with analyst earnings forecast error.  
 
b. Variables measurement:  
(i) Board size is measured as the total number of the members of company’s 
board as reported in annual report. Four years annual reports have been used 
for each company in our sample and the information is self-extracted from 
these reports.  
(ii) Ratio of non-executive directors: denoted by NER is calculated as the 
percentage of total number of non-executive directors to the total number of 
executive directors. 
 
(6) Asset growth 
a. Evidence 
Firms with high assets growth implies that these firms are having and expecting 
future growth in operation. It is expected for such companies to increase their level of 
financial disclosure to convey the good news to the market. Gelb & Zarowin (2002) 
argue that companies with good performance tend to have higher disclosure compared 
to bad performance companies. Roychowdhury & Sletten (2012) provide empirical 
evidence or the superiority of companies with good news information in 
communications this information to the market. They also suggest that due to 
managers’ preference to delay the disclosure of bad news until the time of actual 
earnings announcement, bad news companies exhibited strong shocks to the market 
and have higher return volatility.  
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This finding indicates that the market could not anticipate future earnings 
accurately. Ellis et al. (2012) evaluate the association between firm’s good 
performance and increase in the level of disclosure. They find that good performing 
companies tend to send positive signals to the market through better disclosure 
practices. Similar findings have been reported by Francis et al. (2008) and Blanco et 
al. (2014).  
Additionally, many studies have documented a positive association between asset 
growth and market predictability of future earnings. Gelb & Zarowin (2002) examine 
the impact of voluntary disclosure on the informativeness of stock prices. In this 
study, they control for assets growth and find that asset growth positively associated 
with stock price informativeness. Schleicher et al. (2007) investigate the relationship 
between level of corporate disclosure and share price anticipation of earnings. The 
results of their study show among other things that asset growth is positively and 
significantly correlated with share price informativeness. These findings have been 
also reported by Hussainey et al. (2003); Hussainey, 2009; and Hussainey & Walker, 
2009.  
For the purpose of our study and based on the previous literature, it is expected 
that asset growth to be positively associated with the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecast.  
b. Variable measurement  
The data for asset growth demoted as AG is obtained from database. Total asset 
figures have been obtained for current year (At) and last year (At-1). Therefore, the 
measure of AG is calculated as follows:  
 
 AG = 
𝐴𝑖𝑡−𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡
 (7.4) 
Where: 
 Ait is total asset for company (i) at the end of fiscal year t 
             Ait-1 is total assets for company (i) at the end of fiscal year t-1 
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7.2.4: A note on the Forecast Error Metric. 
The purpose of an error metric is to provide a measure of the deviation of a forecast 
from the realised outcome. The forecast error may be defined as the simple difference 
between the forecast and the outcome. However, the result of the simple difference between 
the forecast and the outcome is a signed forecast error.  
 
 𝑆𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹 − 𝐴                (7.5)                       
 
Where 
SFE = signed forecast error 
A = realised earnings 
F = forecasted earnings. 
 
The sign of the forecast error may be important for some studies, like those 
investigating analysts’ biasness for example, but for the investigations of forecast accuracy an 
unsigned metric is probably more useful because these studies concentrate on the magnitude 
of a forecast error rather than the direction of the error.  Applying an absolute value operator 
to equation (7.5) yields an error metric which measures only the deviation of the forecast from 
the outcome, not the direction of the error. 
 
 𝐴𝐹𝐸 = |𝐹 − 𝐴| (7.6)                                 
Where 
AFE = Absolute unsigned forecast error 
 
   
A study of the error metrics used in previous research indicates that error metrics 
corresponding to linear loss functions are more commonly used.  The error metric for this 
study here will be based on the error metric defined by equation (7.6) above, i.e. the absolute 
difference between the forecast and the actual outcome. 
 
The error metrics defined by equations (7.6) suffers from a major limitation; it is not 
scale free.  The variance of a forecast error will tend to increase with the level of earnings (A) 
rendering inter-company comparisons meaningless.  A solution to the problem is to use a 
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scaling variable, or deflator.  The two most commonly used deflators are actual earnings (A) 
and forecasted earnings (F).  Patz (1989) addresses the problem of selecting a suitable 
deflator. 
 
"There is a practical problem with using actual earnings as the measurement base, 
since such measures are materially distorted when actual earnings are near zero ... Yet it is 
difficult to circumvent the Lorek (1979) argument that the use of forecasted earnings as a base 
implies measurement of a firm's ability to achieve a predicted result, rather than a predictor's 
ability to forecast an outcome"(Patz 1989, footnote 4, p.269). 
 
Of the two points mentioned by Patz, it is the latter, the Lorek (1979) argument, which 
appears the stronger. The Lorek criticism of the use of forecasted earnings as a deflator is 
simple yet convincing.  
The first point which Patz makes, regarding actual earnings values near zero, appears 
relatively weak because Patz gives no indication why actual earnings should be more likely to 
take values near zero than forecasted earnings. Another possible choice for a deflator is the 
stock price (e.g. McNichols 1989).  However, Basi, Carey and Twark (1976) reject this 
approach for studies purely concerned with forecast accuracy. 
"We avoided the temptation to use a price-normalised  ... [error metric]... Since we are 
looking at forecast errors themselves rather than at possible uses of the forecasts (such as in 
forming expectations about future price performance." (Basi, Carey and Twark 1976, p.247). 
   
The deflator chosen for this study is actual earnings. Therefore the error metric to be 
used in this study is the absolute proportionate error, defined by equation (7.7). 
 
 𝐹𝐸 = |
𝐹−𝐴
𝐴
| (7.7)
   
The next stage is to use multivariate regression models to investigate the impact of 
segmental variables on analysts' forecast errors. The models also include non-segmental 
variables which previous empirical studies suggest may influence the accuracy of analysts' 
forecasts. All the variables to be used in the regression analyses have been explained in 
previous sections and in Chapter 6. The next chapter details the form of the regression 
models, i.e. the experimental design; and then presents the results. 
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7.3: Experimental Design and Results 
This part of the analysis chapter presents the experimental design and the results of the 
analysis of the relationship between analysts’ forecast accuracy and segmental disclosure. The 
previous part of this chapter provides a description of the expected association between the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecast and four different aspects of segmental disclosure: (1) change in 
segment standard from IAS 14R to IFRS 8; (2) segments profit line items; (3) Main segment; 
and (4) quality of geographical segment.  It also presents variables measurement and how 
these aspects are quantified. The remainder of this part will be divided as follows: 
Section 7.3.1: details the experimental design (i.e. the statistical models by which the impact 
of segmental disclosure on analysts’ forecast accuracy will be examined). The analysis will be 
executed using multivariate regression models.  
Section 7.3.2:  details the results of the linear additive regressions  
Section 7.3.3: details the results of multiplicative analysis  
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7.3.1:  Experimental Design 
(1) Overview 
In part one of this chapter, six hypotheses relating to the association between 
segmental disclosure and accuracy of analysts’ forecast have been developed. The 
segment variables that are used in the regression models are: 
1- STAND, which proxy for the change in international accounting standards relating to 
segmental disclosure. This variable represent the change between IFRS 8 and its 
predecessor IAS 14R (IFRS 8=1 & IAS 14R=0); 
2- QGEO, which measure the fineness of geographical sales segments; 
3- MASEG, which proxy for the primary segments under IAS 14R and operating 
segment under IFRS 8 (LOB=1 & GEO=0); 
4- MAMRG, which measure the deviation in segments profit margin from consolidated 
profit margin; 
5- BOTHPROF, which proxy for the disclosure of both LOB segments profit and GEO 
segments profit (Both profits disclosed=1, Otherwise=0); 
6- PROMTCH, which proxy for profit match between segments profit line items and 
consolidated statements profits line items ( profits are matching=1, otherwise=0); 
The impact of each of these variables on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast 
will be examined using multivariate regression models. The initial model is a simple 
linear additive one as shown in equation (7.9) 
𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐺𝐸𝑂 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑉 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝑅 +
𝛽7𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  (7.9) 
Where, FE = analysts’ forecast error (absolute proportionate error); 
ERN= absolute proportionate change in earnings over the forecast period; 
STAND= this variable represent the change between IFRS 8 and its predecessor IAS 
14R (IFRS 8=1 & IAS 14R=0); 
QGEO= fineness of geographical segments sales; 
MV= market capitalisation of the company whose earnings are being forecasted; 
EPt-1= previous period earnings to price ratio; 
AG= assets growth; 
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NER= the ratio of non-executive directors in the company board of directors; 
TOTBORD= total number of the board members of the company whose earnings are 
being forecasted; 
NEG= decline in company’s earnings from one fiscal year to another; 
IND= industry sector, there are nine industry sectors included in this study; 
µ = error term which has constant variance and mean of zero  
For equation (7.9) there are four regressions, each of these regression is with a 
different time horizon and different number of segment variables. The first regression will be 
for two years’ time horizon (last year of IAS 14R, and first year of IFRS 8) and it will have 
two segments variables namely; (1) STAND, and (2) QGEO.  
The second regression will be for the same two years’ time horizon and will include 
all six segment variables. The third regression will be for four years’ time horizon (the last 
two years of IAS 14R, and first two years of IFRS 8) and with the two segment variables 
(STAND & QGEO). The fourth regression will also cover four years’ time period but will 
include all six segment variables.   
Equation (7.10) illustrates the relationship between FE and the six segment variables. 
 
𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐺𝐸𝑂 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹 +
𝛽6𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑉 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺 + 𝛽10𝑁𝐸𝑅 +
𝛽11𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (7.10) 
 
The additional variables in this equation are: 
MASEG = which proxy for the primary segments under IAS 14R and operating 
segment under IFRS 8 (LOB=1 & GEO=0); 
BOTHPROF= if both LOB profit and GEO profit have been reported (Both profits 
disclosed=1, Otherwise=0); 
MAMRG = the deviation of individual segments profit margin from consolidated 
profit margin;  
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PROFMTCH = whether segment’s profit line item reconcile with the consolidated 
profit (profits are matching=1, otherwise=0). 
 
(2) The Sample Used in this Analysis 
A total sample size of 348 firms-years will be used in this part of the study. The total 
sample will be divided into two sub-samples consisting of 174 firms-years. Each of the total 
sample and subsamples will be analysed separately to examine the impact of segmental 
disclosure in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast. In addition to that, the total sample 
and the sub-samples will be used to examine whether there is any difference in analysts’ 
utilisation of segmental information after two years period of IFRS 8 adoption.  More details 
about the sample used in this study are provided in Chapter 5.    
As noted in Chapter 6, a study by Emmanuel et al. (1999) indicates that post the 
implementation of SSAP 25 the segment reporting has improved in the first few years but 
later on and as companies are becoming familiar with the standard the level of details in the 
segment reporting has declined significantly. It might be possible to experience the same 
thing with IFRS 8 because most of the studies conducted regarding the implication of IFRS 8 
are for the one year after the effective year of adoption. 
 
7.3.2:  Linear Additive Analysis 
This section presents and describes the results of the linear additive regressions. Four 
different regressions each contain specific aspects of segmental disclosure and specific time 
period will be executed.  
a- Impact of STAND & QGEO on Forecast Accuracy. 
Table (7.10) reports the results of linear regression for the impact of STAND & QGEO on 
the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast over two and four year’s period. Regression one 
and two include companies with single geographical segment. The two regressions also show 
if there is any difference in the significance of these two variables within two different time’s 
horizon.  Regression one is an extension of regression two because it covers four years’ time 
period while regression two covers two years’ time period.  
The results show that variability in company’s earnings (ERN) is positively associated 
with the forecast error. The coefficient of ERN is 0.637 and 0.646 for the four years and the 
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two years regressions respectively. The positive sign on the ERN indicates that the greater the 
amount of information which an analyst is required to predict the more challenging it is to 
forecast earnings accurately.  
Moreover, although the coefficient of QGEO prove a negative association with the 
forecast error (-0.044 & -0.023), the results suggest that only STAND is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with forecast error (-0.202** & -0.415**). The negative 
coefficient of STAND indicates that the adoption of IFRS 8 provide a better insight to 
financial analysts into a company’s future earnings and reduces their forecast error. However, 
it can be noticed that the STAND coefficient is higher in the first year of adoption (-0.415) 
compared to after two years of adoption (-0.202) and the p-values are 0.018 and 0.039 
respectively. 
The results also reveal that EPt-1 is negatively associated with the forecast error, which 
coincide with our hypothesis about its effect on forecast accuracy. In addition, the industry 
factor seems to have some degree of association with the analysts’ forecast accuracy. The 
firms in technology industry exhibited a significant positive association with the forecast 
error. This positive association could be attributed to rapid changes in the technology sector 
and to the extensive intangible assets. All other variables did not show any association with 
the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.   
Although we have expected some difference in the impact of STAND, QGEO and the 
control variables on analysts’ forecast accuracy over different time horizon, regression one 
and two did not show any difference in the impact of the dependent variables on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy except for the difference in STAND coefficient mentioned earlier. This 
indifference in the results of the additive model over two or four years’ time period refute the 
claim of previous literature that there could be some differences in companies interpretation 
of accounting standards over longer time horizon. 
  
147 
 
Table 7. 10: STAND & QGEO Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years Regression) 
 
Regression One Regression Two 
Variables Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.183 0.505 -0.05 0.919 
ERN 0.637 0.000 0.646 0.000 
STAND -0.202 0.039 -0.415 0.018 
QGEO -0.044 0.283 -0.023 0.756 
MV 1.50E-05 0.586 7.39E-07 0.876 
TOTBORD 0.014 0.547 0.037 0.344 
NER -0.022 0.549 -0.013 0.846 
EPt-1 -118.223 0.000 -119.713 0.000 
AG -0.393 0.142 -0.185 0.661 
NEG 0.123 0.251 0.114 0.555 
BM -0.131 0.48 -0.396 0.235 
CG 0.046 0.779 0.088 0.763 
CS 0.124 0.402 0.009 0.973 
HC 0.099 0.687 0.139 0.755 
OG 0.139 0.459 0.542 0.103 
TECH 0.922 0.001 1.682 0.001 
TELEC -0.299 0.379 -0.662 0.279 
UT 0.171 0.483 0.086 0.841 
     
R2 0.677 
 
0.729 
 
Adj R2 0.66 
 
0.669 
 
Size 341 
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Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO 
is a measure for the fineness of geographical segment, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board 
size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, 
NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services 
sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities 
sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.     
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Table (7.11) repeats the same analysis of table (7.10) but without the companies that 
have reported single geographical segment. The results in Table (7.11) show no significant 
differences from the results reported earlier when single geographical segment companies 
have been included. Both ERN and Technology Industry have shown significant and positive 
association with forecast error, while STAND has shown significant negative correlation with 
the forecast error.   
Similar to previous regressions, regressions three and four in table (7.11) did not 
document any notable change in the coefficient or the significance level of the variables 
between two different time periods except for the coefficient of STAND. The results suggest 
that the longer the time period the greater is the impact of IFRS 8 on the analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. These results contradict with the results of table (7.10). The magnitude of 
the impact of IFRS 8 has increased from -0.388 after the first year of adoption to -1.92 after 
two years of adoption. 
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Table 7. 11: STAND & QGEO Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years Regression) No 
Single GEO Segments 
  Regression Three Regression Four 
Variables Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.57 0.868 -2.6 0.6 
ERN 0.657 0.000 0.674 0.000 
STAND -1.92 0.051 -0.388 0.028 
QGEO -0.039 0.517 0.004 0.959 
MV 2.71E-07 0.923 -4.71E-07 0.919 
TOTBORD 0.016 0.493 0.036 0.347 
NER -0.016 0.664 -0.01 0.878 
EPt-1 -32.206 0.607 1.176 0.978 
AG -0.082 0.764 -0.099 0.81 
NEG 0.09 0.43 0.068 0.719 
BM -0.199 0.281 -0.473 0.148 
CG 0.068 0.681 0.13 0.651 
CS 0.096 0.529 -0.01 0.97 
HC 0.073 0.763 0.13 0.765 
OG 0.13 0.491 0.532 0.11 
TECH 0.951 0.000 1.734 0.000 
TELEC -0.224 0.507 -0.525 0.38 
UT 0.203 0.437 0.09 0.831 
  
    
R2 0.697 
 
0.749 
 
Adj R2 0.68 
 
0.72 
 
Size 319 
 
167 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO 
is a measure for the fineness of geographical segment, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board 
size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, 
NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services 
sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities 
sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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b- Impact of Multiple Segment Variables on Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy. 
Table (7.12) shows regression results for the impact of multiple segment variables on the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. The descriptive statistic presented above report that all three 
proxies of the quality of segment profitability disclosure has dropped after the adoption of 
IFRS 8. The mean of MAMRG was 0.49 under IAS 14R and has dropped to 0.16 under IFRS 
8. The mean of BOTHPRO and PROFMTCH was 0.25 and 0.44 respectively under IAS 14R 
compared to 0.18 and 0.33 after the adoption of IFRS 8. Due to the decline in the segment 
profit measures after the adoption of IFRS 8, it is important to examine whether this decline 
has any impact on the degree of association between segmental disclosure and analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy.  
These two regressions investigate (1) the additive impact of STAND, QGEO, MASEG, 
MAMRG, BOTHPRO, and PROMTCH on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy; and (2) 
whether the decline in the segments profitability measures will reduce the magnitude of the 
effect of STAND and QGEO on analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
The results of both regression five and six demonstrate a negative association between all 
segments variables and forecast error except for MASEG. Despite the negative coefficient 
these variables have with the forecast error, only STAND is statistically significant. This 
result support the finding of previous regressions, that the new management approach in 
segmental reporting has resulted in a better analysts’ earnings forecast. 
 Moreover, when comparing the two years’ time horizon (regression six) with the four 
years one (regression five) it can be noticed that both the coefficient and the significance level 
of the STAND have decreased from -0.495 and 0.006 respectively to -0.252 and 0.011. It 
could be argued that the longer the time is the less effective is the new changes in the 
disclosure practice to analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
The decline in the coefficient and significance could be attributed to management ability 
to prevaricate when reporting segment information after few years of adoption. Similar to the 
regressions in table (7.10) and (7.11), regressions five and six prove that the variability in 
earnings is very significant in reducing analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.  
The results show that ERN is statistically significant at 1% in both regression three and 
four and the coefficient is 0.64 and 0.65 respectively. However, the results suggest some 
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difference between regression five and regression six in relation to the effect of the control 
variables in forecast error.  
Regression six shows that along with ERN and STAND, only EPt-1 and industry are 
significantly associated with forecast error, which is matching with the findings of regression 
one and two. On the other hand, regression five show that EPt-1, industry, and AG are 
significantly (p-value=000; 0.001; and 0.031 respectively) related to the forecast error. The 
negative coefficient of Assets Growth (-0.695) coincide with our hypothesis about its 
association with analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.  
Comparing the results of regression five and regression six show that there are no major 
changes in the significance level of the independent variables except for STAND and Oil and 
Gas (OG) sector. The changes in STAND have been explained in the discussion above. Oil 
and Gas sector p-value has decreased from being statistically significant (0.06) to being 
statistically insignificant (0.27).  
After excluding the companies that reported single geographical segment, table (7.13) 
revealed almost the same findings as table (7.12). However, regressions seven and eight did 
not show any significant association between EPt-1 and AG with forecast error. It can also be 
noticed that the coefficient of the STAND has declined from -0.464 in the first year of 
adoption to -0.231 in the second year of adoption. This result matches with the finding of 
previous regressions.  
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Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and 
GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement 
and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-
executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per 
share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care 
Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the 
two-tailed test.      
Table 7. 12: All Segments’ variables Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years) 
 
Regression Five Regression Six 
Variables Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.125 0.662 -0.079 0.878 
ERN 0.639 0.000 0.65 0.000 
STAND -0.252 0.011 -0.495 0.006 
QGEO -0.036 0.373 -0.014 0.856 
MASEG 0.067 0.534 0.045 0.816 
MAMRG -0.068 0.121 -0.056 0.41 
BOTHPROF -0.142 0.244 -0.219 0.313 
PROFMTC -0.152 0.139 -0.304 0.104 
MV 6.93E-07 0.802 -8.88E-07 0.854 
TOTBORD 0.028 0.237 0.058 0.159 
NER -0.025 0.488 -0.011 0.877 
EPt-1 -123.647 0.000 -126.426 0.000 
AG -0.695 0.031 -0.545 0.356 
NEG 0.097 0.366 0.077 0.695 
BM -0.069 0.721 -0.316 0.364 
CG 0.099 0.553 0.16 0.593 
CS 0.115 0.44 0.002 0.994 
HC 0.196 0.436 0.263 0.566 
OG 0.21 0.27 0.637 0.06 
TECH 0.902 0.001 1.639 0.001 
TELEC -0.263 0.444 -0.612 0.328 
UT 0.16 0.513 0.109 0.802 
     
R2 0.684 
 
0.737 
 
Adj R2 0.663 
 
0.701 
 
Size 341 
 
171 
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Table 7. 13: All Segment’s variables Linear Additive Analysis (Four Years VS. Two Years) No 
Single GEO Segments 
  Regression Seven Regression Eight 
Variables Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.055 0.874 -0.266 0.607 
ERN 0.658 0.000 0.677 0.000 
STAND -0.231 0.023 -0.464 0.012 
QGEO -0.04 0.517 0.018 0.828 
MASEG 0.036 0.745 -0.02 0.917 
MAMRG -0.035 0.433 -0.039 0.558 
BOTHPROF -0.142 0.249 -0.215 0.313 
PROFMTC -0.131 0.213 -0.292 0.117 
MV -2.66E-07 0.925 -1.86E-06 0.693 
TOTBORD 0.027 0.255 0.056 0.165 
NER -0.018 0.614 -0.008 0.907 
EPt-1 -39.946 0.534 -6.811 0.878 
AG -0.266 0.43 -0.352 0.544 
NEG 0.071 0.54 0.037 0.846 
BM -0.164 0.394 -0.41 0.23 
CG 0.106 0.528 0.184 0.532 
CS 0.094 0.544 -0.026 0.92 
HC 0.147 0.555 0.233 0.604 
OG 0.166 0.386 0.59 0.081 
TECH 0.932 0.001 1.698 0.000 
TELEC -0.198 0.562 -0.5 0.415 
UT 0.207 0.429 0.126 0.767 
  
    
R2 0.701 
 
0.755 
 
Adj R2 0.679 
 
0.72 
 
Size 319 
 
167 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings variability 
measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness 
of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main 
segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF 
is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which 
has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market 
capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, 
AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is 
Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is 
Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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According to the descriptive statistics presented above, IAS 14R seems to have a 
better segment’s profitability disclosure compared to its successor IFRS 8. However, does that 
decline in segment’s profitability disclosure reduce the magnitude of the impact of IFRS 8 on 
the analysts’ forecast accuracy? To answer this question, it is useful to compare the regression 
results before and after controlling for segment profitability measures.  
Table (7.14) compares the change in the coefficient of QGEO before and after 
controlling for other segment variables over four years period. Although that the average 
QGEO has improved after the adoption of IFRS 8 to 3.91 compared to 3.58 (refer to table 
6.8), table (7.14) shows that the coefficient of QGEO has dropped from -0.044 to -0.036.  
The decline in the magnitude of the impact of QGEO could be attributed to the decline 
in segment profitability disclosure post IFRS 8. It can be also noticed that with the decline in 
segment profitability disclosure, IFRS 8 still seems to provide a better insight to the analysts. 
This finding could be explained by the ability of analysts to see segmental disclosure in the 
same way it is reported to the internal decision makers.  
The same conclusion was reached to when the comparison is made over two years’ 
period. Table (7.15) indicates that the magnitude of QGEO has dropped from -0.023 to -0.014 
post the implementation of IFRS 8. However, despite the drop in the segmental profitability 
disclosure, none of the profitability measure has exhibited significant impact on the accuracy 
of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.  
After removing single geographical segment companies, the impact of the quality of 
geographical segment has not changed even after controlling for segments’ profit measures 
(table 7.16). In consistent with the previous findings, all profitability measures exhibited a 
negative association with the forecast error but however none of them is statistically 
significant. The drop in the magnitude of the quality of geographical segment variable could 
be attributed to the single segment companies. These companies do not provide separate 
geographical segment information in segment notes.  
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Table 7. 14: Linear Additive Analysis, Comparing STAND and QGEO vs. All Segment Variables 
over Four Years Period 
 
Regression Five 
 
Regression One 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
 
Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.125 0.662 
 
0.183 0.505 
ERN 0.639 0.000 
 
0.637 0.000 
STAND -0.252 0.011 
 
-0.202 0.039 
QGEO -0.036 0.373 
 
-0.044 0.283 
MV 6.93E-07 0.802 
 
1.50E-05 0.586 
TOTBORD 0.028 0.237 
 
0.014 0.547 
NER -0.025 0.488 
 
-0.022 0.549 
EPt-1 -123.647 0.000 
 
-118.223 0.000 
AG -0.695 0.031 
 
-0.393 0.142 
NEG 0.097 0.366 
 
0.123 0.251 
BM -0.069 0.721 
 
-0.131 0.48 
CG 0.099 0.553 
 
0.046 0.779 
CS 0.115 0.44 
 
0.124 0.402 
HC 0.196 0.436 
 
0.099 0.687 
OG 0.21 0.27 
 
0.139 0.459 
TECH 0.902 0.001 
 
0.922 0.001 
TELEC -0.263 0.444 
 
-0.299 0.379 
UT 0.16 0.513 
 
0.171 0.483 
MASEG 0.067 0.534 
   
MAMRG -0.068 0.121 
   
BOTHPROF -0.142 0.244 
   
PROFMTC -0.152 0.139 
   
      
R2 0.684 
  
0.677 
 
Adj R2 0.663 
  
0.66 
 
Size 341 
  
341 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings variability 
measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy has a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness 
of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main 
segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF 
is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which 
has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market 
capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG 
is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is 
Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is 
Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
156 
 
Table 7. 15: Linear Additive Analysis, Comparing STAND and QGEO vs. All Segment Variables 
over Two Years Period 
 
Regression Six 
 
Regression Two 
Variables Coefficient Sign 
 
Coefficient Sign 
Intercept -0.079 0.878 
 
-0.05 0.919 
ERN 0.65 0.000 
 
0.646 0.000 
STAND -0.495 0.006 
 
-0.415 0.018 
QGEO -0.014 0.856 
 
-0.023 0.756 
MV -8.88E-07 0.854 
 
7.39E-07 0.876 
TOTBORD 0.058 0.159 
 
0.037 0.344 
NER -0.011 0.877 
 
-0.013 0.846 
EPt-1 -126.426 0.000 
 
-119.713 000 
AG -0.545 0.356 
 
-0.185 0.661 
NEG 0.077 0.695 
 
0.114 0.555 
BM -0.316 0.364 
 
-0.396 0.235 
CG 0.16 0.593 
 
0.088 0.763 
CS 0.002 0.994 
 
0.009 0.973 
HC 0.263 0.566 
 
0.139 0.755 
OG 0.637 0.06 
 
0.542 0.103 
TECH 1.639 0.001 
 
1.682 0.001 
TELEC -0.612 0.328 
 
-0.662 0.279 
UT 0.109 0.802 
 
0.086 0.841 
MASEG 0.045 0.816 
   
MAMRG -0.056 0.41 
   
BOTHPROF -0.219 0.313 
   
PROFMTC -0.304 0.104 
   
      
R2 0.737 
  
0.729 
 
Adj R2 0.701 
  
0.669 
 
Size 171 
  
171 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings variability 
measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy has a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness 
of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main 
segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF 
is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which 
has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market 
capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG 
is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is 
Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is 
Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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Table 7. 16: Linear Additive Analysis, Comparing STAND and QGEO vs. All Segments Excluding 
Single GEO Segment 
 
Regression Seven 
 
Regression Three 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
 
Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.055 0.874  0.57 0.868 
ERN 0.658 0.000  0.657 0.000 
STAND -0.231 0.023  -1.92 0.051 
QGEO -0.04 0.517  -0.04 0.517 
MV -2.66E-07 0.925  2.71E-07 0.923 
TOTBORD 0.027 0.255  0.016 0.493 
NER -0.018 0.614  -0.016 0.664 
EPt-1 -39.946 0.534  -32.206 0.607 
AG -0.266 0.43  -0.082 0.764 
NEG 0.071 0.54  0.09 0.43 
BM -0.164 0.394  -0.199 0.281 
CG 0.106 0.528  0.068 0.681 
CS 0.094 0.544  0.096 0.529 
HC 0.147 0.555  0.073 0.763 
OG 0.166 0.386  0.13 0.491 
TECH 0.932 0.001  0.951 0.000 
TELEC -0.198 0.562  -0.224 0.507 
UT 0.207 0.429  0.203 0.437 
MASEG 0.036 0.745    
MAMRG -0.035 0.433    
BOTHPROF -0.142 0.249    
PROFMTC -0.131 0.213    
 
     
R2 0.701   0.697  
Adj R2 0.679   0.68  
Size 319   319  
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings variability 
measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures the fineness 
of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a value of 0 if main 
segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF 
is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which 
has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market 
capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG 
is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is 
Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is 
Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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c- Summary of Additive Models Analysis 
In summary, the four additive regressions indicated that the adoption of IFRS8, earnings 
viabilities, EPt-1, and industry are significantly associated with analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy.  The results show that both IFRS 8 and EPt-1 are negatively associated with forecast 
error, while both earnings variability and Technology industry are positively related to 
forecast error. In addition AG shows a significant association with FE after adding additional 
aspects of segmental disclosure. The regressions also revealed that segment profit measures 
did not show any association with the forecast error nor did the MASEG variable. Moreover, 
the results show that there are some differences in the magnitude of the relationship between 
STAND and FE if longer time period is used in the analysis.  
The other part of the analysis investigated the impact of adding more segments’ variable 
on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast. The results documented a decline in the 
coefficient of QGEO after including segments’ profitability measures. The reason for the drop 
in QGEO coefficient is due to reduction in segment profitability disclosure particularly for 
geographical segments. However, the analysis also proves that overall; the adoption of the 
management approach has provided a better insight for financial analysts into future earnings. 
This finding coincides with the concerns of the users of the financial reports, that the new 
standards will results in less disclosure for geographical segments particularly geographical 
profit (Berger and Hann, 2007; Hope et al., 2008; Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012). 
Despite the fact that the linear additive models show that only change in segmental 
standard is the only segment variable that has a significant impact on the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecast, the other variables could possibly reduce the extent of ERN positive impact 
on forecast error. In other words, if segmental information is useful to financial analysts, it 
should allow them to predict a greater proportion of the change in earnings (multiplicative 
effect).  
It is important to highlight that the proposed multiplicative effect of segmental variables 
on earnings variability does not eliminate the results of the additive regression that the 
management approach in segmental reporting affect forecast accuracy. The next section of the 
analysis show that when interacting segment variables with earnings’ change, the benefits of 
segmental disclosure become more apparent.    
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7.3.3:  Multiplicative Analysis of Segment Variables 
(1)  Overview 
Multiplicative regression models are constructed by multiplying one explanatory variable 
in another variable. It is usually used when it is possible that those explanatory variables 
would have a combined effect on the dependent variable. The effect of multiplicative models 
could be illustrated by the following example: 
 𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛿 + 𝛽2(𝜗 ∗ 𝛿) + 𝜇 (7.11) 
This example suggests that the impact of the explanatory variable (𝜗) on the 
dependent variable (Y) is reached by differentiating the equation with (𝜗). The result of the 
differentiation will be 𝑌 = 𝛽2(𝛿). This means that the impact of (𝜗) on (Y) depends on both 
the coefficient (𝛽2) and the level of (𝛿).  Based on the above example, the multiplication 
between segment variables and earnings variability and how it is going to affect analysts’ 
forecast accuracy will be explained below.   
The results of the additive regression models indicate that the earnings variability is a 
very important factor in explaining the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast. Thus, the 
forecast error (FE) could be written as a function of earnings change (ERN). 
 𝐹𝐸 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝜇 (7.12) 
Although the segments variables did not impact the accuracy of analysts’ forecast, but 
they may influence the association between the forecast error and forthcoming changes in 
earnings which must be anticipated by the analysts. It is instinctively reasonable that segment 
information provide a better insight about future change in earnings and therefore the effect of 
segment disclosure on the accuracy of analysts’ forecast will be more significant when 
earnings variability is large. The impact of ERN on FE is determined by the coefficient (𝛽1), 
thus if we add segment variables as multiplicative variables with ERN the following model 
will be produced: 
𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐺𝐸𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 
+𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁                     
        +𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (7.13) 
And 
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𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐺𝐸𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 +
𝛽9𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽10𝑁𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗
𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (7.14) 
 
The two equations above illustrate that the greater the absolute proportionate change in 
earnings (ERN) over the forecast period, the greater the impact of changes in the segmental 
reporting variables (STAND, QGEO, MASEG, BOTHPROF, MAMRG, and PROFMTCH) 
on the absolute proportionate forecast error (FE). 
 
The regression coefficient for the segmental multiplicative variables could be interpreted 
as showing their impact on the forecast error for a given proportionate change in earnings. 
Alternatively, it can be said that the regression coefficient shows the impact of segmental 
variables on the forecast error, once the proportionate change in earnings (ERN) has been 
controlled. 
 
Similar to additive regressions, four multiplicative regressions are carried out. The results 
of these regressions are reported in table (7.17) to table (7.23). The regressions in table (7.17) 
to table (7.20) examine the multiplicative impact of only STAND and QGEO segment 
variables on forecast accuracy over two different time period (four years vs. two years). The 
regressions in table (7.21), table (7.22), and Table (7.23) investigate the combined effect of all 
six segment variables on forecast accuracy. 
 
a- Impact of STAND & QGEO on Forecast Accuracy 
 
𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐺𝐸𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 +
𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗
𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (7.13) 
Using equation (7.13), table (7.17) and table (7.18) show that the interaction of ERN 
with both STAND and QGEO has resulted in a significant association with the forecast error. 
The significant negative coefficient on both STAND and QGEO (-0.556 & -0.296) and (-
0.250 & -0.225) indicate that both variables reduce the positive association between forecast 
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error and earnings variability. It proves that the adoption of IFRS 8 and fineness of 
geographical segmentation are providing better insight to financial analysts about future 
change in earnings.  
The results also show that both the ratio of non-executive directors (NER) and 
earnings to price ratio (EPt-1) exhibit significantly negative association with the FE at less than 
1% critical level. The beta of NER for two and four years regressions are -0.235 and -0.166 
respectively, which suggest improvements in analysts’ forecast accuracy from higher 
proportionate of non-executive directors. The corresponding coefficients of EPt-1 for both 
periods are -32.328 and -33.324.  
The negative coefficient of EPt-1 supports our hypothesis that the market ability to 
anticipate earnings’ news in the previous period will improve analysts’ forecasts about future 
changes in earnings. Another variable that show a significant impact on FE for both two years 
and four years regressions is industry (IND).   
The two years multiplicative regression model (table 7.17) revealed that size (MV), 
board size (TOTBORD), assets growth (AG), and decline in earnings (NEG) have no impact 
on forecast accuracy when interacted with change in earnings. The model explains 
approximately 80% of the variability of the dependent variables (R2= 0.798 & Adj. 
R2=0.775).  
On the other hand, the four years multiplicative model (table 7.18) documented a 
significant negative relationship between firm size and FE. This finding coincides with the 
previous literature about the positive impact of large size firms on analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy. The beat and p-value of firm size are -2.66E-06 and 0.026 correspondingly.  
In addition, the multiplication of NEG and TOTBORD with ERN over the four years’ 
time horizon show positive coefficient for both variables at 95% confidence level. The results 
suggest that it is more difficult for analysts to predict future changes in earnings for 
companies with large board size and for companies which have experienced a decline in their 
future earnings.  
Nevertheless, the only variable which does not show any significant impact on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy is AG. This model explains around 77% of the variability of the 
dependent variables (R2= 0.765 & Adj. R2=0.753).  
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Another important finding of the two regression models is related to the degree of 
effect STAND and QGEO have on forecast error. The results show that regression over longer 
time period reduces the degree of the effect these two variables have on forecast error for a 
given level of change in earnings. This can be noticed from the reduction in value of the 
coefficient of both variables. It is worth mentioning that the additive models also show a 
decline in the coefficient of STAND over longer time period.  
In general the two models suggest that both STAND and QGEO reduce forecast error 
for a given level of change in earnings. In addition, firm size, the formation of board of 
directors, and earning to price ration all have negative impact on FE when interacted with 
change in earnings. However, board size, decline in future earnings, and industry show a 
positive effect on FE.  
When redoing the analysis but without the single geographical segment companies 
(table 7.19 & 7.20), the regressions revealed mostly similar results to the results in table 
(7.17) and 7.18. The results in table (7.20) show similar finding to table (7.17) except for the 
MV and NEG. The MV become positively associated with forecast error but still insignificant 
and NEG become statistically significant. Table (7.20) report a decline in the significance 
level of both MV and board size. The significance levels of all other variables remain the 
same. The findings in table (7.19) and table (7.20) show that the exclusion of single 
geographical segment companies have not resulted in a major difference in the association 
between the STAND and QGEO with analysts’ forecast accuracy.   
163 
 
Table 7. 17: Regression Nine, Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO on 
Forecast Accuracy (Two Years) 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept -0.78 0.606 
ERN 1.85 0.000 
STAND*ERN -0.556 0.000 
QGEO*ERN -0.25 0.000 
MV*ERN -1.18E-06 0.592 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.033 0.286 
NER*ERN -0.235 0.000 
EPt-1*ERN -32.328 0.000 
AG*ERN 0.035 0.881 
NEG*ERN 0.159 0.424 
BM 0.086 0.754 
CG 0.126 0.612 
CS 0.023 0.915 
HC 0.16 0.662 
OG 0.463 0.092 
TECH 1.722 0.000 
TELEC 0.346 0.604 
UT 0.035 0.925 
   
R2 0.798 
 
Adj R2 0.775 
 
Size 171 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, 
QGEO is a measure for the fineness of geographical segment, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, 
TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is 
Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, 
CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication 
sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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Table 7. 18: Regression Ten, Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO on 
Forecast Accuracy (Four Years) 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.004 0.964 
ERN 1.185 0.000 
STAND*ERN -0.296 0.000 
QGEO*ERN -0.225 0.000 
MV*ERN -2.66E-06 0.026 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.042 0.038 
NER*ERN -0.166 0.000 
EPt-1*ERN -33.324 0.000 
AG*ERN 0.042 0.778 
NEG*ERN 0.422 0.000 
BM 0.061 0.674 
CG 0.051 0.713 
CS 0.052 0.66 
HC 0.072 0.722 
OG 0.127 0.402 
TECH 0.939 0.000 
TELEC 0.257 0.402 
UT 0.165 0.812 
   
R2 0.765 
 
Adj R2 0.753 
 
Size 341 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, 
QGEO is a measure for the fineness of geographical segment, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, 
TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is 
Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, 
CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication 
sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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Table 7. 19: Regression Eleven, Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO on 
Forecast Accuracy (Two Years & No Single GEO Segment) 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.021 0.894 
ERN 1.419 0.004 
STAND*ERN -0.527 0.001 
QGEO*ERN -0.278 0.000 
MV*ERN 5.43E-07 0.811 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.03 0.326 
NER*ERN -0.153 0.022 
EPt-1*ERN -201.371 0.001 
AG*ERN 0.048 0.837 
NEG*ERN 0.723 0.011 
BM 0.095 0.724 
CG 0.078 0.752 
CS 0.01 0.964 
HC 0.108 0.765 
OG 0.463 0.096 
TECH 1.683 0.000 
TELEC 0.006 0.993 
UT 0.101 0.786 
   
R2 0.808  
Adj R2 0.786 
 
Size 167  
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO 
is a measure for the fineness of geographical segment, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board 
size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG 
is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services 
sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities 
sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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Table 7. 20: Regression Twelve Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of STAND & QGEO on 
Forecast Accuracy (Two Years & No Single GEO Segment) 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept 0.082 0.324 
ERN 1.869 0.000 
STAND*ERN -0.423 0.000 
QGEO*ERN -0.445 0.000 
MV*ERN -2.12E-06 0.161 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.03 0.135 
NER*ERN -0.123 0.002 
EPt-1*ERN -256.683 0.000 
AG*ERN 0.014 0.934 
NEG*ERN 0.958 0.000 
BM 0.086 0.54 
CG -0.003 0.981 
CS 0.068 0.569 
HC 0.015 0.938 
OG 0.149 0.319 
TECH 0.886 0.000 
TELEC 0.127 0.676 
UT 0.336 0.109 
   
R2 0.789  
Adj R2 0.777 
 
Size 319  
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO 
is a measure for the fineness of geographical segment, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board 
size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG 
is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services 
sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities 
sector. The P-value is for the two- tailed test.  
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b- Impact of STAND, QGEO, MASEG, and Segment Profit on Forecast Accuracy 
𝐹𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐺𝐸𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 +
𝛽9𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽10𝑁𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗
𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (7.14) 
The regression results of equation (7.14) are presented in table (7.21), table (7.22), and 
table (7.23). The multiplicative outcomes of segment variables with change in earnings show 
that all segment variables exhibit significant impact on forecast error for a given level of 
change in earnings. The coefficient of STAND is -0.654 and -0.362 when being regressed 
over two and four years’ time period, which imply that the adoption of management approach 
in segment reporting mitigate the positive impact of earnings variability on forecast error. Yet, 
it can be noticed that the degree of effect of the interaction between STAND and ERN has 
declined in longer time period (two years vs. four years). This coincides with our findings in 
the additive regression models.  
The results also document a negative association between forecast error and other 
segment variables over two- and four-year regressions except for BOTHPROF. The results 
suggest that, for a given change in earnings, the forecast error is negatively related to the 
fineness of geographical segment, reporting main segment based on line of business 
classification, and segment profit disclosure. Similar to STAND, all of these variables 
witnessed a decline in their level of impact on FE over a longer time period except for QGEO.  
Moreover, both regression thirteen and regression fourteen report that NER, EPt-1, and 
AG improve analysts’ ability to predict future change in earnings and therefore reduce 
forecast error. In contrast model thirteen indicates that only board size and industry are 
positively associated with forecast error after interacting them with ERN. Model fourteen 
however, show that in addition to board size and industry, the decline in future earnings 
(NEG) magnify the positive impact of change in earnings on analysts’ forecast error.  
On the other hand, a very interesting result is found when removing single 
geographical segment from the regression as shown in table (7.23). First of all, it can be seen 
that all the segment variables are negatively associated with the forecast error and all of them 
are statistically significant including BOTHPROF. The variable BOTHPROF become 
statistically significant because single geographical segment companies report profit line 
items for their line of business only. In addition the table show that all the control variables 
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are statistically significant except for the firm size. Both of board size and decline in future 
earnings exhibit positive correlation with forecast error. While it is clear that non-executive 
ratio, earning to price, and assets growth have a negative impact on forecast error.  
Regression results of STAND & QGEO only Compared to All Segment Variables 
The results for the STAND and QGEO when regressed separately are different from 
their results when regressed with all segment variables. Normally it would be possible to 
expect that the magnitude of the impact of these two variables will increase as more segment 
variables are added into the regression. However, the two years’ regression show that the 
coefficient on QGEO has decline from -0.250 to -0.155 after accounting for the effect of 
MASEG, BOTHPROF, MAMRG, and BOTHPROF. The decline in the extent of the effect of 
QGEO on forecast error could be explained by the drop in the level of disclosure relating to 
segment profit line items particularly geographical segments.  
The same evidence is found after extending the time period to four years as shown in 
models two and four. Before adding other segment variables, the coefficient of QGEO was -
0.225 and subsequently declined to -0.175. As a matter of fact, despite the drop in QGEO 
coefficient, it is still statistically significant. It may be remembered that the linear additive 
regressions have shown similar drop in the magnitude of QGEO after accounting for other 
segment variables.  
However, interestingly the findings reveal that the impact of the adoption of IFRS 8 
for every level change in earnings has increased after controlling for other segment variables. 
This indicates that the new approach in segmental reporting provides better insight for 
financial analysts into future earnings even with the drop in geographical profit disclosure. To 
be more precise, the coefficient values of STAND regressed in model thirteen and model 
fourteen (-0.654 and -0.362) were relatively higher than those in model one and two (-0.556 
and -0.296). This significant result of STAND could be attributed to the added value of 
viewing segment information from the same eyes as companies’ management. Financial 
analysts tend to benefit from their discussion with companies’ management and the new 
approach allows them to match the outcome of their discussions with the information reported 
to external users.  
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Table 7. 21: Regression Thirteen Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of Different Segment’s 
Variables on Forecast Accuracy (Two Years) 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept -0.27 0.845 
ERN 1.852 0.000 
STAND*ERN -0.654 0.000 
QGEO*ERN -0.155 0.019 
MASEG*ERN -0.981 0.000 
MAMRG*ERN -0.124 0.003 
BOTHPROF*ERN -0.159 0.509 
PROFMTC*ERN -0.276 0.031 
MV*ERN 2.46E-06 0.388 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.07 0.017 
NER*ERN -0.154 0.019 
EPt-1*ERN -21.009 0.011 
AG*ERN -1.102 0.006 
NEG*ERN 0.199 0.291 
BM 0.109 0.68 
CG 0.064 0.774 
CS -0.048 0.804 
HC 0.054 0.871 
OG 0.172 0.5 
TECH 1.665 0.000 
TELEC -0.789 0.241 
UT 0.149 0.664 
   
R2 0.84 
 
Adj R2 0.818 
 
Size 171 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and 
GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 
0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive 
directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is 
Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is 
Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two- tailed test.  
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Table 7. 22: Regression Fourteen Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of Different Segment’s 
Variables on Forecast Accuracy (Four Years) 
Variables Coefficient Sign 
Intercept 0.043 0.583 
ERN 1.177 0.000 
STAND*ERN -0.362 0.000 
QGEO*ERN -0.175 0.000 
MASEG*ERN -0.613 0.000 
MAMRG*ERN -0.05 0.03 
BOTHPROF*ERN -0.102 0.418 
PROFMTC*ERN -0.297 0.001 
MV*ERN -8.29E-07 0.613 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.067 0.001 
NER*ERN -0.101 0.008 
EPt-1*ERN -26.384 0.000 
AG*ERN -0.465 0.013 
NEG*ERN 0.457 0.000 
BM 0.028 0.844 
CG 0.001 0.992 
CS -0.002 0.987 
HC 0.008 0.968 
OG -0.017 0.907 
TECH 0.902 0.000 
TELEC 0.065 0.829 
UT 0.202 0.299 
   
R2 0.793 
 
Adj R2 0.78 
 
Size 341 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures 
the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a 
value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit 
margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, 
PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV 
is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last 
period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG 
is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is 
Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two- tailed test. 
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Table 7.23: Regression Fifteen Multiplicative Analysis of the Impact of Different Segment’s 
Variables on Forecast Accuracy (Four Years & excluding single segments) 
Variables Coefficient Sign 
Intercept 0.081 0.308 
ERN 1.912 0.000 
STAND*ERN -0.418 0.000 
QGEO*ERN -0.388 0.000 
MASEG*ERN -0.389 0.001 
MAMRG*ERN -0.059 0.02 
BOTHPROF*ERN -0.277 0.044 
PROFMTC*ERN -0.293 0.001 
MV*ERN 2.40E-07 0.889 
TOTBORD*ERN 0.047 0.022 
NER*ERN -0.106 0.019 
EPt-1*ERN -230.848 0.000 
AG*ERN -0.620 0.011 
NEG*ERN 0.901 0.000 
BM 0.101 0.48 
CG -0.01 0.992 
CS 0.057 0.623 
HC 0.006 0.976 
OG 0.088 0.555 
TECH 0.878 0.000 
TELEC 0.01 0.972 
UT 0.297 0.145 
   
R2 0.808 
 
Adj R2 0.794 
 
Size 319 
 
Notes:This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a measures 
the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as LOB, and a 
value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit 
margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments, 
PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV 
is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last 
period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG 
is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is 
Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the two- tailed test.  
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7.3.4:  Fixed Effect Regression Results 
Given that our sample data is panel data set, the general assumption about the 
independence in the regression error terms is mostly violated. The dependence of the error 
terms across companies or years can result in biased standard error test and misidentified 
significance statistics in OLS regressions. Thus, it leads to having too small confidence 
interval. Therefore, using fixed effect regression robust the findings of our OLS regressions. 
Controlling for fixed effect could be based on the change in the time element or based 
on the change in entity element. In this part both time-fixed effect and firm-fixed effect 
regression is carried out. The results of these regressions are presented in the appendix.       
 
a- Time-Fixed Effect  
 
The results of time-fixed effect presented in appendix 4.1 are for the whole sample 
size including observations with single geographical segments. The results show that 
earnings variability (ERN) is positively associated with the analysts’ forecast error at less 
than 1% confidence level. The analysis also reveals that the adoption of IFRS 8 has 
improved analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. The regression coefficient on the STAND 
is -0.372 and it exhibit a significant negative impact on the dependent variable (FE).  If we 
look at the impact of the other segment variables on analysts’ forecast accuracy, it can be 
noticed that all segment variables are negatively associated with the forecast error. Most of 
them exhibit a statistically significant association at less than 1% level. However, 
BOTHPROF variable is the only variable which did not show significant impact on 
forecast error.    
 Redoing the time-fixed regression but this time without the single geographical 
segment companies has revealed similar findings to the one presented above. Appendix 4.2 
shows that all segmental variable have a significant negative impact on analysts’ forecast 
error. This time and after removing single geographical segment companies from the 
sample, BOTHPROF variable shows statistically significant result.  
  In general, time-fixed results are similar to those of the OLs regression not only for the 
main explanatory variables but even for the control variables.  
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b-   Firm-Fixed Effect  
Firm-fixed effect regression results are presented in both appendix 4.3 and appendix 
4.4. The findings for the impact of IFRS 8 adoption on analysts’ earnings forecast error 
(STAND) support the view that reporting segment information in according with internal 
reporting pattern improves analysts’ ability to predict future earnings.   
For the QGEO, MASEG, and PROFMTCH variables, the firm-fixed effect model 
provide negative and significant estimates parameters. This negative relationships suggest 
that firms reporting finer geographical segments, reporting operating segments based on 
line of business activities, and reporting segment profit that reconcile with the consolidate 
statements tend to have lower analysts’ forecast error. The results are consistent with the 
idea that disaggregated segment information is value relevant and it provides additional 
information to the consolidated information. 
In regards to the impact of MAMRG and BOTHPROF the two tail test does not reveal 
any significant impact of these two variables on forecast error.  However, the one tail test 
shows that MAMRG exhibits a significant negative relationship with forecast error at 
around 5% level.   
The regression in appendix 4.4 is replication of regression in appendix 4.3 but this 
time after excluding single geographical segment companies. The results in appendix 4.4 
witnessed some improvement in the significance level of all segmental variables and in 
particular the significance level of both MAMRG and BOTHPROF. The firm-fixed effect 
regression reveals that MAMRG is negatively related to forecast error and it is statistically 
different from zero at 10% confidence level. The coefficient on BOTHPROF is 
significantly negative at 5% confidence level.  
The control variables do not show any significant difference from the findings 
reported in the OLS regressions. 
 
7.3.5:  Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests 
This section discusses the issue of results’ sensitivity to alternative measures of FE 
and performs additional robustness tests. The objective of this section is to extend the 
multiplicative analysis of segment information impact on forecast accuracy, by repeating 
major tests in different settings. Firstly, testing the results’ robustness to censored FE 
observations. This test controls for truncating FE observations at values greater than zero. 
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Secondly, by testing results’ sensitivity to the use of alternative FE proxies (i.e. ln (1+FE)). 
This test eliminates the effect of large FE observations.  
 Both robustness tests and sensitivity analysis enable us to compare the changes in the 
regression results if different proxies or set of observations have been used.  
c- Robustness Test  
Due to the properties of FE metric our FE observations are censored at values greater 
than zero, thus to test the validity of this study’s findings censored regression (Tobit 
regression) is carried out. The results of Tobit regressions are presented in appendix 5.1 
and appendix 5.2.  
 The results of Tobit regression presented in appendix 5.1 are for the whole sample size 
including observations with single geographical segments. The results reveal similar 
conclusions to our OLS regression’s results. The results reveal that earnings variability 
makes predicting future earnings very hard on financial analysts. However, as it can be 
seen from the table that all segment variables are negatively and significantly associated 
with the FE except for BOTHPROF variable. In addition, the regression documents that 
majority of segments’ variables are statistically different from zero at less than 1% level. 
Also, the impact of the control variables do not show different results from the one 
presented in our main analysis in section (7.3.3).  
 Appendix (5.2) replicates the same regression of appendix (5.1) but without single 
geographical segment observations (i.e. only multiple segments observations). The table 
reveals similar results to appendix (5.1) except that BOTHPROF is becoming statistically 
significant at less than 5% confidence level.  In addition, although the significance level 
for the segment variables is the same compared to whole sample regression (appendix 5.1) 
but it can be noticed that the magnitude of the effect of the segment information has 
increased after removing single geographical segment observations. The reason for the 
improvement in the coefficient of segment variables is because the segment information 
of single segment companies is basically what is reported in consolidated financial 
statements and there is no value added from segment notes in regards to geographical 
segments.   
 Therefore, both of appendix (5.1) and appendix (5.2) proves to some extent the 
validity of our findings based on OLS regressions. They also suggest that truncated FE 
observations do not produce biased and inconsistent estimator parameters (’s). 
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d- Sensitivity Analysis  
To test the results’ sensitivity to FE distribution and having large FE observations, the 
main regression is examined again with these cases controlled for. The control for large FE 
observation is going to be through the recalculation of these observations using another proxy 
(i.e. ln (1+FE)).  
As can be noticed from appendix (6.1), the control for large FE observations does not 
affect the findings of this study. The significant negative association between segment 
variables and FE for every unit of earnings variability measure did not change. Appendix 
(6.1) reveals that QGEO and MASEG are statistically significant at less than 1% level. It also 
shows that PROFMTCH is statistically significant at 5% confidence level and MAMRG at 
around 10% level. The only segment variable which did not show a significant impact on 
forecast accuracy is BOTHPROF. However, the same result was found in the main regression 
presented in section (7.3.3). 
Moreover, even after excluding the single geographical segment observation from the 
sample, appendix (6.2) revealed similar findings to appendix (6.1). The table shows that all 
segment variables are negatively associated with FE. Also, it can be noticed that both STAND 
and QGEO are statistically significant at less than 1% level while MASEG and PROFMTCH 
are significant at less than 5% level. On the other hand, MAMRG is statistically significant at 
10% level.  
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Summary 
To conclude, the preliminary multiplicative analysis presented in Section 3 of this 
chapter shows that earnings prediction by financial analysts improves as a result of the 
adoption of the management approach (IFRS 8) in reporting segmental information. The 
results also suggest that the improvement in the quality of geographical segment post IFRS 8 
has led to reduction in the forecast error when interacted with change in earnings. Despite the 
decline in the disclosure of geographical profit and decline in reconciliation between segment 
profit and consolidated profit post IFRS 8, it is still clear that segment profitability disclosure 
have a significant positive impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy. However, this reduction in 
the quality of segmental profit disclosure has reduced the magnitude of the association 
between the fineness of geographical segments and forecast error. 
Also, while it is true that the quality of segment profit disclosure has decreased after 
the adoption of IFRS 8, but the results still show that the management approach provide a 
better insight to financial analysts about future earnings. This significant result could be 
attributed to the added value of viewing segment information from the same eyes as 
companies’ management. Financial analysts tend to benefit from their discussion with 
companies’ management and the new approach allows them to match the outcome of their 
discussions with the information reported to external users.  
In addition, the multiplicative regression documented that all the control variables are 
statistically significant except for firm size and NEG. However, NEG showed a significant 
impact on forecast error when the model was regressed over four years. Tables (7.21, 7.22, 
and 7.23) show that larger board size and industry type are positively associated with forecast 
error for every level of change in earnings. On the other hand the proportionate of non-
executive directors (NER), EPt-1, and AG all show significant negative impact on FE.  
It can be clearly noticed that segment information is very useful for financial analysts. 
The study provides strong evidence on the added value of the new segment standard in the 
reporting environment. It also highlighted the significance of segment profit line items and 
that the new standards have inclined companies in UK to conceal geographical segment profit 
and to report segment profits which are inconsistent with the consolidated statements.  
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Chapter 8- Segment Profit Disclosure and Market’s Ability to Predict 
Future Earnings. 
 
Overview 
The findings presented in the previous chapters (Chapter 6&7) show that the adoption 
of IFRS 8 has led to decrease in the quality of the disclosure of segmental profit and in 
particular the disclosure of profit line items of geographical segments. The results also show 
that the extent of segmental profit disclosure is positively associated with analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. Therefore, in this chapter the focus will be mainly on the importance of 
segment profit disclosure.  
This chapter will examine whether the disclosure of segmental profit provide an 
insight to the market about future earnings. The methodology of this chapter is a slightly 
different from the one used in Chapter 7. This chapter is utilising a price-based matric to 
capture for market ability to predict firm’s future change in earnings. Thus, for the purpose of 
conducting this study, the Future Earnings Response Coefficient (FERC) Model will be 
implemented. Details of the model and model specification will be presented in section 8.2.4 
and also in 8.3.1 of this chapter. The remainder of this chapter will be divided as follows: 
8.1: Descriptive Statistics 
8.2: Segmental Profit Disclosure and Share Price Anticipation of Earnings 
8.3: Experimental Design and Results 
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8.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
In this part, a summary of the descriptive statistics for the Future Earning Response 
Coefficient (FERC) model will be presented. The variables of the basic FERC model are R, 
Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3, ERN, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3, AGt, and EPt-1. The segmental profit disclosure 
variables that are tested in the model are MAMRG, BOTHPROF, and PROFMATCH. These 
three variables are similar to the one tested in the analysts’ forecast model.  
Tables (8.1) to (8.3) show information about the mean, medium, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum for each of the variables included in our model. Table (8.1) provides 
a comprehensive summary for full dataset (both prior and post IFRS 8). Table (8.2) 
corresponds to the subsample of post IFRS 8 period. Table (8.3) corresponds to the subsample 
for the period prior to IFRS 8.  
It can be noticed from table (8.1) that mean and median for both returns and earnings 
are positive, which indicates that on average firms have experienced an increase in their 
market values and an improvement in their financial performance over the tested period. 
However, for the post-IFRS 8 period only the mean of the change in earnings at period t+3 is 
negative. On the other hand, the pre-IFRS 8 period statistics show positive means and 
medians for all variables except for current return (Rt).  
The statistics presented in the two tables correspond to the subsamples of pre-IFRS 8 
and post-IFRS 8 indicate that the average stock return is higher post IFRS 8, while average 
changes in earnings is higher in the pre-IFRS 8 period. As with the descriptive statistics of the 
previous chapter, it is found that all profit measures have witnessed a decline in their means 
values after the adoption of IFRS 8. The mean of MAMRG has declined from 0.4818 pre-
IFRS 8 to 0.2986 post-IFRS 8. However, the difference in means is not significantly different 
from zero as shown in table (8.4). It can also be observed that the decrease in the number of 
firms which reported profit for both segment definitions and reported profit line item that 
matches with consolidated statement profit line items is statistically significant from zero. 
Clearly this is the reason for our decision to focus on the impact of segment profit disclosure 
on market ability to foresee future earnings changes. 
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Note: Rt is the current period stock return, Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings 
change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last 
period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit 
margin. 
 
  
Table 8. 1: Market Reaction Analysis’s Descriptive Statistics for Whole Sample Period (IAS14 & 
IFRS 8) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Rt 362 0.0176 0.0468 0.423 1.4 -2.07 
Rt+1 364 0.0435 0.061 0.405 1.43 -2.07 
Rt+2 364 0.1277 0.1293 0.345 2.09 -2.06 
Rt+3 364 0.0728 0.0893 0.34 2.09 -2.06 
ERN 340 0.0755 0.1211 0.44 3.04 -2.88 
ERNt+1 342 0.069 0.1164 0.511 3.04 -2.88 
ERNt+2 343 0.048 0.0926 0.531 3.04 -2.88 
ERNt+3 347 0.0488 0.0819 0.523 3.04 -3.06 
AGt 364 0.1719 0.0793 0.424 5.08 -0.67 
EPt-1 357 0.0731 0.0658 0.057 0.47 0 
MAMRG 358 0.3897 0.0587 2.751 38.8 0 
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Table 8. 2: Market Reaction Analysis’s Descriptive Statistics for IFRS 8 Period only 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Rt 182 0.187 0.1635 0.319 1.43 -0.74 
Rt+1 182 0.0587 0.0815 0.315 0.79 -2.06 
Rt+2 182 0.0762 0.0991 0.368 2.09 -2.06 
Rt+3 182 0.0853 0.1086 0.349 2.09 -1.15 
ERN 171 0.052 0.1169 0.554 3.04 -2.88 
ERNt+1 173 0.1267 0.1253 0.451 3.04 -2.73 
ERNt+2 172 0.044 0.0852 0.509 2.5 -2.71 
ERNt+3 174 -0.0287 0.0496 0.469 1.65 -3.06 
AGt 182 0.0765 0.0302 0.223 1.27 -0.46 
EPt-1 180 0.0822 0.0779 0.0605 0.4 0 
MAMRG 180 0.2986 0.06211 1.892 24.76 0 
Note: Rt is the current period stock return, Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings 
change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last 
period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit 
margin. 
  
181 
 
Table 8. 3: Market Reaction Analysis’s Descriptive Statistics for IAS 14R Period only 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Rt 180 -0.1538 -0.1099 0.445 1.03 -2.07 
Rt+1 182 0.0282 0.0328 0.478 1.43 -2.07 
Rt+2 182 0.1792 0.1586 0.313 1.43 -0.74 
Rt+3 182 0.0603 0.0825 0.331 1.07 -2.06 
ERN 169 0.0993 0.1301 0.282 1.47 -1.23 
ERNt+1 169 0.0099 0.0999 0.445 1.47 -2.88 
ERNt+2 171 0.052 0.1169 0.554 3.04 -2.88 
ERNt+3 173 0.1267 0.1253 0.562 3.04 -2.73 
AGt 182 0.2672 0.1619 0.541 5.08 -0.67 
EPt-1 177 0.0639 0.0595 0.0519 0.47 0 
MAMRG 178 0.4818 0.0581 3.409 38.81 0 
Note: Rt is the current period stock return, Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings 
change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last 
period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit 
margin. 
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Table 8. 4: Means Difference of Segment Profit Variables (Market Reaction Model) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval d.f. Sig (2-tailed) 
Lower Upper 
MAMRG -0.18 3.8 0.28 -0.74 0.38 177 0.529 
BOTHPROF -0.07 0.37 0.03 -0.13 -0.02 181 0.006 
PROFMATCH -0.09 0.47 0.03 -0.16 -0.02 181 0.008 
 
Tables (8.5), (8.6), and (8.7) present Pearson correlations for the ten variables of the 
FERC model and the three segment profit proxies. Table (8.6) and (8.7) correlations 
correspond to pre and post IFRS 8 respectively.  Table (8.5) presents the correlation for the 
full dataset and it shows that correlations between Rt, Rt+1 and Rt+2 and the following year’s 
change in returns is positive and statistically significant. The correlation between current 
return and next year change in earnings is 0.204 and it is statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
Also, the correlation of the return at year t+1 and t+2 with following year’s earnings change 
are 0.157 and 0.287 and both are statistically significant at 0.01 level.  
It can be observed that for post-IFRS 8 period the correlations between current return 
(Rt) and future changes in earnings for the three years period (ERNt+1, ERNt+2, and ERNt+3) 
are positive and mostly significant. The same applies to the correlations between next periods 
returns (Rt+1& Rt+2) and future earnings change related to the these periods (ERNt+2& 
ERNt+3). The correlations between the returns in period t, t+1, and t+2 and the following 
year’s earnings change are 0.268, 0.243, and 0.289, all statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
For pre-IFRS 8, although the correlations between the current return and future change 
in earnings over the three years period is positive but none of them is statistically significant. 
This could be interpreted as market inability to anticipate future earnings change in that 
period. Also, by looking at table (8.6) and table (8.7) it can be noted that the magnitude of the 
correlations between the current return and future change in earnings for the post-IFRS 
8period is much higher than the one for pre-IFRS 8 period. 
The second part of this chapter discusses the basic model that is going to be used in 
the regression analysis, the measurements and specification of the variables to be used in our 
analysis, the hypothesis of the expected impact of segment profit disclosure on market ability 
to anticipate earnings.
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Table 8. 5: Market Reaction Analysis Pearson’s Correlation for Full Dataset 
Variable R Rt+1 Rt+2 Rt+3 ERN ERNt+1 ERNt+2 ERNt+3 AGt EPt-1 MAMRG BOTHPROF PROFMATCH 
Rt 1 -0.183** -0.049 0.061 -0.040 0.204* 0.072 -0.141** -0.164** 0.133* -0.107* -0.015 -0.081 
Rt+1 -0.183** 1 -0.234** -0.058 -0.074 0.067 0.157** 0.062 0.042 0.124* -0.168** 0.054 -0.043 
Rt+2 -0.049 -0.234** 1 -0.054 0.108* -0.104 0.145** 0.287** 0.055 -0.109* 0.058 0.100 0.045 
Rt+3 0.061 -0.058 -0.054 1 0.070 0.128* -0.143** 0.237** -0.072 0.010 0.005 -0.023 -0.046 
ERN -0.040 -0.074 0.108* 0.070 1 -0.259** -0.187** 0.144** 0.101 -0.272** -0.065 0.025 -0.014 
ERNt+1 0.204** 0.067 -0.104 0.128* -0.259** 1 -0.306** -0.197** -0.055 -0.070 -0.008 0.028 -0.014 
ERNt+2 0.072 0.157** 0.145** -0.143** -0.187** -0.306** 1 -0.232** 0.019 0.064 -0.004 -0.008 0.030 
ERNt+3 -0.141** 0.062 0.287* 0.237** 0.144** -0.197** -0.232 1 0.074 -0.081 0.046 0.025 -0.011 
AGt -0.164** 0.042 0.055 -0.072 0.101 -0.055 0.019 0.074 1 -0.170** 0.172** 0.046 0.006 
EPt-1 0.133* 0.124* -0.109* 0.010 -0.272** -0.070 0.064 -0.081 -0.170** 1 -0.079 -0.071 -0.064 
MAMRG -0.107* -0.168** 0.058 0.005 -0.065 -0.008 -0.004 0.046 0.172** -0.079 1 0.013 0.069 
BOTHPROF -0.015 0.054 0.100 -0.023 0.025 0.028 -0.008 0.025 0.046 -0.071 0.013 1 -0.014 
PROFMATCH -0.081 -0.043 0.045 -0.046 -0.014 -0.014 0.030 -0.011 0.006 -0.064 0.069 -0.014 1 
Note: Rt is the current period stock return, Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future 
periods earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments and zero otherwise, 
PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 otherwise  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 8. 6: Market Reaction Analysis Pearson’s Correlation for pre-IFRS 8 
Variable R Rt+1 Rt+2 Rt+3 ERN ERNt+1 ERNt+2 ERNt+3 AGt EPt-1 MAMRG BOTHPROF PROFMATCH 
Rt 1 -0.426** 0.070 0.058 0.108 0.090 0.035 -0.156* -0.097 0.051 -0.160* -0.018 -0.038 
Rt+1 -0.426** 1 -0.296** -0.235** -0.083 0.002 0.112 0.031 0.059 0.087 -0.231** 0.042 -0.098 
Rt+2 0.070 -0.296** 1 0.199** 0.050 0.132 -0.073 0.261** 0.040 -0.211** 0.085 0.155* 0.033 
Rt+3 0.058 -0.235** 0.199** 1 0.176* 0.199** -0.096 0.131 -0.110 -0.239** 0.019 -0.015 0.070 
ERN 0.108 -0.083 0.050 0.176* 1 -0.273** 0.188* 0.204** 0.073 -0.367** 0.105 0.100 -0.057 
ERNt+1 0.090 0.002 0.132 0.199** -0.273** 1 -0.387** -0.167 0.000 -0.022 -0.361** 0.045 0.062 
ERNt+2 0.035 0.112 -0.073 -0.096 0.188* -0.387** 1 -0.256** 0.026 0.053 -0.029 0.009 0.056 
ERNt+3 -0.156* 0.031 0.261** 0.131 0.204** -0.167* -0.256** 1 0.045 -0.263** 0.061 0.013 0.038 
AGt -0.097 0.059 0.040 -0.110 0.073 000 0.026 0.045 1 -0.164* 0.206** 0.062 -0.014 
EPt-1 0.051 0.087 -0.211** -0.239** -0.367** -0.022 0.053 -0.263 -0.164* 1 -0.136 -0.071 0.000 
MAMRG -0.160* -0.231** 0.085 0.019 0.105 -0.361** -0.029 0.061 0.206** -0.136 1 -0.058 0.155 
BOTHPROF -0.018 0.042 0.155* -0.015 0.100 0.045 0.009 0.013 0.062 -0.071 -0.058 1 -0.007 
PROFMATCH -0.038 -0.098 0.033 0.070 -0.057 0.062 0.056 0.038 -0.014 0.000 0.115 -0.007 1 
Note: Rt is the current period stock return, Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future 
periods earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments and zero 
otherwise, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 otherwise  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 8. 7: Market Reaction Analysis Pearson’s Correlation for post-IFRS 8 
Variable R Rt+1 Rt+2 Rt+3 ERN ERNt+1 ERNt+2 ERNt+3 AGt EPt-1 MAMRG BOTHPROF PROFMATCH 
Rt 1 0.220** -0.054 0.038 -0.106 0.268** 0.158* 0.017 -0.045 0.112 0.035 0.090 -0.055 
Rt+1 0.220** 1 -0.169* 0.190* -0.080 0.143 0.243** 0.127 0.027 0.168* 0.001 0.087 0.052 
Rt+2 -0.054 -0.169* 1 -0.250** 0.124 -0.233** 0.390** 0.289** -0.006 -0.001 0.017 0.023 0.030 
Rt+3 0.038 0.190* -0.250** 1 0.029 0.072 -0.197** 0.371** 0.015 0.201** -0.13 -0.026 -0.155* 
ERN -0.106 -0.080 0.124 0.029 1 -0.256** -0.400** 0.117 0.162* -0.234** -0.073 -0.026 -0.003 
ERNt+1 0.268** 0.143 -0.233** 0.072 -0.256** 1 -0.247** -0.183* -0.093 -0.131 0.009 0.041 -0.059 
ERNt+2 0.158* 0.243** 0.390** -0.197** -0.400** -0.247** 1 -0.216** 0.004 0.083 0.023 -0.030 -0.001 
ERNt+3 0.017 0.127 0.289** 0.371** 0.117 -0.183* -0.216** 1 0.039 0.131 -0.003 0.010 -0.114 
AGt -0.045 0.027 -0.006 0.015 0.162* -0.093 0.004 0.039 1 -0.141 0.016 -0.068 -0.024 
EPt-1 0.112 0.168* -0.001 0.201 -0.234** -0.131 0.083 0.131 -0.141 1 0.001 -0.045 -0.092 
MAMRG 0.035 0.001 0.017 -0.013 -0.073 0.009 0.023 -0.003 0.016 0.001 1 0.149* -0.018 
BOTHPROF 0.090 0.087 0.023 -0.026 -0.026 0.041 -0.030 0.010 -0.068 -0.045 0.149* 1 -0.043 
PROFMATCH -0.055 0.052 0.030 -0.155* -0.003 -0.059 -0.001 -0.114 -0.024 -0.092 -0.018 -0.043 1 
Note: Rt is the current period stock return, Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future 
periods earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments and zero otherwise, 
PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 otherwise  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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8.2: Segmental Profit disclosure and Share Price Anticipation of Earnings 
The aim of this chapter is to further examine the impact of segment profit disclosure 
on the ability of stock prices to predict future change in earnings. The model of Collins et al. 
(1994) will be used to detect the association between the extent of segmental profit disclosure 
and the informativeness of stock price. Gelb & Zarowin (2002; p34) suggest that the use of 
this approach “can be applied in other cases of interest to both academics and policy makers, 
such as assessing the benefits of additional required disclosure (e.g. for segments)”. Collins et 
al. (1994) argue that it is necessary to add three years of future change in earnings in order to 
capture the idea of market anticipation power.  
More details about this model will be explained later in the Experimental Design 
section. This part specifies the variables to be used in the analysis, the hypothesis of the 
expected association between segment profit disclosure variables and share price anticipation 
of earnings, and the control variables that are included as part of Collins et al. (1994) model. 
The remainder of this chapter will be divided into four sections as follows: 
8.2.1: Measurement of the Dataset and Variables 
8.2.2: Measurement Specifications 
8.2.3: Control Variables Factors Affecting Share Price Anticipation 
8.2.4: Summary of the Chapter 
  
187 
 
8.2.1: The Dataset and Variables’ Measurement 
1- Share Price Anticipation of Earnings  
The disclosure of earnings information has been given a considerable attention by 
researchers in accounting and finance literature. Basically the early studies related to earnings 
information goes back to 1968. The two most important aspects of earnings disclosure that 
have been frequently examined are related to its usefulness to the market participants and to 
market efficiency hypothesis (Walker, 2004).   
Studies which have examined the association between share price and earnings have 
covered several aspects which could explain the extent of this association. The quality of 
firm’s financial disclosure is one area which found to effect the strength of association 
between stock price and earnings change (e.g. Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm & Myers, 
2002; Hussainey et al., 2003; and Ettredge et al., 2005).  
The disclosure studies in general provided consistent evidence that the degree of financial 
disclosure is significantly and positively associated with the association between earnings and 
stock return. However, most of these studies have concentrated on the firm’s overall 
disclosure either voluntary or mandatory, in which a disclosure index that covers several 
aspects of financial disclosure is designed.  
Few studies only examined the effect of one aspect of disclosure such as the disclosure 
segmental information in stock price ability to predict earnings change. Ettredge et al. (2005) 
evaluate the impact of the adoption of the new segmental standards (SFAS 131) on the stock 
market ability to predict firm’s change in earnings. Ettredge et al. (2005) disclosure matric is 
based on number of reported business segments and they tested whether the increase in the 
number of reported segments has any impact on the informativeness of stock price. They find 
that many of single segment companies have reported multiple segments post-SFAS 131 and 
those companies have experienced an increase in the degree of association between stock 
return and future change in earnings.  
However, there is a very important element of segmental disclosure that has been affected 
by the new standard; which is related to the disclosure of profit line items and the use of non 
IFRS measure. Our study adds to the existing literature by examining the impact of segment 
profit disclosure on association between stock return and changes in earnings. 
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2- Description of Dataset 
The dataset to be used in this analysis has been obtained from Reuter’s DataStream 
database. It comprises the following information for 91 companies over 4 year period.  
a) Annual EPS for fiscal year t-1, t, t+1, t+2, and t+3 
b) Share price for fiscal year t-1, t, t+1, t+2, and t+3 
c) Total Assets for fiscal year t-1 and t 
d) Segment profit disclosure (i.e. MAMRG, BPTHPROF, AND PROFMATCH) 
 
The segment data has been obtained individually from companies annual reports. More 
details of the collection of segment variables have been offered in Chapter 5, section (5.1) 
sample selection. 
The reason for using DataStream to obtain information about stock price, earnings and 
assets rather than Bloomberg, which has been used in the previous chapter, is because the data 
are available for larger number of companies (91 compared to 87). Also, when we have 
started our initially data collection process we used DataStream and because we do not have 
an access to the analysts’ forecast data in DataStream we decided to use the Bloomberg for 
the analysts’ forecast study and use DataStream for our market model. The earnings and stock 
price information has been taken three month after the end of each fiscal year for every 
company. The advantage of this dataset is that all figures have been calculated using the same 
assumption and therefore the data are consistent across all companies. The details of variable 
measurements and specification will be presented in the next section.  
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8.2.2: Variables Measurement and Specification 
The analysis of this chapter investigates the impact of three proxies of segment 
profitability disclosure on the informativeness of stock price. The three proxies of segment 
profitability disclosure along with the variables of Collins et al. (1994) model are: 
1) Change in earning for four consecutive years (ERN, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, and ERNt+3) 
2) Stock return for four consecutive years (Rt, Rt+1, Rt+2, and Rt+3)  
3) Operating Segment’s profit margin (MAMRG) 
4) Disclosure of both operating (primary) segment profit and secondary segment profit 
(BOTHPROF) 
5) Operating segment profit line item is matching with consolidated statements 
(PROMTCH) 
The underlying association between stock return and earnings change as explained by 
Collins el al (1994) will be presented in this section. Also, each aspect of segment profit 
disclosure will be examined separately in relation to stock price ability to predict earnings 
change. Thus, several hypotheses have been developed and will be tested using statistical 
analysis method. For the purpose of conducting the statistical analysis all of these variables 
are in numeric form. The segment variables have been calculated using companies’ annual 
report and more details on the selection of annual reports has been mentioned in Chapter 5.  
(1) Stock price anticipation of future change in earnings 
(a) Hypothesis development 
Various studies have examined the association between stock return and 
earnings information. However, due to the weak correlation between these two 
variables, researchers try to investigate if there is any possible explanation of this 
weak correlation. One of the plausible explanations is suggested by Collins et al. 
(1994), by regressing the current stock return with future earnings change. The 
implementation of FERC is based on the assumption that the current stock return is a 
function of the expectation about the changes in future earnings.  
Many of the studies which have used this approach in their analysis have 
provided strong evidences on the positive association between current stock return 
and the change in earnings. Evidences on the ability of future change in earnings to 
explain current price movement can be found in the studies of Dhaliwal, Lee and 
Fargher, 1991; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Miller & Piotroski, 2000; Hussainey et al., 
2003; Hussainey & Wlaker, 2009; Hanlon et al.,2007; Hussainey, 2009. 
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At the same time there are many studies which have examined the association 
between the current stock return and future change in earnings in the light of the 
extent of the firm’s financial disclosure (voluntary and/or mandatory) such as Gelb & 
Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Hussainey et al., 2003; Ettredge et al., 
2005; Luo et al., 2006; and Schleicher et al., 2007. 
 
Consistent with the evidences listed above, the hypothesis relating to the 
association between current stock return and future change in earnings are presented 
below. 
H80: The movement in stock price is not associated with the future change in earnings.  
H81: The movement in stock price is associated the future change in earnings. 
 
(c) Measurement of variable 
The stock return for period t, t+1, t+2, and t+3 are defined as buy-and-hold 
returns from 9 months before the financial year–end to three months after the financial 
year end. Stock returns are calculated as the natural logarithm of current stock price 
(Pit) divided by last period stock price (Pit-1) as shown in the equation below: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
) 
The earnings variables are defined as earnings change per share in period t, 
t+1, t+2, and t+3 from 9 months before the financial year-end to three months after the 
financial year-end. Both current and future earnings changes are calculated as the 
natural logarithm of current earnings per Share (EPSt) divided by last year’s earnings 
per share (EPSt-1) as shown in the equation below: 
𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
) 
  
191 
 
(2) Segment profit disclosure 
(c) Hypothesis development 
The main independent variables that are investigated in this study are related to the 
extent of segment’s profit disclosure. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to evaluate 
the effect of segment profit in the association between share price and future change in 
earnings. In other words, it evaluates whether better disclosure of segment profit line 
items improves market ability to anticipate future change in earnings. Balakrishnan et al. 
(1990) demonstrate that predictive ability of segment profit is greater than that for 
consolidated profit. Baldwin (1984) reveals that profit figures are critically important in 
earnings prediction and firm valuation process.  
However, the management approach in segment reporting does not require the 
companies to report segment profit for their geographical segment unless geographical 
segmentation is company’s operating segments. In other words, if a company report its 
operating segments based on industrial classification, according to IFRS 8, the company 
can chose to not report geographical profit. Due to this amendment in IFRS 8, many of the 
users of financial reports are concerned about the usefulness of segment information if the 
company omit geographical profit. And yet it is generally accepted that geographical 
profits have greater information content than LOB profits. The allocation of common 
costs may reduce or eliminate the information content of segment profit data. It is less 
likely for costs to be common to different geographical segment, particularly when 
geographical segments are classified by origin.  
To evaluate the effect of segment profit on the informativeness of stock price, three 
proxies for segment profit are used in this study: 
(i) If both profits (LOB profit and GEO profit) are disclosed. 
(ii) If the profit of primary segment (IAS 14R) or operating segment (IFRS 8) is 
matching with consolidated profit. 
(iii) The deviation of profit margin of primary segment/operating segment from 
consolidated profit.  
The following hypotheses are investigated for these variables:  
H90: The association between share price and future earnings change is not associated 
with the disclosure of both profits 
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H91: The association between share price and future earnings change is associated with 
the disclosure of both profits. 
 
H100: The association between share price and future earnings change is not associated 
with the deviation in segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin. 
H101: The association between share price and future earnings change is associated with 
the deviation in segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin. 
 
H110: The association between share price and future earnings change is not associated 
with profit matching between segment notes and consolidated statements. 
H111: The association between share price and future earnings change is associated with 
the profit matching between segment notes and consolidated statements. 
 
(d) Measuring the variables 
Segment profit is captured by three different proxies. Two of these proxies are dummy 
variables and the third one is measured by the deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit. The detail of these proxies is presented below:  
(i) BOTHPROF: a dummy variable that indicates if both LOB profit and GEO profit 
are disclosed in segment notes. The variable takes the value of one if both profits 
are reported and zero otherwise.  
(ii) PROMTCH: a dummy variable that indicates if segment profit matches with 
consolidated profit in the financial statement. Due to the wide diversity in profit 
definitions (i.e. operating profit, profit before tax, profit before interest and tax, net 
profit, etc.) companies tend to report different profit definitions. However, for 
practical reason, this study does not attempt to distinguish between these profits 
definition. A company is given a value of one if the profit definition reported in 
segment notes matches with a profit definition in consolidated statements and a 
value of zero otherwise. 
(iii) MAMRG: This measure is calculated for primary segment (IAS 14R) or operating 
segment (IFRS 8). This variable indicates whether individual segments’ profit 
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margin reveals different information from consolidated profit. The rationality 
behind this variable is that if individual segments’ profit margin is similar to 
consolidated profit margin then segment profit has no added value to financial 
analysts. This variable is calculated as follows: 
(iv) MAMRG = ∑ |𝑆𝐺𝑀𝑗𝑖 −  𝐶𝑀𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1
/𝑁 (8.2) 
Where SGMji: profit margin of segment j for company i 
SGMi: 
𝑃𝑗𝑖
𝑆𝑗𝑖
; 
Where Pji: profit of segment j for company i 
       Sji: sales of segment j for company i 
      CMi: consolidated profit margin for company i 
CMi =
𝑃𝑖
𝑆𝑖
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8.2.3: Control Variables Affection Association between Stock Return and Earnings Change 
In order to evaluate the impact of the extent segmental profit disclosure in the stock 
price predictability of future change in earnings, Collins et al. (1994) suggest the need to 
control for three aspects which are expected to explain part of the association between current 
stock return and change in earnings. These three aspects are future Stock Return (Rt+1), Assets 
Growth (AG) and previous period Earnings to Price ratio (EPt-1).  
For each of these two controlling variables, evidences from previous literature are 
presented and based on these evidences the rationality for including them has been explained. 
In addition, their measurement specifications and expected correlation with stock return are 
clarified in this section. 
(1) Future Stock Return (Rt+1) 
a. Evidence 
Collins et al. (1994) argues that due to the error-in-variables problem with using 
realised earnings measures to explain the association between stock return and 
changes in earnings, it is necessary to include some variables which could reduce this 
problem. One of the partial solutions to this problem is to include future return in the 
regression model. The return at the current period is a function of expectation of future 
earnings and reflection of realised earnings. However, due to the lack of timeliness in 
earnings information majority of the realised earnings is reflected in future return. The 
increase in future return due to the reflection of realised earnings of current period will 
have a negative effect on the current return. In addition because investors have 
expectations about future earnings there is also unexpected portion of future earnings 
which is assumed to negatively correlate with the current return. However, this 
unexpected portion of future earnings is positively associated with future return. Due 
to the unavailability of unexpected portion of future earnings, future return will be 
included in the regression. In other word, the future stock return is not assumed to be 
directly related to current stock return but it is only a proxy for the unexpected portion 
of future earnings.  
Based on the findings of the abovementioned studies, it can be concluded that future 
stock returns (Rt+1) are expected to negatively correlate to the current period stock 
return. 
Gelb & Zarowin (2002) have applied Collins et al. (1994) model and document that 
future return is negatively correlated with current return. Similar findings have been 
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proved by Hussainey et al., 2003; Ettredge et al., 2005; Luo et al., 2006; Schleicher et 
al., 2007; Hussainey, 2009; and Hussainey & Walker, 2009.  
b. Variable measurement 
The measurement of future return (Rt+1) has been explained in the previous section 
(Section Two) of this chapter.  
 
(2) Earning to price (E/P) 
a. Evidence 
To control for previous earning-to-price ratio has been first introduced by Collins 
et al. (1994). They examine market predictability of future earnings and suggested to 
include earnings to price ratio of last period in order to control for their model 
measurement error (more details on Collins’s study have been provided in Chapter 5, 
section 5.3). According to this study, the rationale behind controlling for previous 
earnings-to-price is coming from twofold reasons. Firstly, it provides a proxy for 
market’s forecast of earnings growth. Because EPt-1 is calculated as earning for period 
t-1 over the price at beginning of period t, it represents market ability to anticipate 
earnings. It is argued that earnings comprise anticipated Et-2(Xt-1) portion which is 
reflected in the price of current period (Pt-1) and unanticipated (UXt-1) portion which 
will be realised in next period price (Pt). Therefore, they expected that anticipation of 
previous earnings to be positively associated with market ability to forecast future 
earnings. Secondly, they controlled for EPt-1 because it is proved that annual earnings 
have a serial negative correlation and it is expected that earning-to-price ratios to be 
mean reverting.  
Collins et al. (1994, p.298) note “A second reason EPt-1 will proxy for expected 
earnings growth is that there is some negative serial correlation in annual earnings 
(e.g. Ball & Watts, 1972). Easton & Harris (1991) suggest that, as a result, earnings to 
price ratios will be mean reverting (see Beaver & Morse, 1987 for evidence). Kendall 
& Zarowin (1990) and Lipe & Kormendi (1991) argue that higher-order negative 
serial correlation in annual earnings is also important”. 
Gelb & Zarowin (2002) have applied Collins et al. (1994) model and documented 
that controlling for EPt-1 has improved market anticipation of future earnings. Similar 
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findings have been proved by Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al. (2007); 
Hussainey, 2009; and Hussainey &Walker, 2009.  
Based on the findings of the abovementioned studies, it can be concluded that EPt-1 is 
expected to positively correlate to the current period stock return.  
b. Variable measurement 
The measurement of EPt-1 will be based on the same measure that has been 
implemented by previous studies. It is measured as last period earnings per share 
(EPSt-1) divided by the price at the beginning of current period. 
 
(3) Asset growth 
c. Evidence 
Firms with high assets growth implies that these firms are having and expecting 
future growth in operation. It is expected for such companies to increase their level of 
financial disclosure to convey the good news to the market. Gelb & Zarowin (2002) 
argue that companies with good performance tend to have higher disclosure compared 
to bad performance companies. Roychowdhury & Sletten (2012) provide empirical 
evidence on the superiority of companies with good news information in 
communicating this information to the market. They also suggest that due to 
managers’ preference to delay the disclosure of bad news until the time of actual 
earnings announcement, bad news companies exhibited strong shocks to the market 
and have higher return volatility. This finding indicates that the market could not 
anticipate future earnings accurately.  
Ellis et al. (2012) evaluate the association between firm’s good performance and 
increase in the level of disclosure. They find that good performing companies tend to 
send positive signals to the market through better disclosure practices. Similar findings 
have been reported by Francis et al. (2008) and Blanco et al. (2014).  
Additionally, many studies have documented a positive association between asset 
growth and market predictability of future earnings. Gelb & Zarowin (2002) examine 
the impact of voluntary disclosure on the informativeness of stock prices. In this 
study, they controlled for assets growth and find that asset growth positively 
associated with stock price informativeness. Schleicher et al. (2007) investigate the 
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relationship between level of corporate disclosure and share price anticipation of 
earnings. The results of their study show among other things that asset growth is 
positively and significantly correlated with share price informativeness. These 
findings have been also reported by Hussainey et al. (2003); Hussainey, 2009; and 
Hussainey & Walker, 2009.  
For the purpose of our study and based on the previous literature, it is expected that 
asset growth to be positively associated with the current return.  
 
d. Variable measurement  
The data for asset growth demoted as AG is obtained from database. Total asset 
figures have been obtained for current year (At) and last year (At-1). The calculation of 
this variable has been illustrated in the previous chapter (Chapter 7, section three) 
8.2.4: The Underlying Assumption of FERC Model. 
This section discusses the underlying assumption for the development of FERC model 
and the expected association between current return and future change in earnings. We follow 
Lundholm & Myers (2002) approach in developing the FERC model to reach to the version 
that is applicable to our analysis.  
The first step is to write the equation of both previous and current stock price as 
follows: 
𝑃0 = 𝐵𝑉0 + 𝐸0(𝑋1) + 𝐸0(𝑋2)    ……… (8.1) 
And  
 
𝑃1 = 𝐵𝑉1 + 𝐸1(𝑋2)  ……… (8.2) 
Assuming a clean surplus accounting system,  
Then  
𝐵𝑉1 = 𝐵𝑉0 + 𝑋1 − 𝐷1……… (8.3) 
By substituting (8.3) in (8.2), we have 
𝑃1 = 𝐵𝑉0 + 𝑋1 − 𝐷1 + 𝐸1(𝑋2)  ……… (8.4) 
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The subtracting (4) from (1), we get  
𝑃1 − 𝑃0 = 𝐵𝑉0 + 𝑋1 − 𝐷1 + 𝐸1(𝑋2) − 𝐵𝑉0 − 𝐸0(𝑋1) − 𝐸0(𝑋2)  ……… (8.5) 
Then,  
𝑃1 + 𝐷1 − 𝑃0 = 𝑋1 + 𝐸1(𝑋2) − 𝐸0(𝑋1) − 𝐸0(𝑋2)  ……… (8.6) 
∵ the unexpected portion of the earning at current period (UX1) is the difference between the 
actual earnings at current period (X1) and the expectation of current earnings at previous 
period (EX0),  
∴ we can re-write equation (8.6) as follows: 
 
𝑃1 + 𝐷1 − 𝑃0 = 𝑈𝑋1 + 𝐸1(𝑋2) − 𝐸0(𝑋2)  ……… (8.7) 
Therefore, if we scale the lift hand side of the equation by the price at the beginning of 
the period and the right hand side by the earnings at the beginning of the period we obtain the 
following model 
𝑅1 = 𝑈𝑋1 + ∆𝐸(𝑋2)  ……… (8.8) 
 
The model in equation (8.8) could be extended to include three years of future change in 
earnings. 
𝑅1 = 𝑈𝑋𝑡 + ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1) + ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+2) + ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+3)    ……… (8.9) 
Due to the unavailability of the unobservable earnings and change in earnings 
expectation, we replace them with the actual earnings number. The unobservable portion of 
current earnings is measured by earning in both current and last periods (Xt-1, and Xt); we can 
rewrite equation (8.9) to be as follows: 
𝑅1 = 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑡 + ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1) + ∆(𝑋𝑡+2) + ∆(𝑋𝑡+3)    ……… (8.10) 
Using equation (8.10) we can run a regression to find the FERC, which will be 
represented by the coefficient of ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1), ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+2), and ∆𝐸(𝑋𝑡+3).  
The regression model is  
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𝑅1 = 𝛽0∆(𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝛽1∆(𝑋𝑡) + 𝛽2∆(𝑋𝑡+1) + 𝛽3∆(𝑋𝑡+2) + 𝛽4∆(𝑋𝑡+3)    ……… (8.11) 
However, using the actual earnings in the model create what is known as error-in-
variables problem. More details on this problem and the suggested solutions have been given 
in Chapter 5. After the partial solution to the error-in-variables problem, the final model that 
is going to be used in our analysis is as follows: 
𝑅1 = 𝛽0∆(𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝛽1∆(𝑋𝑡) + 𝛽2∆(𝑋𝑡+1) + 𝛽3∆(𝑋𝑡+2) + 𝛽4∆(𝑋𝑡+3) + 𝛽5𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡+2 +
𝛽7𝑅𝑡+3 + 𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀    ……… (8.12) 
 
Part two of this chapter provided information related to the dataset used in our 
analysis, variables’ measurements and specifications, null and alternative hypothesis for each 
variable, and the underlying assumptions of the FERC model. The next stage is to use 
multivariate regression models to investigate the impact of segmental variables on analysts' 
forecast errors. The models also include non-segmental variables which previous empirical 
studies suggest may influence the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. All the variables to be used 
in the regression analyses have been explained in previous sections and in Chapter 5. The next 
chapter details the form of the regression models, i.e. the experimental design; and then 
presents the results. 
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8.3: Experimental Design and Results 
This part of the analysis chapter presents the experimental design and the results of the 
analysis of the impact of segmental profit disclosure on stock price predictability of future 
change in earnings. Part two of this chapter provides a description of the expected impact of 
three segment profit disclosure proxies: (1) disclosure of profit for both LOB and GEO 
segments; (2) the deviation of segment profit margins from consolidated statements profit 
margin; (3) whether the profit line item for the primary segment/operating segment reconcile 
with profit line items of the consolidated statements on the association between current stock 
return and future change in earnings.  The previous part of this chapter, also presents variables 
measurement and how these aspects are quantified. The remainder of this part will be divided 
as follows: 
8.3.1 Details the experimental design (i.e. the statistical models by which the impact of 
segmental profit disclosure on stock price informativeness will be examined). The analysis 
will be executed using multivariate regression models.  
8.3.2 Details the results of the linear additive regressions  
8.3.3 Details the results of multiplicative analysis  
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8.3.1:  Experimental Design 
Overview 
In part one of this chapter, three hypotheses relating to the association between 
segmental profit disclosure and stock price anticipation of future change in earnings have 
been developed. The segment variables that are going to be used in the regression models 
are: 
1- MAMRG, which measure the deviation in segments profit margin from consolidated 
profit margin; 
2- BOTHPROF, which proxy for the disclosure of both LOB segments profit and GEO 
segments profit (Both profits disclosed=1, Otherwise=0); 
3- PROMTCH, which proxy for profit match between segments profit line items and 
consolidated statements profits line items ( profits are matching=1, otherwise=0); 
The impact of each of these variables on the informativeness of stock price will be 
examined using multivariate regression models. The initial stock price model that is used in 
our analysis is based on equation (8.12): 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡+2 +
𝛽7𝑅𝑡+3 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    ……… (8.13) 
Where, Rt = stock return at period t; 
Rt+1 = stock return at period t+1; 
 Rt+2 = stock return at period t+2; 
 Rt+3 = stock return at period t+3; 
ERNt-1 = proportionate change in earnings at period t-1; 
ERNt = proportionate change in earnings at period t; 
ERNt+1 = proportionate change in earnings at period t+1; 
ERNt+2 = proportionate change in earnings at period t+2; 
ERNt+3 = proportionate change in earnings at period t+3; 
EPt-1= previous period earnings to price ratio; 
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AG= assets growth; 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = error term which has constant variance and mean of zero  
For equation (8.13) there are four regressions, each of these regression is with a 
different variable of segment profit disclosure proxy. The first regression evaluates the impact 
of the deviation of segment profit from consolidated profit (MAMRG) on the market ability to 
predict future change in earnings. The second regression evaluates the impact of disclosing 
profit line items for both LOB and GEO segments (BOTHPROF) on market ability to predict 
future change in earnings. The third regression evaluates the impact of reconciliation between 
segment profit and consolidated statements profit (PROFMTCH) on the informativesness of 
stock price. The fourth regression evaluates the aggregated effect of these three proxies on the 
relationship between return and future change in earnings.   
Equations (8.14) to (8.17) illustrate the relationship between current stock price and 
change in earnings in the existence of segmental profit variables. 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡+2 +
𝛽7𝑅𝑡+3 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽11(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) +
𝛽12(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽13(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽14(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) +
𝛽15(𝑅𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽16(𝑅𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽17(𝑅𝑡+3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    ……… (8.14) 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡+2 +
𝛽7𝑅𝑡+3 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽11(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) +
𝛽12(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽13(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽14(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 ∗
𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽16(𝑅𝑡+2 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽17(𝑅𝑡+3 ∗
𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    ……… (8.15) 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡+2 +
𝛽7𝑅𝑡+3 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽11(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) +
𝛽12(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽13(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽14(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 ∗
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽16(𝑅𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽17(𝑅𝑡+3 ∗
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    ……… (8.16) 
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𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡+2 +
𝛽7𝑅𝑡+3 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽11(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) +
𝛽12(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽13(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽14(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) +
𝛽15(𝑅𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽16(𝑅𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + 𝛽17(𝑅𝑡+3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐺) + +𝛽18(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 ∗
𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽19(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽20(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) +
𝛽21(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽22(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽23(𝑅𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) +
𝛽24(𝑅𝑡+2 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹) + 𝛽25(𝑅𝑡+3 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹)𝛽26(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) +
𝛽27(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽28(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽29(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) +
𝛽30(𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑡+3 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽31(𝑅𝑡+1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝛽32(𝑅𝑡+2 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) +
𝛽33(𝑅𝑡+3 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑀𝑇𝐶𝐻) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    ……… (8.17) 
The additional variables in this equation are: 
MAMRG = the deviation of individual segments profit margin from consolidated 
profit margin;  
BOTHPROF= if both LOB profit and GEO profit have been reported; 
PROFMTCH = whether segment’s profit line item reconcile with the consolidated 
profit. 
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8.3.2:  Basic Stock Price Informativeness Model 
1- Introduction 
This section presents and describes the results of the regressions for the basic stock price 
informativeness model as illustrated in equation (8.13). The results of this regression are 
contained in table (8.8). The regression contains the change of earnings for periods t-1, t, t+1, 
t+2, t+3, future stock return for three consecutive years (Rt+1, Rt+2, and Rt+3), last period 
earnings-to-price ratio, and assets growth for current period. A description of the results 
precedes the table.  
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2- Regression Results: Basic Stock Price Model 
The results of the linear regression contained in table (8.8), indicate that for all firm-years 
sample, the correlation between current returns and future return are negative and statistically 
significant except for Rt+3whichshows a positive association with current return but not 
significant. On the other hand, all future changes in earnings exhibit positive and statistically 
significant association with current return. Most of the FERC are statistically significant at 
less than 1% level.  
The regression coefficients for ERNt+1, ERNt+2, and ERNt+3 are 0.430, 0.229, and 0.122 
respectively. It can be noticed that the magnitude of the correlation between current return and 
future change in earning is decreasing as we move further away from the current period. This 
indicates that the market ability to predict future earnings is better for shorter time horizon, 
which coincides with our argument in the previous chapter when we explained the rational for 
having one year time horizon for analysts’ forecast.  Both of last year earning-to-price ratio 
and assets growth have shown significant association with current stock return. 
However, the sign of the assets growth is negative which might indicate that the 
companies which have experienced a growth in their total assets are more difficult to 
anticipate by the market. The negative association between current return and assets growth 
could be explained by companies’ tendency to conceal information from the market to avoid 
competition cost whenever they have a potential for future growth (see Emmanuel & Garrod, 
1987; Talha et al., 2006; and Dedman & Lennox, 2009). Dedman & Lennox (2009) show that 
companies labelled as having more current competitors, higher potential threat of new entry, 
and higher price elasticity to change in demand are more likely to conceal information about 
company’s earnings in public reports. 
The overall results of table (8.8) provide addition evidence to the existing literature about 
the stock price ability to predict future change in earnings. 
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Table 8.8: Basic Stock Price Informativeness Model 
Variables Coefficient Sig 
Intercept -0.119 0.006 
ERNt-1 0.096 0.1 
ERNt 0.262 0.000 
ERNt+1 0.430 0.000 
ERNt+2 0.229 0.000 
ERNt+3 0.112 0.060 
Rt+1 -0.277 0.000 
Rt+2 -0.142 0.077 
Rt+3 0.043 0.664 
AG -0.158 0.003 
EPt-1 1.611 0.000 
R2 0.228   
Adj R2 0.203 
 
Size 312   
Note: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is current stock return (Rt), Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 
are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods 
earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures 
deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a 
value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments and zero otherwise, PROFMTCH is 
dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 otherwise, 
P-values are based on the two-tailed tests.  
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8.3.3:  Multiplicative Analysis of Segment Variables’ Impact on Stock Price Predictability 
of Future Earnings 
1- Overview 
Multiplicative regression models are constructed by multiplying one explanatory variable 
in another variable. It is usually used when it is possible that those explanatory variables 
would have a combined effect on the dependent variable. The effect of multiplicative models 
could be illustrated by equation (7.11) of previous chapter. The explanation of how 
multiplicative model works in general has been provided in Chapter 7, section 7.3.3.   
The results of the basic stock price linear regression model reveal that current return is 
positively and significantly associated with future change in earnings. Although segmental 
profit disclosure is not expected to have direct impact on the movement of stock price, but it 
is assumed that higher quality of segmental information provide a better insights to the market 
about future cash flow and earnings. Therefore, this part tries to add the effect of segmental 
profit disclosure on the degree of association between stock return and future earnings change 
to the basic stock price model. In other words, the multiplicative models investigate whether 
the quality of segmental profit disclosure provide better insight to the market about future 
change in earnings and thus improve the degree of association between current return and 
future change in earnings. 
It is instinctively reasonable that segment information provides a better insight about 
future change in earnings and therefore the effect of segment disclosure on the stock price 
ability to predict future change in earnings will be more significant when earnings variability 
is large. The impact of the quality of segmental profit disclosure on informativeness of stock 
price is determined by the coefficient𝛽12, 𝛽13, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽14of model 8.14, 8.15, and 8.16. For 
model 8.17 the impact of the quality of segmental profit disclosure on informativeness of 
stock price is determined by coefficients (𝛽12, 𝛽13, 𝛽14, 𝛽20, 𝛽21, 𝛽22, 𝛽28, 𝛽29, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽30).  
Equations (8.14 to 8.17) above illustrate that the greater the absolute proportionate change 
in earnings (ERN) over the prediction period, the greater the impact of the segmental profit 
reporting variables (BOTHPROF, MAMRG, and PROFMTCH) on the stock price ability to 
reflect future change in earnings. 
 
The regression coefficient for the segmental multiplicative variables could be interpreted 
as showing their impact on the informativeness of stock price for a given proportionate 
change in earnings. Alternatively, it can be said that the regression coefficient shows the 
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impact of segmental variables on the ability of stock price to predict future change in 
earnings, once the proportionate future change in earnings (ERNt+1, ERNt+2, and ERNt+3) have 
been controlled. 
 
The results of these multiplicative regressions are reported in table (8.9) to table (8.12). 
The regressions in table (8.9), table (8.10), and table (8.11) contain the results of the impact of 
each of the profit disclosure proxies individually. The regression in table (8.12) presents the 
results of the combined effect of the three proxies in the association between stock return and 
future change in earnings.  
 
2- Individual Effect of Segmental Profit Disclosure  
This part discusses the effect of the quality of segmental profit disclosure by looking at 
the impact of each of the three measures separately.  It is argued that disaggregation of profit 
information according to companies’ different activities or geographical markets enable the 
market to assess the performance and associated risk of each of these segments in a better way 
rather than using the consolidated figures. This will improve market ability to predict future 
profitability of a company particularly where segments are very diverse.   
The first aspect of segmental profit disclosure quality that is going to be assessed in this 
part is related to the deviation of segmental profit from the consolidated profit. The study 
assumes that the higher the extent to which the individual segments’ profit deviate from the 
consolidated profit, the more insightful the segment information is to the market. The results 
of the impact of segmental profit deviation from consolidated profit (MAMRG) on market 
ability to predict future change in earnings are presented in table (8.9) below.  
The results show that the coefficient on ERNt is positive and significant at 5% level. In 
addition, the results provide evidence on the market is able to anticipate future change in 
earnings one year ahead. The coefficient on ERNt+1 is positive and statistically significant at 
less than 1% level. However, two years and three years future change in earnings did not 
show a significant association with current change in earnings.  
Both Assets growth and previous year earning to price ratio show a significant association 
with current change in earnings at less than 1% level. Assets growth again show a negative 
association with the current return, which could be again due to proprietary cost effect on 
companies disclosure of earnings information. 
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 On the other hand, earnings to price ratio show a positive and statistically significant 
association with stock return. The result matches with Collins et al. (1994) findings about the 
relationship between current stock return and last year earning to price ratio. 
The incremental predictive value of the deviation of segmental profit margin from the 
consolidated one on the informativeness of stock price is given by the coefficients on 
MAMRG*ERNt+1, MAMRG*ERNt+2, and MAMRG*ERNt+3. Although, table (8.9) shows 
that these coefficients are positive (0.584, 0.942, and 1.173) respectively, it can be noticed 
that only ERNt+3 show a statistically significant impact. It is also noticeable that, the 
magnitudes of these coefficients are increasing as the prediction period increases.  
These results indicate that the stock price ability to reflect future change in earnings is 
stronger for companies with higher profit margin difference and it is stronger for longer 
prediction’s time horizon. The results coincide with our assumption about the impact of 
segmental profit margin on informativenss of stock price and therefore, the null hypothesis 
(H50) can be rejected.    
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Table 8. 9: The Impact of MAMRG on Stock Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings 
Variables Coefficient Sig 
Intercept -0.096 0.04 
MAMRG -0.216 0.298 
Rt+1 -0.055 0.505 
Rt+2 -0.073 0.48 
Rt+3 -0.041 0.683 
ERNt-1 0.1 0.124 
ERNt 0.218 0.018 
ERNt+1 0.438 0.000 
ERNt+2 0.106 0.219 
ERNt+3 -0.051 0.524 
AG -0.196 0.000 
EPt-1 1.468 0.000 
MAMRG*Rt+1 -1.406 0.001 
MAMRG*Rt+2 -0.535 0.368 
MAMRG*Rt+3 0.518 0.383 
MAMRG*ERNt-1 0.375 0.177 
MAMRG*ERNt 0.549 0.215 
MAMRG*ERNt+1 0.584 0.189 
MAMRG*ERNt+2 0.942 0.114 
MAMRG*ERNt+3 1.173 0.017 
R 0.288 
 
Adj R2 0.241   
Size 307   
Note: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is current stock return (Rt), Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 
are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods 
earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures 
deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, the P-values are based on the two-tailed 
test. 
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The second aspect of segmental profit disclosure quality that is going to be assessed in 
this part is related to whether companies disclose profit line items for both LOB and GEO 
segments (Operating/primary and secondary). Many of the previous studies which have 
investigated the impacts of management approach on the extent of segmental information 
disclosure have documented a decline in the disclosure of geographical segments profit line 
items (Street et al., 2000; Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Paul and Largay, 2005; Crawford et 
al., 2012).  
The study assumes that the disclosure of profit for both LOB and GEO segments 
improves market predictability of future change in earnings. The results of the impact of the 
disclosure of both operating/primary segments and secondary segments (BOTHPROF) on 
market ability to predict future change in earnings are presented in table (8.10) below.  
Table (8.10) shows that the coefficient on ERNt is positive and significant at 1% level. 
In addition, the results provide evidence on the market ability to anticipate future change in 
earnings for year t+1 and t+2. The coefficient on ERNt+1 is 0.371 and it is statistically 
significant at less than 1% level. While the coefficient on ERNt+2 is 0.239 and it is also 
statistically significant at less than 1% level. Although, the change in earnings at year t+3 
show a positive association with current change in earnings (0.094) but it is not significantly 
different from zero.  
This finding supports our expectation regarding the ability of stock price to reflect 
future change in earnings. It is worth mentioning that FERC is higher for first year of 
prediction compared to second year which indicate that the refection of earning information in 
stock price is higher when prediction interval is short. Additionally the coefficients on both 
Rt+1 and Rt+2 exhibit a negative association with current return as expected, but only the return 
at period t+1 is statistically different from zero.  
Both Assets growth and previous year earning to price ratio show a significant 
association with current change in earnings. Assets growth show a negative association with 
the current return, which could be attributed again to proprietary cost effect on companies’ 
disclosure of earnings information. On the other hand, earnings to price ratio show a positive 
and statistically significant association at less than 1% level with stock return. The result 
matches with Collins et al. (1994) findings about the relationship between current stock return 
and last year earning to price ratio.  
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The incremental predictive value of reporting profit line items for both 
operating/primary and secondary segments on the informativeness of stock price is given by 
the coefficients on BOTHPROF*ERNt+1, BOTHPROF*ERNt+2, and BOTHPROF*ERNt+3. 
Table (8.10) shows that coefficient on the interaction between BOTHPROF and future change 
in earnings at period t+1 is positive as expected and statistically significant at less than 5% 
level. However, both BOTHPROF*ERNt+2, and BOTHPROF*ERNt+3 did not show any 
significant impact on stock price informativeness.  
These results indicate that the stock price of the companies that disclosed segmental 
profit for both operating/primary and secondary segments have significantly greater 
forecasting power of future change in earnings compared to those which disclosed segmental 
profit for operating/primary segments only. Moreover, although the interaction between 
BOTHPROF and future return at period t+1 and t+2 show a negative association but none of 
them is statistically different from zero. The results coincide with our assumption about the 
impact of reporting both profits on informativenss of stock price and therefore, the null 
hypothesis (H40) can be rejected.    
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Table 8.10: The Impact of BOTHPROF on Stock Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept -0.111 0.015 
BOTHPROF -0.022 0.78 
Rt+1 -0.216 0.004 
Rt+2 -0.123 0.155 
Rt+3 0.04 0.629 
ERNt-1 0.091 0.139 
ERNt 0.253 0.000 
ERNt+1 0.371 0.000 
ERNt+2 0.239 0.000 
ERNt+3 0.094 0.13 
AG -0.122 0.025 
EPt-1 1.46 0.000 
BOTHPROF*Rt+1 -0.073 0.679 
BOTHPROF*Rt+2 -0.075 0.766 
BOTHPROF*Rt+3 0.008 0.974 
BOTHPROF*ERNt-1 0.109 0.583 
BOTHPROF*ERNt -0.082 0.674 
BOTHPROF*ERNt+1 0.475 0.028 
BOTHPROF*ERNt+2 -0.245 0.296 
BOTHPROF*ERNt+3 -0.165 0.449 
R 0.267 
 
Adj R2 0.219   
Size 312   
Note: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is current stock return (Rt), Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 
are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods 
earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, BOTHPROF is a 
dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments and zero 
otherwise, P-values are based on the two-tailed tests. 
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The management approach in segmental reporting received a criticism regarding the 
disclosure of non-IFRS measure such that the reported earnings in segmental report does not 
reconcile with the earnings in consolidated financial statements (Crawford et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the last aspect of segmental profit disclosure quality which is going to be assessed 
in this part is related to whether reconciliation between segmental profit and profit reported in 
consolidated statements has any impact on stock price ability to predict future change in 
earnings.  
The study assumes that the disclosure of a segmental profit that matches with the 
consolidated profit in the income statement (PROFMTCH) improves market predictability of 
future change in earnings. The results in table (8.11) illustrate the impact of PROFMTCH on 
the association between current stock return and future change in earnings. 
The results show that the coefficient of current change in earnings is positive and 
statistically significant at less than 1% level. In regards to the future change in earnings, all 
three years future change in earnings demonstrate a positive association with the current 
return. However, only ERNt+1 and ERNt+2 exhibited significant association with stock price 
return. The results correspond to our expectation about market ability to anticipate future 
change in earnings.  
Additionally, future return at period t+1 and t+2 show a negative coefficient. 
However, only Rt+1 show statistically significant impact on current price change which 
indicates that the current return is negatively associated with the unobservable portion of 
future return at period t+1. The results also reveal that both assets growth (AG) and earnings 
to price ratio (EPt-1) show exactly similar association with current return to those in table (8.9) 
and (8.10).  
The most important finding of table (8.11) is related to the impact of reporting a 
segmental profit that matches with the consolidated statements. For companies which reported 
a matching segmental profit we find evidence of improvement in price anticipation power of 
change in earnings one year ahead. In particular, the regression coefficient on 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+1 is 0.488 and it is statistically significant at less than 1% level. Which 
indicate that the incremental effect of profit match on the stock price ability to reflect future 
earnings is significant for one year ahead earnings.  
On the other hand, although the parameter estimates on the interaction between 
PROFMTCH and change in earnings two and three years ahead (PROFMTCH*ERNt+2 and 
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PROFMTCH*ERNt+3) are positive (0.035 & 0.1) but they are statistically insignificant. Taken 
together, these three coefficients indicate that reporting a segmental profit that reconcile with 
consolidated statements provide a better insight to the market about future change in earnings 
particularly within 12 months prediction period. Moreover, the interaction of profit matching 
variable with future returns illustrates negative association with current return but only 
PROFMTCH*Rt+3 is statistically different from zero. 
In summary, the regression results in table (8.11) suggest that the disclosure of 
segmental profit that reconcile with profit reported in consolidated statements improve the 
ability of stock price to anticipate next period change in earnings. However, statistically the 
effect of profit matching is more important for predicting one year ahead earnings. Therefore, 
these results coincide with our assumption about the impact of profit matching on 
informativenss of stock price and therefore, the null hypothesis (H60) can be rejected.    
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Table 8. 11: The Impact of PROFMTCH on Stock Return Ability to Reflect Future Earnings 
Variables Coefficient Sig 
Intercept -0.101 0.032 
PROFMTCH -0.033 0.554 
Rt+1 -0.226 0.006 
Rt+2 -0.136 0.154 
Rt+3 0.143 0.123 
ERNt-1 0.113 0.96 
ERNt 0.25 0.001 
ERNt+1 0.34 0.000 
ERNt+2 0.245 0.000 
ERNt+3 0.103 0.157 
AG -0.15 0.004 
EPt-1 1.539 0.000 
PROFMTCH*Rt+1 -0.21 0.136 
PROFMTCH*Rt+2 -0.095 0.572 
PROFMTCH*Rt+3 -0.382 0.02 
PROFMTCH*ERNt-1 -0.123 0.361 
PROFMTCH*ERNt 0.066 0.66 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+1 0.488 0.001 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+2 0.035 0.82 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+3 0.1 0.935 
R 0.289 
 
Adj R2 0.243   
Size 312   
Note: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is current stock return (Rt), Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 
are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods 
earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, PROFMTCH is dummy 
which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 otherwise, P-values 
are based on the two-tailed tests. 
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3- Combined Effect of Segmental Profit Disclosure  
This part discusses the effect of the quality of segmental profit disclosure on stock 
informativeness by looking at the impact of the three proxies of segmental profit disclosure at 
the same time (i.e. in one regression). We would like to test whether the inclusion of all three 
measures in one regression will lead to reduction in the importance of one or all of these 
measures in explaining the association between stock return and future change in earnings.  
The results of this regression have been reported in table (8.12) below.  
Table (8.12) shows that the coefficient on ERNt is positive and significant at 5% level. In 
addition, the results provide evidence on the market ability to anticipate future change in 
earnings for one year ahead. The coefficient on ERNt+1 is 0.33 and it is statistically significant 
at less than 1% level. The p-value of ERNt+2 and ERNt+3 indicate that the market can no 
longer anticipate earnings change for more than 12 months period. The results also reveal that 
despite the negative association between current return and future returns but this association 
is not significantly different from zero. With the inclusion of all profit measures in one 
regression still assets growth and earnings-to-price ratio show similar results to individual 
regression discussed earlier.  
The most important part of this regression is related to the results of the combined effect 
of profit disclosure measure on stock price ability to reflect future change in earnings. 
Interestingly, the multiplicative variables show that the quality of segmental profit disclosure 
contributes positively to market predictability power of future earnings. The coefficients on 
MAINMRG*ERNt+1, MAINMRG*ERNt+2, and MAINMRG*ERNt+3 are 0.803, 1.02, and 
1.271 respectively and all statistically significant at 10% level. It could be interpreted that if 
segmental profit report additional information from consolidated statements as measured by 
the difference in profit margin, this will increase market stock informativeness. It could be 
noticed that explanation power of MAMRG two and three years ahead has improved when 
run with other profit proxies.   
On the other hand both the disclosure of profit for both segment definitions (LOB & 
GEO) and the disclosure of segmental profit that reconciles with consolidated statements have 
exhibited a positive impact on the market predictability of future change in earnings over 12 
months period. The parameter estimator on BOTHPROF*ERNt+1 is 0.388 and it is statistically 
significant. Thus, those companies which have reported profit information for both 
operating/primary and secondary segments experienced a higher ability to reflect future 
earnings in current stock prices. At the same time the market has viewed those companies 
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which have reported segmental profit in consistent with the consolidated financial statements 
as better disclosure companies and lead to better prediction of future change in earnings. The 
coefficient on PROFMTCH*ERNt+1 is 0.256 and it is statistically different from zero.  
However, two and three years ahead changes in earnings did not show any significant 
association with current return when interacted with either BOTHPROF or PROFMTCH. 
Which indicate that it more challenging for the market to anticipate earnings for a long time 
horizon. This finding coincides with our argument regarding the analysts’ forecast accuracy in 
previous chapter.  
Given all the above results it could be concluded that higher quality of segmental profit 
disclosure as measured by the above three proxies has improved market ability to predict 
future change in earnings particularly next year earnings.  
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Table 8. 12: Combined Impact of MAINMRG, BOTHPROF, and PROFMTCH on Stock Return 
Ability to Reflect Future Earnings 
Variables Coefficient Sig. 
Intercept -0.093 0.08 
MAINMRG -0.272 0.198 
BOTHPROF 0.013 0.867 
PROFMTCH 0.001 0.979 
Rt+1 -0.028 0.784 
Rt+2 -0.061 0.599 
Rt+3 0.066 0.581 
ERNt-1 0.123 0.112 
ERNt 0.226 0.028 
ERNt+1 0.33 0.000 
ERNt+2 0.114 0.208 
ERNt+3 -0.028 0.758 
AG -0.153 0.005 
EPt-1 1.434 0.000 
MAINMRG*Rt+1 -1.38 0.003 
MAINMRG*Rt+2 -0.329 0.586 
MAINMRG*Rt+3 0.315 0.604 
MAINMRG*ERNt-1 0.45 0.132 
MAINMRG*ERNt 0.584 0.204 
MAINMRG*ERNt+1 0.803 0.079 
MAMRG*ERNt+2 1.02 0.091 
MAINAMRG*ERNt+3 1.271 0.012 
BOTHPROF*Rt+1 -0.38 0.827 
BOTHPROF*Rt+2 -0.09 0.714 
BOTHPROF*Rt+3 0.013 0.956 
BOTHPROF*ERNt-1 0.058 0.786 
BOTHPROF*ERNt -0.143 0.473 
BOTHPROF*ERNt+1 0.388 0.075 
BOTHPROF*ERNt+2 -0.251 0.283 
BOTHPROF*ERNt+3 -0.086 0.677 
PROFMTCH*Rt+1 -0.115 0.428 
PROFMTCH*Rt+2 -0.091 0.601 
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PROFMTCH*Rt+3 -0.286 0.076 
PROFMTCH*ERNt-1 -0.18 0.192 
PROFMTCH*ERNt 0.001 0.996 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+1 0.256 0.089 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+2 0.156 0.313 
PROFMTCH*ERNt+3 -0.099 0.439 
R 0.360 
 
Adj R2  0.273   
Size  307   
Note: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is current stock return (Rt), Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3 
are future stock return, ERN is current period earnings change, ERNt+1, ERNt+2, ERNt+3 are future periods 
earnings change, AGt is total assets growth, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, MAMRG measures 
deviation of segment profit margin from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a 
value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and GEO segments and zero otherwise, PROFMTCH is 
dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement and 0 otherwise, 
P-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
 
8.3.4:  SUMMARY 
The conclusions of the multiplicative analysis, detailed in Part Three of this chapter, 
appear to be supported by the results of the individual and combined regression models. 
First of all, the results suggest that the stock price movement is to a great extent explained by 
Future Earnings Response Coefficients (FERC) which proxy for the degree by which stock 
price anticipates future change in earnings.  Secondly, for a given level of ERN, stock 
informativeness is positively related to firm size (EPt-1) and negatively related to asset growth 
(AGt).  Thirdly, the use of segmental information, in particular segmental profit, appears to 
have a significant positive impact on market ability to predict future change in earnings. 
When regressed individually, both PROFMATCH and BOTHPROF represent very important 
information to the market and improve market ability to foresee future earnings. MAINMRG 
also shows a positive impact on the association between stock return and future change in 
earning but it only shows a statistically significant impact with earning three years ahead.  
The results of the combined model reveal a significant impact of the three segmental profit 
disclosure proxies on stock price ability to reflect future earnings.   
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Chapter 9- Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
 
9.1: Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of this study and highlights a number of conclusions 
regarding the impact of IFRS 8 (management approach) on segmental reporting and whether 
the adoption of this approach provides a better insight into future earnings. The impact of 
IFRS 8 on earnings predictability has been examined from two perspectives. The first one is 
related to the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecast and the second is related to 
market ability to predict future changes in earnings. The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 9.2 provides an overview of the whole study. Section 9.3 points 
out the research objectives and research method. Section 9.4 presents the main findings and 
conclusions of the analysis of this study. Section 9.5 highlights some of the limitations of this 
study and proposes a number of aspects in which further analysis may be conduct for future 
research.  
 
9.2 Overview of the Study 
This thesis has been structured into 9 chapters. Chapter 1 lays the foundation of this 
research and provides a briefing about financial disclosure and the different areas in which 
financial disclosure have been studied in accounting and finance literature. The chapter also 
introduces the concept of segmental disclosure and its importance in the reporting 
environment, followed by the objective and the questions of this study. In order to help the 
reader to have a comprehensive understanding of this study background information about 
segmental reporting regulations has been discussed in Chapter 2. The background covers the 
development in segmental reporting under USA GAAP, international accounting standards, 
and UK reporting regulations. In addition, Chapter 2 compare segmental reporting 
requirements under the risk and reward approach and the management/internal reporting 
approach. Chapter 3 discusses the issue related to segment identification, which represent the 
definitions, headings, or categories in which segmental information should be reported. The 
chapter also provide more details about the importance of segmental information to the users 
of financial reports.  
Chapter 4 summarises the previous literature relevant to this study and highlight the 
main findings of these studies. The literature review chapter covers different themes on 
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overall financial disclosure, segmental disclosure, and application of future earnings response 
coefficient. In addition, it presents a separate section on the implication of the adoption of 
management approach. The literature review chapter is followed by the sample data and 
research methodology chapter. This chapter describes the data set, targeted market, and source 
of data. It also outlines the empirical models and the underlying theoretical assumptions of 
these models. It explains two type of analysis that will be carried out in analysis chapters. 
These three types of analysis apply different methods and different models. The first type is 
mainly descriptive statistical analysis. The second type is regression analysis which consists 
of two main models: 1) related to analysts’ forecast accuracy, and 2) related to market 
informativeness.  
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the empirical analysis and the results of the analysis. 
Chapter 7 compared the extent of segmental disclosure between risk and reward approach 
(IAS 14R) and management approach (IFRS 8). Few dimensions in segmental disclosure have 
been compared such as number of segments, number of line items, quality of geographical 
segment, segment profitability measure, etc. The analysis is purely descriptive with few 
statistical tests. Chapters6&7 evaluate the usefulness of segmental information to the users of 
the financial reports. In particular, Chapter 8 empirically examines the impact of segmental 
disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, while it also empirically examines the 
impact of segment profitability disclosure on capital market ability to anticipate future 
changes in earnings.    
 
9.3: Research Objectives and Research Methods 
 The objective of this study is to empirically investigate information value-added of 
segmental disclosure, in particular post the adoption of IFRS 8. It examines whether the 
adoption of the management approach provide financial analysts with a better insight about 
future changes in earnings. In addition this study examines the impact of segmental profit 
disclosure quality on market predictability of future changes in earnings. The study is based 
on UK FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies over a 4-year period.  
The analysis of this study focuses on whether the disaggregation of financial information 
of UK multi-segments companies is perceived by financial analysts and investors to have 
significantly positive association with earnings predictability. It also explores the impact of 
other possible factors that might have an influence on the association between earnings 
predictability and segmental information. The study seeks to provide some evidences on: 
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(a) the difference in segmental disclosure practices between IAS 14R and IFRS 8, 
(b) the relationship between segmental disclosure and financial analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy and in particular the impact of IFRS 8 adoption on this relationship,  
(c) the relationship between segmental profit disclosure and the degree at which future 
change in earnings is reflected in current change in stock price. 
 
Alongside the aforementioned outcomes, this study provides an insight about the quality of 
segmental disclosure in the UK market across different industries. 
 The methodology adopted in this study is based on a positivist epistemology, as it 
seeks to provide new knowledge through empirically falsifying existing hypotheses about the 
expected impact of segmental information on financial analysts and investors earnings 
predictability power. Two distinctive models have been used in this study to capture the 
association between segmental information and financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
in one hand and stock return ability to reflect future change in earning in the other hand.  
Financial analysts’ model has been utiliseutilised in many different contexts in 
previous accounting and finance studies (e.g. Emmanuel et al., 1992; Lang & Lundholm, 
1996; Hussain, 1997; Venkatachalam, 2001; Hann, 2003; Hope, 2003; and Ettredge et al., 
2005). This study utilised analysts’ earnings forecast rather than statistical earnings forecast 
due to the outstanding results of analysts’ forecast that have been documented by many 
studies (e.g. Brown & Rozeff, 1978; Collins & Hopwood, 1980; Fried & Givoly, 1982; 
Cooper & Taylor, 1983; Cooper, 1984; Bhaskar & Morris, 1984; O’ Brien, 1988; and Patz, 
1989). The model expresses analysts’ forecast error as a linear function of several segmental 
disclosure measures interacted with the earnings variability variable which is the main 
explanatory variable to earnings forecast error. The inclusion of several aspects of segmental 
disclosure allows for testing and identifying the most important aspect of segmental 
information specifically rather than having one simple measure. 
The stock return and future earnings model on the other hand, has been utilised in many 
previous studies to evaluate the impact of disclosure on market ability to reflect future 
earnings information (Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Hope et al., 2008; 
and Ettredge et al., 2005). Other studies have also applied this method, but for other purposes 
such assessing the effect of specific financial figures; for example, evaluating the impact of a 
particular type of expenses or dividends policy on market predictability power of earnings 
(Hanlon et al., 2007; Walker & Hussainey, 2008; and Hussainey, 2009). The model expresses 
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current stock return as a linear function of future change in earnings. For the purpose of this 
study, segmental profit variables have been added as a multiplicative factor of change in 
earnings.  
 
9.4: Main Findings and Conclusions 
This section documents the main findings of this study with an attempt to draw a 
number of conclusions based on these findings. The findings of this study can be divided into 
three main categories: (i) the implications of IFRS 8 adoption on companies’ segmental 
disclosure practices; (ii) the relationship between analysts’ forecast accuracy and segmental 
disclosure; and (iii) the relationship between the ability of stock returns to anticipate future 
changes in earnings and segmental disclosure.  
9.4.1: Implication of IFRS 8 
 The adoption of IFRS 8 has had a significant and noticeable impact of the disclosure 
of segmental information by UK listed companies. The descriptive analysis presented in 
Chapter 6 reveals that the implementation of IFRS 8 has resulted in more number of segments 
reported for both LOB and GEO segments. This finding is consistent with evidences of 
previous studies (Street at al., 2000; Herrmann & Thomas, 2000; Berger & Hann, 2003; Paul 
& Largay, 2005; Nichols et al., 2012; and Pisano & Landriani, 2012). Statistical tests show 
that the increase in the number of geographical segments is statistically significant. This 
finding refutes the claim that the management’s approach will result in fewer geographical 
segments/entity-wide disclosure.  
On the contrary, the number of line items disclosed has decreased for both LOB and 
GEO segments post the implementation of IFRS 8. The findings show that the decline in 
geographical segments’ line items is statistically different from zero which coincide with 
previous studies (i.e. Paul & Largay, 2005; Valenza & Heem, 2010; and Nichols et al., 2012). 
We found that the most significant line item that is no longer provided for geographical 
segment is related to earnings/profit information. Many previous studies have documented a 
similar finding (Herrm & Thomas, 2000; Berger & Hann, 2003; Hope et al., 2008).   
Additional analysis on the disclosure of segment profitability indicates that the 
adoption of IFRS 8 has inclined UK companies to aggregate profit information. Two proxies 
of the quality of segmental profit disclosure have been developed: (1) disclosure of both LOB 
and GEO profit line item; (2) reconciliation between segment profit and consolidated 
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statement. The two proxies indicate that the quality of segmental profit disclosure has 
decreased post IFRS 8 implementation. This finding support Berger and Hann’s (2003) 
concern about the lack of profit definition and the use of Non-GAAP measures in the new 
approach. The analysis shows that the majority of the sample companies are very conservative 
about the adoption of IFRS 8 and just a few companies have opted for early adoption of IFRS 
8. On the other hand, the majority of the companies identified the chief operating decision 
maker (CODM). 
Despite the increase in the number of geographical segments reported by UK 
companies post the adoption of IFRS 8, it is the quality of these segments that really matters 
(Hussain, 1997).  The analysis presented in Chapter 6 documents a statistically significant 
increase in the quality of geographical segments disclosed post IFRS 8. This finding suggests 
that company managers (CODM) rely on a finer identification of geographical location to 
assess the performance, risks, and opportunities of each segment.   
In terms of the impact of IFRS 8 adoption across different sectors, the findings 
indicate that there is a variation in the extent of segmental disclosure between these sectors. 
Most of the differences in the number of segments related to the Basic Material, Oil and Gas, 
and Technology sectors. On the other hand all sectors witnessed a decrease in the number of 
line item disclosed, with the highest drop in the mean difference of LOB line items is in the 
Basic Material sector, while the Telecommunication sector illustrated the highest drop in 
GEO line items. The analysis also shows that the most conservative sectors are Basic 
material, Health Care, and Utilities.  
It is found that very few companies in every sector reported both operating and entity-
wide profits. On the other hand, there are some variations between the different sectors in 
term of reporting a segment profit that matches with consolidated statements. It can be noticed 
that 75% of the Telecommunication sector companies reported a matching profit. Further, the 
segment profit of 4 companies out of 11 for each of basic material and consumer goods 
reconciles with consolidated profit. Moreover, the analysis indicates that post IFRS 8 around 
one-third of the companies reported a different segment profit from the consolidated 
statement compared to IAS 14R period.  
The difference in mean quality of geographical segments revealed that all sectors have 
experienced an increase in the mean difference post the adoption of IFRS 8. Only the Health 
care and Telecommunication sectors have reported lower mean difference after the 
implementation of the management approach. The reported improvement in the quality of 
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geographical segments could be attributed to the internal reporting requirement of these 
sectors. It is widely accepted that disaggregated sales information at country level provides 
company management with a better insight about country-specific economic characteristics. 
This type of information facilitates efficient resource allocation to companies.    
To sum up it could be argued that the adoption of IFRS 8 has encouraged UK 
companies to report better segmental information in most aspects (i.e. more LOB segments, 
more GEO segments, and better QGEO) with a pronounced difference across sectors. The 
only major concern regarding IFRS 8 is related to the drop in the disclosure of line items and 
in particular, segmental profit. The higher degree of compliance with the requirements of 
IFRS 8 which results in a higher degree of segmental disclosure could be attributed to low 
preparation cost. Since the information reported externally is in accordance with internal 
reports, companies find IFRS 8 more convenient compared to IAS 14R.     
9.4.2: Relationship between Analysts’ Forecast and Segment Information 
The correlation tables in Chapter 7 suggest that the behaviour of the dependent 
variable, Forecast Error, is distinctively influenced by earnings variability variable. Thus, our 
analysts’ forecast accuracy model utilises earnings variability as the main explanatory 
variable with which segmental variables will interact. Earnings variability represents the 
uncertainty about the earnings that analysts try to anticipate when making earnings prediction. 
Earnings variability is measured as the absolute proportionate change in earnings over the 
forecast period (12 months). The highly positive correlation between Analysts’ forecast error 
and absolute proportionate change in earnings indicates that the greater the change in 
earnings, the greater uncertainty about earnings prediction that analysts face. "Forecast errors 
consist, in part or entirely, of new information revealed over the forecast horizon, i.e. between 
forecast and realisation." (O'Brien, 1988, p.63). 
 
The main concern of this study is to examine whether segmental information provides 
a better insight for analysts about future changes in earnings. Emmanuel and Gray (1987) 
stated that most of the analysts interviewed refer to disaggregated information in segment 
notes to make 12-24 months future earnings forecast. Thus, the multiplicative models 
presented in Chapter 7 capture the influence of segmental information on analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. The analysis is divided into two main categories; a) the effect of IFRS 8 
and QGEO on forecast accuracy; and b) the effect of several aspects of segment information 
(STAND, QGEO, quality of segment profit information, and segment definitions) on forecast 
accuracy.  
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The influence of the quality or the fineness of geographical segments on analysts’ 
forecasts sound intuitively plausible. It is very unlikely that an analyst could make an accurate 
forecast to geographical segment which is broad such as ‘rest of the world’. In addition there 
is sound evidence on the impact of disaggregated geographical information to reduce 
systematic risk (Prodhan, 1986). The results in Chapter 7 show that both the adoption of IFRS 
8 and the quality of geographical segments are significantly and negatively related to forecast 
error. These results indicates that the adoption of management approach and reporting finer 
geographical segments provide financial analysts with a better insight about future changes in 
earnings. It could be argued that reporting geographical sales on a country level and reporting 
segmental information in the same way it is reported internally reduce the uncertainty about 
future earnings faced by analysts. Finer geographical segments also enable analysts to 
estimate geographical market risk to each of these segments (Kinney, 1972). 
The analysis was conducted over a two-year and four-year period, and both analyses 
revealed the same results. In addition, a further analysis was carried out by excluding single 
geographical segment companies from the sample to see whether these companies had any 
effect on the negative association between forecast error and quality of geographical 
segments. The results show no change either in the significance of QGEO, or in its negative 
impact on forecast error.  However, the magnitude of the effect of QGEO on forecast error 
increased after removing single segment companies. The regression coefficient on QGEO has 
increased from -0.225 to -0.44 and statistically significant at less than 1% level. In addition, 
the analysis shows that firm size, the formation of board of directors, and earning to price 
ration all have negative impact on FE when interacted with change in earnings. However, 
board size, decline in future earnings, and industry show a positive effect on FE.  
  The impact of segmental disclosure is not necessarily limited to the quality of 
geographical segments. One of the major concerns about the management approach is that it 
gives companies more room to leeway and report aggregated information particularly 
earnings figures. Despite the empirical evidence presented above about the usefulness of IFRS 
8 for financial analysts’ forecast, the descriptive analysis conducted in Chapter 6 provides 
evidence about the decline in the segment earnings disclosure. It shows that UK companies 
exploited the flexibility in this standard to aggregate and conceal segments’ earnings 
information. Thus, the second part of Chapter 7 evaluated the impact of segment profit 
disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. The extent of segmental profit disclosure 
has been measured using three proxies. These proxies are Profit Match (PROFMTCH), Both 
Profits (BOTHPROF), and Main Profit Margin (MAMRG). Another variable that has been 
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included in the analysis is MASEG, which is a proxy for the type of definition used to report 
main operating segments.  
The regressions in this section have also been divided into two categories: one with 
single geographical segment companies and the other without these companies. The results of 
the regressions with single geographical segment companies show that despite the addition of 
other segmental variables, both STAND and QGEO show negative and significant association 
with forecast error. This implies that the adoption of management approach and reporting 
better quality geographical segments reduced the negative impact of earnings variability on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. The most interesting finding of this part of the analysis is related 
to the importance of segment earnings disclosure. The results prove that the quality of 
segmental earnings disclosure provides financial analysts with a better insight into future 
changes in earnings. The three profit measures show a negative association with forecast error 
and two of them show statistically significant results. The disclosure of both LOB and GEO 
profits (BOTHPROF) did not show a significant association with the Forecast error. These 
findings suggest that disclosure of segment profit margin that is different from consolidated 
profit margin and reporting a segment profit that reconcile with consolidated statements are 
useful to analysts to predict earnings 12 months ahead. They also support our argument about 
the importance of earnings disaggregated information to financial analysts and that greater 
emphasis should be given to this issue by standards setters. In addition, the analysis show that 
companies which defined their main operating segment based on line business characteristics 
have been perceived as more informative about future earnings. The association between 
MASEG and forecast error is negative and highly significant. The other controlling variables 
show almost similar results to STAND and QGEO models. These results are robust over two-
year and four-year periods.   
When excluding single segment companies from the analysis, the results support the 
previous finding about the importance of IFRS8 in general to financial analysts’ earnings 
prediction. The same conclusion is reached regarding the effect of QGES, MASEG, and 
segment profits. In addition, as expected, removing single segment companies from the 
sample has improved the magnitude of the effect of QGEO from -0.175 to -0.388. The only 
difference between the results of the regression results of the model without single segment 
companies and the results of the full sample companies is in terms of the significance of 
BOTHPROF. After the exclusion of single segment companies, BOTHPROF shows 
statistically significance and negative associations with forecast error.  
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To conclude, the analysis and results presented in Chapter 7 of this study show that the 
adoption of IFRS 8 (management approach) has reduced the uncertainty faced by analysts 
about future earnings prediction. The study also documents that reporting geographical sales 
information in more disaggregated manner ( more country-wise segments) has appositive 
impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy over 12 month period. In addition, defining the main 
operating segments on the basis of business activities or line of business seems to be more 
useful to analysts compared to other types of definitions such as GEO or mixed. The most 
interesting finding of this study is in relation to the impact of quality of segment profit 
disclosure on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings prediction. The study provides strong 
empirical evidence that disaggregated earnings figures improve the accuracy of earnings 
prediction for every level change in earnings. The empirical evidences of this study about the 
positive impact of segmental information on analysts’ earnings prediction are consistent with 
the finding of previous studies (Rappaport & Lerner, 1969; Kinney, 1971; Emmanuel & 
Garrod, 1987; Emmanuel et al., 1992; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Hussain, 1997; and Hope, 
2003)   However, since IFRS 8 does not have a clear guidelines about segment’s profit 
disclosure nor about entity wide disclosure many companies tend to aggregated or sometime 
conceal this information from the public. Therefore, more guidelines should be added to the 
standard in this regard.   
 
9.4.3: Segment Information and Stock Return Anticipation of Future Earnings 
According to the findings of chapter 7 about the significant effect of disaggregated 
profit information on analysts’ forecast accuracy, Chapter 8 focuses solely on the impact of 
the quality segmental profit disclosure on market ability to reflect future earnings in current 
stock return. For the purpose of the analysis of this chapter, CKSS, 1994 model has been 
utilised to evaluate whether segmental profit figure provide a better insight to the market 
about future changes in earnings. Gelb & Zarowin (2002; p34) suggest that the use of this 
approach “can be applied in other cases of interest to both academics and policy makers, such 
as assessing the benefits of additional required disclosure (e.g. for segments)”.  
The main explanatory variable in this model is future changes in earnings. Due to 
model specification, three years of future changes in earnings will be included. Collins et al. 
(1994) argue that it is necessary to add three years of future change in earnings in order to 
capture the idea of market anticipation power. Thus, the effect of segmental profit disclosure 
will be based on the interactions with these future changes in earnings. If segmental 
230 
 
information is perceived to have a positive impact on market ability to anticipate future 
earnings, the magnitude of the correlation between current return and future earnings is 
expected to increase. The analysis in this chapter has been divided into two parts. The first 
part is the individual effect of segmental profit disclosure, where each of the segmental profit 
proxies is regressed separately with current return and future change in earnings. The second 
part is the combined effect of segmental profit disclosure, where all three profit measures are 
regressed with current stock return and future change in earnings in the same model. 
 The results of MAMRG regression indicate that the first two years of future changes 
in earnings are positively correlated with current stock return and that only one year ahead 
changes in earnings are statistically different from zero. The results also show that MAMAEG 
improved the magnitude of the correlations between current return and future changes in 
earnings over the three years period. However, the impact of MAMRG on market anticipation 
power of future earnings is only statistically significant at t+3. These results indicate that the 
stock price ability to reflect future change in earnings is stronger for companies with higher 
profit margin difference and it is stronger for a longer prediction time horizon. 
On the other hand, BOTHPROF regression show that although all three future changes 
in earnings have positive correlation with current return, only one year and two year ahead are 
statistically significant. Unlike MAMRG, BOTHPROF show a positive impact on market 
ability to predict earnings over a short period of time only. The interaction between 
BOTHPROF and future change in earnings at period t+1 is positive as expected and 
statistically significant at less than 5% level. Therefore, stock price of the companies which 
report profit definition under both operating and entity-wide segments have better ability to 
reflect next year earnings.  
One of the fundamental criticisms of IFRS 8 concerns the disclosure of non-IFRS 
measures such as that the reported earnings in segmental report do not reconcile with the 
earnings in consolidated financial statements (Crawford et al., 2012).  PROFMTCH measures 
whether the reported profit definitions in segment notes reconcile with any figure in the 
consolidated income statement. In regards to the future change in earnings, the results show 
that all three years future changes in earnings demonstrate a positive association with the 
current return. Both next year and two years ahead changes in earnings exhibited a 
statistically significant correlation with current stock return. Most importantly, the results 
provide evidences of improvement in price anticipation power of change in earnings one year 
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ahead.  These results suggest that the stock market has a better ability to reflect next year 
earnings for those companies whom segmental profit reconciles with consolidated profit.  
Although all three profit disclosure proxies have significant explanatory power, by 
comparing the value of R-square of the three individual regressions, it can be noticed that the 
explanatory power of the PROFMTCH is greater than that attributed to each of MAMRG and 
BOTHPROF. This could be attributed to the importance of matching segment profits with 
consolidated statements, which helps investors to evaluate segments performance accurately. 
It may also be due to the allocation of common/overhead costs among the segments instead of 
having one lump sum figure which makes profit data more reliable for making investment 
decisions.     
While it is clear that each of profit measures show a significant impact on market 
anticipation power of future changes in earnings, the second part of Chapter 8 seeks to 
examine the collaborative effect of the three segmental profit measures on the association 
between current stock return and future changes in earnings at the same time. This part finds 
strong evidence for the impact of quality of segmental profit disclosure on the market ability 
to anticipate future changes in earnings. The regression results reveal that when segmental 
profit margin is different from consolidated margin, the market has better ability to foresee 
future change in earnings over short and long term periods. While, reporting earnings figure 
for both main operating segments and entity-wide segments (mostly geographical) improves 
stock price reflection of future earnings for short term period (i.e. next year earnings). The 
combined regression also shows that when segment profit matches consolidated income 
statement; the market anticipation power of the next year’s earnings is higher. This implies 
that the market views those companies which have reported segmental profit consistent with 
the consolidated financial statements as having better disclosure than those with mismatching 
profit.  
Given all the above results it could be concluded that higher quality of segmental 
profit disclosure as measured by the above three proxies has improved market ability to 
predict future change in earnings particularly next year earnings. Our findings are supporting 
the previous evidence about the usefulness of segment information to capital market 
(Kochanek, 1974; Prodhan, 1986; Choi & Levich; 1991; Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Bens & 
Monahan, 2004; Ettredge et al., 2005; Hope et al., 2008; and Wan et al., 2011).  
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The table below summarizes the objectives and main findings of this study and link 
them with the literature evidence.   
Table 9. 1: Summary the Study Objectives and Main Findings 
Research Objectives Main Findings Literature Evidence 
To evaluate and compare the 
disclosure of segment information 
pre and post the implementation of 
IFRS 8 of UK listed companies. 
The adoption of IFRS 8 has 
encouraged UK companies to 
report better segmental 
information in most aspects (i.e. 
more LOB segments, more GEO 
segments, and better QGEO) with 
a pronounced difference across 
sectors. The only major concern 
regarding IFRS 8 is related to the 
drop in the disclosure of line items 
and in particular, segmental profit. 
This finding is consistent with 
evidences of previous studies 
(Street at al., 2000; Herrmann & 
Thomas, 2000; Berger & Hann, 
2003; Paul & Largay, 2005; ; 
Valenza & Heem, 2010; Nichols et 
al., 2012; and Pisano & Landriani, 
2012) 
To investigate the impact of the 
management approach on analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy. 
The adoption of IFRS 8 has 
reduced the uncertainty faced by 
analysts about future earnings 
prediction. Also, reporting finer 
geographical sales information has 
appositive impact on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy over 12 month 
period. In addition, defining the 
main operating segments on the 
basis of business activities or line 
of business seems to be more 
useful to analysts compared to 
other types of definitions such as 
GEO or mixed. The most 
interesting finding of this study is 
in relation to the positive 
association between analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy and quality of 
segment profit disclosure. 
The findings are consistent with 
the finding of previous studies 
(Rappaport & Lerner, 1969; 
Kinney, 1971; Emmanuel & 
Garrod, 1987; Emmanuel et al., 
1992; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; 
Hussain, 1997; and Hope, 2003) 
To investigate the impact of the 
quality of segments’ profit 
information on stock market 
ability to anticipate future changes 
in earnings 
The results indicate that the stock 
price ability to reflect future 
change in earnings is stronger for 
companies with higher profit 
margin difference and it is stronger 
for a longer prediction time 
horizon. Also, stock price of the 
companies which report profit 
definition under both operating 
and entity-wide segments have 
better ability to reflect next year 
earnings. In addition the findings 
suggest that the stock market has a 
better ability to reflect next year 
earnings for those companies 
whom segmental profit reconciles 
with consolidated profit. 
 
 
The findings are consistent with 
the finding of previous studies 
(Kochanek, 1974; Prodhan, 1986; 
Choi & Levich; 1991; Lundholm 
& Myers, 2002; Bens & Monahan, 
2004; Ettredge et al., 2005; Hope 
et al., 2008; and Wan et al., 2011) 
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9.5: Limitations, Further Research, and Policy Implications 
 9.5.1: The Form of Analysis 
 This study seeks to examine the predictive ability of financial analysts in relation to 
the extent of segmental disclosure via empirical analysis. The implemented approaches in the 
analysis chapters are not free of empirical problems. As such, the findings of this study may 
be different if another methodology had been adopted, or different dataset used.  
Although the analysis of this thesis was based on a quantitative approach, there are 
several alternative approaches that can be utilised to investigate the usefulness of segmental 
information in the prediction of future earnings.  
One alternative approach is to use interviews or questionnaires, as Crawford et al. 
(2012) did. Another approach is to use the experimental method in which analysts are 
provided with two sets of information, one based on consolidated information and the other 
based on segmental information. This approach has been utilised by Emmanuel et al., (1999).  
However, these studies may be limited due to the lack of any real incentives to be accurate. 
Some studies investigated predictive gain to segmental information through model based 
approach. The main criticism about these types of study centres on the forecast models 
developed by researchers. Due to the fact that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than 
model-based forecasts, it would not be appropriate to use the results of model-based forecast 
to proxy for analysts’ forecast.   
Therefore, based on the above, it could be argued that none of the previously 
mentioned approaches is free of problems. However, these different approaches should be 
considered as complementing each other rather than competing with each other. Also, 
expanding the time line of the study to cover 5 to 10 years is worth exploring.  
9.5.2: The Choice of Earnings Forecast 
The information regarding analysts’ earnings forecast was obtained from Bloomberg 
analysts’ consensus earnings prediction. Although there are alternative sources of analysts’ 
earnings forecast, the data from Bloomberg is the only available source due to the access 
constraints. It is important to note that this study does not control for the possible differences 
between brokerage firms, no those between individual analysts within these firms.  
Although the main objective of this study is to assess the association between segment 
disclosure and forecast of future earnings, there are many other aspects that need to be 
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examined such as the association between segment information and company valuation, 
competition cost, or prediction of firm risk.  
9.5.3: Measurement Error 
There is likely to be some degree of measurement error in some of the variables of this 
study. First of all, the measurement of the fineness of geographical segments (QGEO) is 
subject to subjective judgments about the score given to the geographical locations. Secondly, 
the measurement of additional information is obtained from the deviation between segment 
profit margin and consolidated profit margin (MAMRG). Thirdly, there is inevitably a degree 
of personal judgment about the reconciliation of segment profit definition with consolidated 
statement. However, it is highly likely that these measurement errors would have been 
encountered in any other study that seeks to evaluate the impact of segmental disclosure on 
earnings’ predictive ability empirically.  
The second problem relates to the use of proportionate segment sales as the weighting 
variable used in calculating QGEO.  It is possible that inter-segment sales may have 
materially affected segment sales data.  However, this problem is difficult to address and 
evidence from Mautz (1968, p.38) indicates that for most companies, inter-segment sales do 
not represent a significant proportion of total sales. 
 
9.5.4: Source of Segment Information and Segments Definitions 
It is worth mentioning that the study is limited to the use of segment notes of the 
annual report as the only source for segmental information. Since the study aims to explore 
the impact of IFRS 8 adoption on the disclosure of segmental information in audited annual 
reports, the study does not take into account any segmental information reported outside 
segment notes such as director reports, our companies’ websites, and etc. This is one area in 
which future research could explore. 
In addition, the study did not take into account other forms of defining or categorising 
segments such as matrix or mixed segmentation. Basically, all segment information used in 
this study is based on either LOB or GEO segmentation. There is relatively small number of 
companies in the sample which used either mixed or matrix approach. These companies have 
been categorised as either LOB or GEO based on the narrative discussions in the segment 
notes. It is possible that these various ways of defining segments would impact the predictive 
power of segmental information.   
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9.5.6: Segments’ Line Items 
This study evaluated the impact of segment profit disclosure on analysts and market 
ability to foresee future change in earnings. The motivation for this analysis is based on the 
descriptive findings, which indicate that the new approach resulted in the reduction in the 
disclosure of profit line items particularly to geographical segments.  However, it is also 
found that the disclosure of other line items such as capital expenditure, liabilities and assets 
has dropped too. Future research could investigate the impact of this drop in the disclosure of 
segments’ line items on other profit on earnings prediction.    
9.5.7: Large Forecast Error 
Most previous studies of analysts' forecasts involve comparing forecast accuracy 
between two samples; pre-SEC LOB requirements versus post-SEC LOB requirements 
(Baldwin, 1984), or analysts' forecast versus models' forecasts (Basi, Carey and Twark, 1976).  
Such studies may be affected by a few large values for forecast errors.  However, this present 
study does not compare forecast accuracy between two different samples of forecasts, but 
instead seeks to explain variation in analysts' forecast errors.  If the aim of a study is to 
explain variation in forecast accuracy, a wide variation in forecast errors is not only 
acceptable, it is desirable. 
If elimination of large forecast errors reduces coefficients insignificantly, this would 
not necessarily invalidate the findings of this research.  It may be that small differences in 
segment definition results in very little variation in forecast accuracy.  It is only when 
differences in segment definition are great that large variations in forecast accuracy arise.  
Thus, by limiting the size of forecast errors it would be more difficult to detect the impact of 
segmental disclosure on forecast accuracy.   
9.5.8: Summary 
In general, this thesis has a number of limitations which have been recognised and 
acknowledged during the course of this research. Given these limitations, however, it is 
believed that the findings of this study are valid and make a significant contribution to the 
existing accounting and finance literature. To the researcher’s knowledge, it is the first study 
to have examined empirically the impact of segmental disclosure on the ability of analysts and 
stock prices to predict future change in earnings; specifically, the evaluation of the association 
between segmental profit disclosure and analysts’ forecast accuracy and stock price ability to 
reflect future change in earnings. The study also provides significant evidence for the 
important role of the fineness of geographical segments to reduce financial analysts’ forecast 
error. Therefore, the current thesis has contributed to the understanding of the usefulness of 
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segmental information post the adoption of IFRS 8. Moreover, this study provides insights to 
the IASB and other regulatory bodies about the possible enhancements to IFRS 8, particularly 
in areas related to profit disclosure and disclosure of other line items. Further research can be 
carried out based on the results presented o this study and cover some of the aspects that could 
not be covered in this study.   
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Glossary of Terms 
 
10-K FORM Provides a comprehensive overview of the 
company's business and financial condition and 
includes audited financial statements. 
 
AIMR 
 
Association for Investment Management and 
Research. 
 
ANALYSTS FORECAST 
 
Analysts’ expectations of a company growth and 
profitability based on financial models that estimate 
future earnings. 
 
ASX 
 
Australian Stock Exchange. 
 
BIG BATH 
 
Management strategy to manipulate a company 
financial performance to make bad results look even 
worse to make future results better.  
 
CAC 40 
 
Represent large firms on French Stock Market. 
 
CEO 
 
Chief Executive Officer. 
 
CFO 
 
Chief Financial Officer. 
 
CODM 
 
Chief Operating Decision Maker. 
 
 
COMPANIES ACT 1985 
 
Set of rules and regulations in the UK that enable 
companies to be formed by registration, and set out 
the responsibilities of companies, their directors and 
secretaries. 
 
EBIT 
 
Earnings Before Interest and Tax. 
 
EBITDA 
 
Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization.  
 
ERC 
 
Earnings Response Coefficient. 
 
FASB 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
 
FERC 
 
Future Earnings Response Coefficient. 
 
FINAICIAL DISCLOSURE 
 
The publication and dissemination of all relevant 
information about a business entity that may 
influence an investment decision.  
 
FTSE 100 
 
An index composed of the 100 largest companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
FTSE 250 
 
An index composed of the 101st to the 350th largest 
companies listed on London Stock Exchange.  
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GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  
 
GEO 
 
A Company Geographical Segmentation.  
 
GNP 
 
Gross National Product.  
 
IAS 14R 
 
International Accounting Standard No. 14 Revised 
about the disclosure of Segment Reporting.  
 
IASB 
 
International Accounting Standards Board.  
 
IASC 
 
International Accounting Standards Committee. 
 
IFRS 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards. 
 
IFRS 8 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards No. 8 
about the disclosure of Operating Segments.  
 
LOB 
 
A Company Line of Business Segmentation.  
 
ROA 
 
Return on Assets. 
 
ROE 
 
Return on Equity. 
 
SEC 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 
SEGMENT REPORTING  
 
Breaking down the financials information of a 
business enterprise into individual divisions or 
segments. 
 
SFAS 131 
 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
131; Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise 
and Related Information. 
 
SFAS 14 
 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
14; Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business 
Enterprise. 
 
SIC CODE 
 
The Standard Industrial Classification; a system for 
classifying industries by a four-digit code.  
 
SSAP 25 
 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 25 
about disclosure of segment information in the UK.  
 
WAC 
 
Weighted Average Correlation.  
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Appendix 
Appendix (1):  
(a) Kinney’s (1971) models 
Consolidated Model using GNP 
𝐸𝑡 = (1 + ∆𝐺𝑁𝑃) ∗ 𝐸𝑡−1 
Earnings Trend Model using Consolidated Earnings 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑖−2, 𝐸𝑡−3, … . 𝐸𝑡−𝑛) 
The Segment Revenue Model 
𝐸𝑡 = [∑(1 + ∆𝑠𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑠𝑡−1𝑗] ∗
𝐸
𝑆
 
 
The Segment Sale Model 
𝐸𝑡 = [∑(1 + ∆𝑠𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑠𝑡−1𝑗] ∗
𝑒𝑗
𝑠𝑗
 
Where: 
Et: is the consolidated earnings in time t 
St: is the consolidated sale in time t 
E: is the average consolidated earnings 
S: is the average consolidated sale 
ej: is the average segmental earnings of segment j 
∆stj: is the percentage change in segment sale of segment j in time t 
sj: is the average segmental sale of segment j 
 
(b) Collins’s (1976) models: 
Linear Market Model 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑋𝑚𝑡 
The Strict Martingale Model 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 
The Sub-martingale Model 
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𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +
1
𝑁
∑(𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗−1) 
The Mean Reversion Model with No Drift 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗 
The Moving Average Model of a Pure Mean Reverting Process 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 −
1
𝑁
∑(𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗−1) 
 
(c) Emmanuel and Pick’s (1980) models 
National Institute Economic Review growth forecast in industrial output applied to last year’s 
segment sales. 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = (1 + ∆𝐼𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗 
National Institute Economic Review growth forecast in industrial output and the consumer 
price index applied to last year’s segment sales. 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = (1 + ∆𝐼𝑡𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐶𝑃𝐼) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗 
Forecast derived from the Business Monitor historic sales applied to last year’s segment sales. 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = [1 +
𝑆𝑡−1𝑗 − 𝑆𝑡−2𝑗
𝑆𝑡−2𝑗
] ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗 
The previous year’s consolidated profit margin applied to the estimated segment sales. 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = [∑(1 + 𝐼𝑆𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗] ∗
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
 
The previous year’s consolidated profit margins adjusted for a trend applied to the segment 
sales. 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = [∑(1 + 𝐼𝑆𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗] ∗
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
−
𝐸𝑖𝑡−2
𝑆𝑖𝑡−2
𝐸𝑖𝑡−2
𝑆𝑖𝑡−2
 
The previous year’s segment profit margins applied to the estimated segment sales. 
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𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = [∑(1 + 𝐼𝑆𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗] ∗
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
 
The previous year’s segment profit margins adjusted for a trend applied to the estimated 
segment sales. 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = [∑(1 + 𝐼𝑆𝑡𝑗) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑗] ∗
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
−
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−2
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡−2
𝑒𝑖𝑡−2
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡−2
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Appendix (2): Hussain and Skerratt (1992) Theoretical Model 
𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where: 
𝑃𝑡 : is consolidated profit at time t 
𝑃𝑖𝑡: is profit of segment i at time t  
If segment profit is decomposed to the three components then we have;  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
Where: 
ait :is level of activity of segment i at time t 
Iit:is industry profit index at time t 
dit: is the deviation of segment i profit at time t from industry index profit at time t 
Then,  
𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The same logic could be applied to next period profit;  
𝑃𝑡+1 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
And  
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 ∗ (1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡+1) 
 
They assumed that ait+1 and dit+1 follow a random walk with random error, and that analysts 
have no insight about either the future change in segment activities or future change in 
segment profit deviation from industry profit index. 
 Then; 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1 
And; 
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𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡+1 
However, they assumed that due to analysts’ industry expertise, they are able to anticipate the 
future change in industry profit.  
 
So;  
𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑖) + 𝛼𝑖𝑡+1 
Where; 
gi: is percentage change in industry profit index,  
𝛼𝑖𝑡+1 is a random error term with mean zero 
 
Also by assuming all the three error terms are uncorrelated and given all above assumption, 
the expectation of next period profit can be written as follows 
 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡+1) = 𝐸(𝑎𝑖𝑡+1 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 ∗ (1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡+1)) 
 
And  
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡+1) = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑖) ∗ (1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
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Appendix (3): List of Sample Companies 
Company Name Sector Name 
Sector 
Number Listing Early Adopter 
AEGIS PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 NO 
AGGREKO PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
AMEC PLC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 NO 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
ANTOFAGASTA PLC Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
ARM HOLDING PLC Technology 8 FTSE 100 YES 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH 
FOODS PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 NO 
ASTRAZENECA PLC Health Care 5 FTSE 100 NO 
BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
BAE SYSTEMS PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 YES 
BALFOUR BEATTY PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
BG GROUP PLC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 YES 
BHP BILLITON PLC Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
BODYCOTE PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
BP PLC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 NO 
BRITISH AIRWAYS Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
BRITISH AMERICAN 
TOBACCO PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 NO 
BT GROUP PLC Telecommunication 9 FTSE 100 NO 
BUNZL PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
BURBERRY GROUP PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 NO 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 YES 
CAPITA PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
CARILLION PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
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Appendix (3): Continue List of Sample Companies 
Company Name Sector Name 
Sector 
Number Listing Early Adopter 
CARPHONE WAREHOUSE PLC Telecommunication 9 FTSE 250 NO 
CENTRICA PLC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 NO 
COBHAM PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
COLT GROUP Telecommunication 9 FTSE 250 YES 
COMPASS GROUP PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 YES 
CRANSWICK PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 250 NO 
DAILY MAIL PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 YES 
DAIRY CREST Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 250 NO 
DEBENHAMS Consumer Services 2 FTSE 250 NO 
DIAGEO PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 NO 
ELECTROCOMPONENTS PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
EURASIAN NATURAL 
RESOURCES  Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
EUROMONEY INSITITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 NO 
EXPERIAN PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
G4S Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
GEM DIAMONDS Basic Material 1 FTSE 250 NO 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE Health Care 5 FTSE 100 NO 
HAYS PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
HOMESERVE PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 YES 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 NO 
INTERNATIONAL POWER PLC Utilities 10 FTSE 100 NO 
INTERTEK GROUP PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
INVENSYS PLC Technology 8 FTSE 100 NO 
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Appendix (3): Continue List of Sample Companies 
Company Name Sector Name 
Sector 
Number Listing Early Adopter 
JOHNSON MATTHEY Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
KAZAKHMYS PLC Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
KINGFISHER PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
LONMIN PLC Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
MARKS AND SPENCER PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
MELROSE PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
MILLENNIUM AND COPTHORNE Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 NO 
MONDI PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
MORGAN CRUCIBLE Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
MOTHERCARE PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 250 NO 
NATIONAL GRID PLC Utilities 10 FTSE 100 NO 
NEXT PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 YES 
PEARSON PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 YES 
PETROFAC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 NO 
PUNCH TAVERNS PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 NO 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
RECKITT BENCKISER Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 YES 
REED ELSEVIER Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
REXAM PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
RIGHTMOVE Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 NO 
RIO TINTO Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
ROLLS ROYCE Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 YES 
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Appendix (3): Continue List of Sample Companies 
Company Name Sector Name 
Sector 
Number Listing Early Adopter 
SABMILLER PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
SAGE GROUP PLC Technology 8 FTSE 100 NO 
SAINSBURYS PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
SALAMANDER PLC Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 250 NO 
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN 
ENERGY PLC Utilities 10 FTSE 100 NO 
SERCO GROUP PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 NO 
SEVERN TRENT PLC Utilities 10 FTSE 100 NO 
SMITH & NEPHEW Health Care 5 FTSE 100 NO 
SMITH GROUP PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 YES 
SPORT DIRECT Consumer Services 3 FTSE 250 NO 
SYNERGY HEALTHCARE Health Care 5 FTSE 100 NO 
TRAVIS PERKINS Industrial 6 FTSE 250 NO 
TESCO PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
THOMAS COOK PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
TULLOW OIL Oil & Gas 7 FTSE 100 NO 
UNILEVER PLC Consumer Goods 2 FTSE 100 NO 
UNITED UTILITIES Utilities 10 FTSE 100 NO 
VEDANTA RESOURCES PLC Basic Material 1 FTSE 100 NO 
VODAFONE GROUP PLC Telecommunication 9 FTSE 100 YES 
WHITEBREAD Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
WOLSELEY PLC Industrial 6 FTSE 100 YES 
WPP PLC Consumer Services 3 FTSE 100 NO 
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Appendix (4.1): Impact of Segment Variables on Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy (Time-Fixed 
Effect) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 0.248 0.182 1.360 0.175 -0.110 0.606 
ERN 1.198 0.246 4.870 0.000 0.715 1.682 
ERN*STAND -0.372 0.097 -3.830 0.000 -0.562 -0.181 
ERN*QGEO -0.176 0.039 -4.490 0.000 -0.253 -0.099 
ERN*MASEG -0.614 0.107 -5.740 0.000 -0.824 -0.403 
ERN*MAMRG -0.052 0.023 -2.250 0.025 -0.097 -0.006 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.085 0.128 -0.670 0.506 -0.338 0.167 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.292 0.089 -3.280 0.001 -0.467 -0.117 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.067 0.021 3.290 0.001 0.027 0.108 
ERN*NER -0.106 0.038 -2.790 0.006 -0.181 -0.031 
ERN*AG -0.469 0.187 -2.500 0.013 -0.837 -0.100 
ERN*EP -26.055 3.939 -6.610 0.000 -33.804 -18.305 
ERN*MV -8.30E-07 0.000 -0.510 0.613 0.000 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.440 0.100 4.400 0.000 0.244 0.637 
BM -0.169 0.219 -0.770 0.440 -0.600 0.261 
CG -0.203 0.210 -0.970 0.335 -0.616 0.210 
CS -0.207 0.199 -1.040 0.300 -0.599 0.185 
HC -0.196 0.253 -0.770 0.441 -0.694 0.303 
IND -0.205 0.194 -1.060 0.291 -0.587 0.177 
OG -0.223 0.221 -1.010 0.312 -0.657 0.211 
TECH 0.698 0.271 2.580 0.010 0.165 1.231 
TELEC -0.132 0.341 -0.390 0.699 -0.803 0.539 
       
R2 0.793           
Size 341           
Notes: This table reports time-fixed effect regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error, ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB 
and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated 
statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of 
non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings 
per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care 
Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the 
two-tailed test.     
249 
 
Appendix (4.2): Impact of Segment Variables on Analysts Forecast’ Accuracy Excluding 
Single GEO Segment Companies (Time-Fixed Effect) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value 
P-
value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 0.380 0.192 1.980 0.048 0.003 0.757 
ERN 1.969 0.324 6.080 0.000 1.332 2.607 
ERN*STAND -0.449 0.101 -4.470 0.000 -0.647 -0.251 
ERN*QGEO -0.394 0.060 -6.590 0.000 -0.512 -0.277 
ERN*MASEG -0.393 0.112 -3.490 0.001 -0.614 -0.172 
ERN*MAMRG -0.061 0.026 -2.370 0.018 -0.111 -0.010 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.256 0.140 -1.830 0.068 -0.531 0.019 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.283 0.092 -3.090 0.002 -0.463 -0.103 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.048 0.021 2.320 0.021 0.007 0.088 
ERN*NER -0.114 0.045 -2.510 0.013 -0.203 -0.024 
ERN*AG -0.622 0.243 -2.550 0.011 -1.100 -0.143 
ERN*EP -229.205 42.677 -5.370 0.000 -313.195 -145.216 
ERN*MV 2.01E-07 0.000 0.120 0.908 0.000 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.883 0.135 6.560 0.000 0.618 1.148 
BM -0.186 0.226 -0.820 0.411 -0.630 0.258 
CG -0.310 0.218 -1.420 0.156 -0.740 0.119 
CS -0.244 0.209 -1.170 0.244 -0.656 0.167 
HC -0.290 0.257 -1.130 0.259 -0.796 0.215 
IND -0.298 0.204 -1.460 0.144 -0.699 0.103 
OG -0.213 0.230 -0.930 0.355 -0.665 0.239 
TECH 0.580 0.273 2.120 0.035 0.042 1.118 
TELEC -0.283 0.341 -0.830 0.408 -0.955 0.389 
       
R2 0.807           
Size 319           
Notes: This table reports time-fixed effect regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error, ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB 
and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated 
statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of 
non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings 
per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care 
Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the 
two-tailed test.      
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Appendix (4.3): Impact of Segment Variables on Analysts Forecast’ Accuracy (Firm-Fixed 
Effect) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 0.075 0.050 1.500 0.135 -0.024 0.175 
ERN 1.108 0.301 3.690 0.000 0.516 1.700 
ERN*STAND -0.303 0.092 -3.270 0.001 -0.485 -0.121 
ERN*QGEO -0.209 0.049 -4.290 0.000 -0.305 -0.113 
ERN*MASEG -0.750 0.149 -5.050 0.000 -1.043 -0.458 
ERN*MAMRG -0.048 0.030 -1.580 0.115 -0.107 0.012 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.096 0.164 -0.580 0.559 -0.418 0.227 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.246 0.110 -2.240 0.026 -0.461 -0.030 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.093 0.029 3.240 0.001 0.036 0.150 
ERN*NER -0.109 0.048 -2.270 0.024 -0.204 -0.014 
ERN*AG -0.344 0.227 -1.520 0.130 -0.791 0.102 
ERN*EP -28.825 4.711 -6.120 0.000 -38.105 -19.545 
ERN*MV -2.40E-06 0.000 -1.050 0.296 0.000 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.510 0.115 4.450 0.000 0.284 0.736 
R2 0.775      
Size 341           
Notes: This table reports firm-fixed effect regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error, ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and 
GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement 
and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-
executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per 
share, The P-value is for the two-tailed test.     
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Appendix (4.4): Impact of Segment Variables on Analysts Forecast’ Accuracy No 
Single GEO Segments (Firm-Fixed Effect) 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
t-
value P-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 0.147 0.053 2.780 0.006 0.043 0.251 
ERN 2.140 0.419 5.100 0.000 1.313 2.966 
ERN*STAND -0.389 0.096 -4.070 0.000 -0.578 -0.201 
ERN*QGEO -0.468 0.081 -5.760 0.000 -0.628 -0.308 
ERN*MASEG -0.478 0.154 -3.100 0.002 -0.782 -0.174 
ERN*MAMRG -0.056 0.033 -1.700 0.090 -0.121 0.009 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.341 0.179 -1.910 0.058 -0.694 0.012 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.295 0.116 -2.540 0.012 -0.524 -0.066 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.065 0.029 2.210 0.028 0.007 0.122 
ERN*NER -0.109 0.059 -1.860 0.064 -0.224 0.006 
ERN*AG -0.566 0.288 -1.970 0.050 -1.133 0.000 
ERN*EP -237.762 50.914 -4.670 0.000 
-
338.094 -137.431 
ERN*MV -1.10E-06 0.000 -0.430 0.665 0.000 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.917 0.149 6.140 0.000 0.623 1.212 
R2 0.791      
Size 319           
Notes: This table reports firm-fixed effect regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error, ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and 
GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement 
and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-
executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per 
share, The P-value is for the two-tailed test.     
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Appendix (5.1): Tobit Regression- Impact of Segment Variables on Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 95% Confidence Interval 
Intercept 0.245 0.176 1.390 0.166 -0.102 0.591 
ERN 1.175 0.233 5.050 0.000 0.717 1.632 
ERN*STAND -0.361 0.079 -4.550 0.000 -0.517 -0.205 
ERN*QGEO -0.176 0.037 -4.730 0.000 -0.249 -0.102 
ERN*MASEG -0.612 0.103 -5.920 0.000 -0.815 -0.408 
ERN*MAMRG -0.050 0.022 -2.240 0.026 -0.093 -0.006 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.101 0.122 -0.830 0.409 -0.342 0.140 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.296 0.086 -3.440 0.001 -0.466 -0.127 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.068 0.020 3.410 0.001 0.029 0.107 
ERN*NER -0.101 0.036 -2.780 0.006 -0.173 -0.030 
ERN*AG -0.463 0.181 -2.560 0.011 -0.819 -0.108 
ERN*EP -26.432 3.808 -6.940 0.000 -33.924 -18.941 
ERN*MV -8.66E-07 0.000 -0.550 0.585 0.000 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.458 0.096 4.760 0.000 0.269 0.647 
BM -0.174 0.212 -0.820 0.413 -0.590 0.243 
CG -0.200 0.203 -0.980 0.326 -0.600 0.200 
CS -0.210 0.193 -1.090 0.278 -0.589 0.170 
HC -0.194 0.245 -0.790 0.430 -0.676 0.289 
IND -0.202 0.188 -1.070 0.284 -0.572 0.168 
OG -0.219 0.213 -1.020 0.307 -0.639 0.201 
TECH 0.701 0.262 2.670 0.008 0.185 1.217 
TELEC -0.136 0.330 -0.410 0.681 -0.784 0.513 
       
R2 0.433           
Size 341           
Notes: This table reports Tobit regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB and 
GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated statement 
and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of non-
executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings per 
share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care 
Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the 
two-tailed test. 
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Appendix (5.2): Tobit Regression- Impact of Segment Variables on Analysts’ Forecast 
Accuracy No Single GEO Segments 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 0.378 0.185 2.040 0.042 0.014 0.741 
ERN 1.906 0.310 6.160 0.000 1.297 2.516 
ERN*STAND -0.417 0.081 -5.140 0.000 -0.577 -0.257 
ERN*QGEO -0.387 0.057 -6.740 0.000 -0.500 -0.274 
ERN*MASEG -0.388 0.109 -3.580 0.000 -0.602 -0.174 
ERN*MAMRG -0.059 0.025 -2.410 0.017 -0.107 -0.011 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.275 0.133 -2.070 0.039 -0.536 -0.014 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.292 0.088 -3.310 0.001 -0.466 -0.119 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.047 0.020 2.390 0.017 0.008 0.086 
ERN*NER -0.105 0.043 -2.430 0.016 -0.191 -0.020 
ERN*AG -0.616 0.234 -2.630 0.009 -1.077 -0.156 
ERN*EP -230.832 40.778 -5.660 0.000 -311.080 -150.584 
ERN*MV 2.06E-07 0.000 0.120 0.902 0.000 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.901 0.129 7.010 0.000 0.648 1.155 
BM -0.196 0.218 -0.900 0.369 -0.624 0.232 
CG -0.307 0.211 -1.460 0.146 -0.721 0.108 
CS -0.247 0.202 -1.220 0.223 -0.644 0.151 
HC -0.291 0.248 -1.170 0.242 -0.779 0.197 
IND -0.297 0.196 -1.510 0.132 -0.683 0.090 
OG -0.208 0.222 -0.940 0.349 -0.645 0.228 
TECH 0.582 0.264 2.200 0.028 0.062 1.101 
TELEC -0.286 0.329 -0.870 0.387 -0.934 0.362 
       
R2 0.452           
Size 319           
Notes: This table reports Tobit regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error (FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB 
and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated 
statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of 
non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings 
per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care 
Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the 
two-tailed test.      
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Appendix (6.1): Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Segment Variables on 
Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 
Intercept 0.105 0.025 4.205 0.000 
ERN 0.252 0.076 3.131 0.001 
ERN*STAND -0.067 0.026 -2.578 0.010 
ERN*QGEO -0.043 0.012 -3.567 0.000 
ERN*MASEG -0.132 0.034 -3.914 0.000 
ERN*MAMRG -0.011 0.007 -1.516 0.130 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.190 0.040 -0.482 0.630 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.054 0.028 -1.906 0.058 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.022 0.006 3.423 0.001 
ERN*NER -0.029 0.012 -2.458 0.014 
ERN*AG -0.093 0.059 -1.583 0.114 
ERN*EP -7.650 1.242 -6.157 0.000 
ERN*MV -1.827E-06 0.000 -3.533 0.000 
ERN*NEG 0.150 0.031 4.777 0.000 
BM -0.020 0.045 -0.450 0.653 
CG -0.023 0.041 -0.549 0.583 
CS 0.016 0.036 0.444 0.658 
HC -0.032 0.060 -0.530 0.597 
OG 0.017 0.046 0.364 0.716 
TECH 0.254 0.068 3.720 0.000 
TELECOM 0.103 0.095 1.089 0.277 
UT 0.090 0.061 1.463 0.145 
     
R2 0.659       
Size 341       
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error ln(1+FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined as 
LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin from 
consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both LOB 
and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with consolidated 
statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, NER is the ratio of 
non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG is decline in earnings 
per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services sector, HC is Health Care 
Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities sector. The P-value is for the 
two-tailed test.      
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Appendix (6.2): Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Segment Variables on 
Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy No Single GEO Segments 
  Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 
Intercept 0.123 0.026 4.835 0.000 
ERN 0.273 0.103 2.658 0.008 
ERN*STAND -0.083 0.027 -3.078 0.002 
ERN*QGEO -0.066 0.019 -3.461 0.001 
ERN*MASEG -0.077 0.036 -2.140 0.033 
ERN*MAMRG -0.013 0.008 -1.649 0.100 
ERN*BOTHPROF -0.038 0.044 -0.855 0.393 
ERN*PROFMTCH -0.072 0.029 -2.443 0.015 
ERN*TOTBORD 0.017 0.007 2.554 0.011 
ERN*NER -0.016 0.014 -1.080 0.281 
ERN*AG -0.128 0.078 -1.651 0.100 
ERN*EP -68.799 13.537 -5.083 0.000 
ERN*MV -1.140E-6 0.000 -2.065 0.040 
ERN*NEG 0.281 0.043 6.585 0.000 
BM -0.012 0.046 -0.271 0.787 
CG -0.029 0.042 -0.688 0.492 
CS 0.024 0.037 0.652 0.515 
HC -0.042 0.060 -0.705 0.482 
OG 0.049 0.048 1.014 0.311 
TECH 0.243 0.067 3.608 0.000 
TELECOM 0.048 0.095 0.507 0.612 
UT 0.088 0.065 1.355 0.176 
     
R2 0.653       
Size 319       
Notes: This table reports OLS regression. The dependent variable is Analysts’ Forecast Error ln(1+FE), ERN is earnings 
variability measured as ABS((Et-Et-1)/Et), STAND is a dummy with a value of 1 for IFRS 8 and 0 for IAS 14R, QGEO is a 
measures the fineness of geographical segment, MASEG is a dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments are defined 
as LOB, and a value of 0 if main segments are defined as GEO, MAMRG measures deviation of segment profit margin 
from consolidated profit margin, BOTHPROF is a dummy which has a value of 1 if profit definition is reported for both 
LOB and GEO segments, PROFMTCH is dummy which has a value of 1 if main segments profit reconcile with 
consolidated statement and 0 other wise, MV is firm size measure as market capitalization, TOTBORD is board size, 
NER is the ratio of non-executive directors, EPt-1 is last period earnings to price ratio, AG is Total Assets Growth, NEG 
is decline in earnings per share, BM is Basic Material sector, CG is Consumer Goods sector, CS is Consumer Services 
sector, HC is Health Care Sector, TECH is Technology sector, TELEC is Telecommunication sector, and UT is Utilities 
sector. The P-value is for the two-tailed test.      
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